

CHRISTIAN ETHICS



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CHRISTIAN ETHICS

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PREFACE

The first edition of my *Christliche Ethik in kurzer Skizzierung* appeared in 1914, the second in 1922. The purpose of both editions was solely to serve as a basis for my lectures in Wartburg Seminary. They were not intended for a wider circle of readers. In order to facilitate the use of the book by students having little or no command of the German language, an English translation was prepared in recent years by Pastors E. Karsten and K. Weltner and used in the classroom in mimeographed form.

Repeatedly and with increasing insistence the wish was expressed that in somewhat expanded form my *Ethics* might appear in print and thus be made available to the general public. Only the lack of time prevented me from complying with this request before this. Finally, however, Professor Buehring, who had been using the book in connection with his courses in Christian Ethics for years, and I agreed to do the work of preparing an English edition conjointly. He himself assumed the task of furnishing the manuscript for the section on Social Ethics, which in the German book had been treated rather sketchily. He also prepared the English translation of my part of the

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work after it had been revised and expanded by me. Thus I bear the responsibility for pp. 1-255 and 397-413 of this book, while Professor Buehring is responsible for pp. 256-396. He also compiled the index, while I furnished the detailed bibliography.

In the section prepared by me everything that has been taken over from the German edition has been carefully re-examined and in several instances the subject matter was more fully developed. The most important additions of this kind will be found in the introductory chapters. Here especially the presentation and critical examination of other moral philosophies, which have engaged the attention of scholars and writers during the last hundred and fifty years and in one way or another still engage their attention today, should be pointed out. The reader will notice that in this section also the more important ethical views and theories that have been presented in our own country in recent years and that are still being widely discussed today have been considered, briefly though it had to be on account of the limitations of space. Our future pastors must know the views and forces that influence our American life today, and they must be able to judge them intelligently. This feature of the present volume also distinguishes this presentation of Christian Ethics from nearly everything else that has been offered by Lutheran authors in the English language in our country to date. With the exception of several valuable publications by Dr. John A. W. Haas of Allentown,

Pa., this ethical antithesis of modern philosophy has either been ignored by them entirely or touched upon only incidentally.

In the presentation of Individual Ethics I have aimed to elaborate the Scripture basis in every chapter as clearly as possible, for this is equally as important in ethics as in dogmatics. Only the Scripture can give the correct answer to the question concerning the beginning made in creation, concerning the nature of sin and its consequences, concerning the restoration of spiritual life and its preservation and development. If this method of treatment at the same time has the effect of stimulating the reader's conscience and actually edifying his spiritual life, without lapsing into sermonizing, I should not consider that a defect of this book. Those who are familiar with the literature on the subject will discover both a considerable dependence on the work of others and yet an attitude of independence toward it.

Social Ethics enjoys a wide popularity today, and the readers will be grateful to Professor Buehring for his rather detailed presentation. Even so, it would be manifestly impossible to discuss every possible topic of Social Ethics within the compass of one volume. For any points that may have been touched upon only in passing or perhaps have been omitted entirely for lack of space, the reader is directed to the detailed bibliography, where ample literature is listed for further study.

The bibliography was prepared by me with special care. Its comprehensiveness is likewise a feature not found in any other similar work. My purpose was not merely to list a limited number of references but to stimulate a desire for further study and to pave the way for it. How many a paper read on the floor of a ministerial conference or a church convention, how many an essay published in our church periodicals, would be materially improved in content and thoroughness if the author had known and used the literature pertaining to the subject. The reader will find that in this bibliography the German writers are represented in much greater number than the English. The reason for that is by no means merely the fact that after all I am more familiar with the German literature on the subject. In many cases the German literature, insofar as it is of importance to the student of Lutheran ethics, is far more rich and comprehensive than the English. Besides, every Lutheran theologian in America ought to have a reading knowledge of German.

The final issue is not in the sphere of doctrine but of life, though, to be sure, genuine Christian life may be expected only where sound Biblical doctrine is in control. If this book will contribute something toward a continued re-examination of our ethical principles in the light of Holy Scripture and if it will prove in some measure at least a stimulus to a genuinely ethical life, it will achieve its purpose.

M. REU.

Dubuque, Iowa,

Summer vacation, 1935.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

NAME AND DEFINITION OF ETHICS

Ethics in its most general sense is the science of the moral. There are three names in common use to designate this science, Ethics, Morals, and in German the occasional *Sittenlehre*. Ethics is derived from the Greek verb ἔθω, I am accustomed, and the noun ἔθος, custom, *SITTE* habit, usage, either of a people (Acts 6:14; Luke 1:9) or of an individual (Luke 22:39); but more exactly from the Ionic form of the word, ἥθος. ἥθος was used by Homer to designate the accustomed place where one could usually be found, then in the sense of habit, custom. Plato gave it a new content: disposition, character; and in the same sense Aristotle spoke of ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἠθική as the science of character-building. While thus the meaning of the word approached consistently nearer to our present usage, yet we must not overlook the fact that both Plato and Aristotle used it in a purely formal, morally neutral sense, not necessarily involving a good disposition, a good character.

Morals is derived from the Latin *mos*, will, personal will, custom, order, authority to be respected (cf. *mores et institutiones majorum*), more particularly from the adjective *moralis*, which was first formed by Cicero. He coined the word as a translation of the Greek ἠθικός in Aristotle's ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἠθική, so that according to him Ethics and Morals are identical terms, and the latter as well as the former is an ethically neutral concept.

The German word *Sittenlehre* (*Sitte* from the Old High-German *situ*, habit of life, common usage) etymologically denotes the science of the customs, modes of activity, or settled habits developed in individuals, clans or tribes. Not until the eighteenth century did the concept come to denote the inward disposition, and then it was not the noun *Sitte* that came to be used in this sense but the adjective *sittlich* derived from it. *Sittlich* was used to translate ἠθικός and *moralis* in the sense of Aristotle and Cicero, but with this difference that it gradually lost its neutral meaning and came to be used to denote a *good* disposition, *good* habits. In order to make a distinction from the more superficial and neutral *Sittenlehre* (science of customs), the new word *Sittlichkeitslehre* (science of morals) was coined.

Thus we see that originally none of these concepts fully covers that which we today understand by the science under discussion. Only the more recent *Sittlichkeitslehre* adequately expresses it. Of the two English words, Ethics and Morals, the word Morals has

for us a somewhat disagreeable flavor, since Rationalism with its emphasis on "right living" rather than faith is fond of using it in antithesis to Faith, and since Rome in its use of the term thinks more of the external conduct than of the inward disposition underlying it. We therefore adopt the term Ethics as the sole remaining choice, though we must emphasize at once that we do not take it like the ancients in a neutral sense. Ethics to us denotes the doctrine of the moral in the sense of the morally good. Keeping this in mind, we may say, Ethics is the science of the moral as it is to be realized first of all in the life of the individual and then also within the community of other personal beings.

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CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF THE ETHICAL AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL OR CHRISTIAN ETHICS

What is ethical? When can an act be said to be moral? The ethical exists only in the realm of freedom, hence only in the realm of personality. Of all creatures in this world man alone was created as a free being. All others are subject to the law of necessity. Their life, growth and activities are directed by the law of their nature; they are not free to will. But man was created by God as a personal being, that is, a being endowed with the faculties of knowing and willing, hence free. And because he is free he is also accountable for his actions. There is even in his case, of course, a certain inescapable law of necessity, both in the functioning of his reason and of his physical nature. But aside from this there has been given him a broad realm of freedom, in which his personality may assert itself. Here he can say, I will, and, I will not. Here there is no compulsion; but there is an obligation that appeals to the will of man and is realized through the action of that will. When man in the exercise of his freedom accepts this obligation and wills what he ought, so that the given obligation is realized in his thought and action, he acts in a moral or ethical capacity, provided

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that the purpose is to attain the goal of life that is set before him. For moral action is always purposeful action. While man cannot evade the law of nature that puts him under compulsion, he can evade the moral law that places him under obligation. He may accept that obligation or reject it, and herein lies the distinction between the morally good and the morally evil.

To us it is entirely self-evident to make this distinction between nature and freedom, between natural law and moral law, and to speak of morality only in the realm of freedom and personality. Yet there are many who refuse to make this distinction. Naturalism knows only of one realm, the realm of nature, where all things are fixed once and for all, where there is no freedom, no change. We shall discuss three representatives of this naturalistic school of thought, Rousseau (†1778), Feuerbach (†1872), and Haeckel (†1919). NAT

In order to understand the naturalism of Rousseau we must bear in mind that he was reared in that historic center of culture, Geneva, and that he received his higher education in supercultural Paris. He was repelled by this highly saturated and often unnatural culture and began to long for the freedom of nature where he could live and move unhampered as he pleased. On one of his rambles he accidentally learned that the Academy of Dijon was offering a prize for the best treatise on the question, "Has the Revival of the Sciences and Arts Contributed to a Purification of

Morals?" At once he wrote down his thoughts on this question, maintaining that the sciences and arts were a moral misfortune. The happiest man, he said, is he who lives far removed from them in a strictly natural environment, who does not obey man-made laws but simply follows the impulses of his nature. That by this theory he did not intend to support a consistent naturalism is evident from the fact that he did not go to the limit of denying the existence of God and that he still regarded the conscience as a part of man's nature. Rousseau's naturalism was chiefly a protest against the overemphasis on culture in every form and a strong appeal for an unhampered development of man according to his natural impulses.

Genuine consistent naturalism, however, was represented by Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach was originally a pupil of Hegel. Hegel held that there is but one realm of real life, the realm of freedom. Nature in itself has no actual reality; it is only a transitional stage on the way to reality, that is, to the freedom of spirit. Feuerbach recognized the fallacy of this doctrine. But he went to the opposite extreme of asserting that spirit and freedom have no real existence at all, that the only reality is nature. But if nature alone is real, then the ethical cannot be considered as an independent field of activity but is merely the demand of the natural impulse. Men may speak of the freedom of self-determination, but that is all imaginary. Every impulse of man aims for happiness and self-satisfac-

tion, no matter where it is to be found. It is wrong therefore to condemn egoism. To speak of the "ethical" is to use a misnomer; we should say "natural" or "according to one's impulses."

But if everything thus falls under the category of nature, then there can be no distinction between good and evil, for then we could defend even our most evil deeds by saying that the satisfaction of our impulses demanded them. But if that distinction is nevertheless to be maintained, we shall have to distinguish between two kinds of egoism. Feuerbach did that. He differentiated between a simple and an expanded egoism, the latter being one which, without ceasing to be egoism, also includes others in the circle of interests. The impulse that leads men to marry and establish a family life shows, according to Feuerbach, the necessity of making this distinction, for here the well-being of another person becomes a matter of interest to the egoistic individual. The concept "good," then, is not identical with simple, but with expanded egoism. Here it is, too, that "duty" plays its part. Once a community life is established, the will of the one becomes an obligation to the other.

This view of Feuerbach is untenable for two reasons. In the first place, it denies the noblest trait in man, his love for others, and identifies it with its opposite, selfishness; in the second place, he forgets to tell us what would happen if in such an egoistic fellowship as he describes each of the two parties should try

to impose his will upon the other. As soon as their selfish interests clash, their fellowship is threatened or entirely dissolved. Such a naturalism must inevitably lead either to the complete isolation of all individuals or to war, in the last analysis to a war of all against all.

This was the very thing that Ernst Haeckel wanted to avoid. Haeckel developed his views on morals chiefly in the latter part of his book, *Die Weltraetsel*. In the earlier chapters of this book he had scientifically discussed the problems of the world, especially its origin, and, as he thought, had solved them by the application of the theory of evolution. Now, the superficial reader might draw the conclusion that his ethical principles too were a necessary consequence of physical science. In fact many were deceived by him in drawing this conclusion. Haeckel makes the fundamental error of proceeding from the premise that spirit does not exist as a separate entity, that what is called spirit is in reality only a modification of matter. His ethics therefore is materialistic and naturalistic and, like Feuerbach's philosophy, recognizes only the natural impulses as motives for human action.

He goes beyond Feuerbach, however, in that he denies egoism as the exclusive dominating motive. He recognizes two lines of obligations: obligations to oneself, and obligations to society. Accordingly he adds to egoism the principle of altruism. But everything will depend now upon the relation of the latter to the

former. Haeckel does not co-ordinate them but subordinates altruism to egoism. Like Feuerbach he holds that there can be no lasting regard for another unless one's own interests also receive their just due. History also shows that except where truly religious or moral principles were operative altruism has always been repressed by egoism. Since this is the case, this form of naturalism likewise makes any enduring community life impossible.

We must also class as naturalistic morality, though there is a variation in certain details, the view of those who endeavor to show by means of social statistics that supposedly free acts, such as marriages, crimes, etc., since they occur with surprising regularity, are really due to a natural law and not to free choice. This proof fails to convince for the following reasons: first, this regularity is only a relative one; secondly, the method of computation is wrong because it covers too much ground; in the third place, it is impossible to gather statistics on that which should receive first consideration in the field of morality, viz., the thoughts and motives that for some reason or other fail to materialize in words or deeds; and finally, experience shows that man has never yet succeeded in ridding himself of a sense of responsibility for such actions.

The answer given by naturalism to the question, What is moral? then is, Whatever is natural or according to nature; and the term *natural* is taken to indicate either opposition to culture and artificial refinement or

the unrestrained pursuit of natural impulses. That moral training is virtually out of the question in such a system is obvious, for nature is here simply given free rein to do as it pleases. Only a system of ethics that recognizes a law above the impulses can lead man forward and upward. But the study of naturalism does give us one positive result: Man has a natural side and this must receive due consideration if he is to lead a truly moral life.

A more satisfactory answer to the question, What is moral? is given by utilitarianism. Utilitarianism also is essentially egoistic, but it essays to follow not blind impulses but those impulses that are directed by the far-seeing eye of reason. Man's reason leads him to look into the past and the future and to ask, What course of action, in the light of past experience, will give me the greatest and most enduring benefit in the future? Having determined the answer he acts accordingly, for whatever is useful is also good. Utilitarianism was first advocated scientifically by Thomas Hobbes (†1679), later especially by Bentham (†1832). In America it was revived by the Ethical Societies. Practically, utilitarianism is as old as egoism, as old as sin.

Jeremy Bentham was not originally concerned with the question, What is moral? and still less with the question, What is moral for the individual? He was seeking a social theory in which the rights and duties of each individual could be determined exactly and in a way that would make for the greatest pos-

sible good for the community. To him human society was like a complicated machine, and he believed that it must be possible to compute in the minutest detail the function of every individual wheel in that machine in order to make the whole organism work harmoniously. Or, to use his own illustration: If an engineer is able by the application of certain fixed laws and the use of mathematical formulas to determine the loading strength of a bridge, the same should also be possible of society. All that is necessary is to find the ultimate unit from which all computations can be made. The engineer or architect knows such a unit from the science of physics with its doctrine of atoms; let the builder of human society also discover his ultimate unit, and he will be able to determine the laws governing the individuals of that society with mathematical certainty. Bentham found this unit in the sense of pleasure or displeasure. To increase pleasure, to decrease displeasure, that is the sole purpose of legislation and morals. Whatever tends to happiness, whatever is most effective in producing pleasure and preventing displeasure, that must be law, that is ethical. And he is not thinking merely of sensual but of intellectual pleasure, though in the further discussion of this theory he loses sight of this distinction. Again and again he reaches the conclusion: Virtues are traits that produce pleasure; vices are traits that produce displeasure, and in doing so he is thinking primarily of sensuous pleasure and displeasure. Duty to him is that which, ac-

according to the reasoning of thoughtful men, proves to be of greatest benefit. Hence his most general principle may be stated thus: Weigh the good and the bad results of any course of action and decide for that course which promises the greatest amount of happiness or benefit.

In particular, he lists four motives for correct conduct. He terms them the fourfold sanction of law. The first is the natural sanction and reads, *Do that which will give you the greatest pleasure.* The second is the moral, or, as he prefers to call it, the social sanction, *Do that which will earn you the greatest respect and friendship and the least contempt and hatred of your fellowmen.* The third is the political sanction, *Act in such a way that your conduct will not conflict with the laws of the land.* The fourth is the religious sanction and reads, *In all your actions let the divine warnings and the divine promises concerning the future be your guide.* But he sums it all up in one sentence: *Strive for the maximum of pleasure!* And since Bentham unlike the naturalists did not begin with the individual but with society, his maxim was expressed in the words: *Seek the greatest possible good for the greatest possible number!*

A beautiful theory — but its practical application is impossible. Intensiveness (greatest possible good) and extensiveness (greatest possible number) too often conflict with each other, with the resulting inevitable choice between a reduction of the individual portions

and the number of participants. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand why a consistent egoist should be interested in seeing the greatest possible number of others just as happy as himself; and still less can one see how an enlightened egoist can be brought to sacrifice something himself rather than to let others suffer want. The latter is possible only where man is not governed by egoism exclusively but also has a certain feeling of sympathy for others and a social disposition. Sympathy makes such a sacrifice conceivable, cold reason never. Utilitarianism deals with postulates that are completely and entirely foreign to the natural man.

Even aside from this, utilitarianism must be rejected on at least four counts. 1. It results at best in a comfortable life but never in one that is truly noble and useful. 2. It must never be confronted with difficult tasks or it is doomed to failure: it is incapable of moral heroism or strict self-discipline. 3. It may teach man to reach out but never to strive upward: the concepts of righteousness and love, without which no society can endure for any length of time are unknown to the utilitarian, for his egoism makes it impossible for him to rise above the "I" and the "You" and to decide impartially what each is to receive, and true love is destroyed in its very essence when it is made dependent on the idea of usefulness. 4. Utilitarianism will not even suffice for the common, everyday life, for it is impossible always to know in advance the results of our action. History has not taught us in vain that

there are such things as conscience and duty, duty in the noblest sense of the term, of which utilitarianism has never even dreamed.

Very closely related to utilitarianism, though not quite identical with it, is the view held by the Ethical Societies. The first of these societies was founded by Felix Adler in New York in 1875. They quickly multiplied both in America and Europe. Their principle is that the so-called moral law is nothing but the sum total of men's outward experiences. Whatever conclusions we arrive at when considering men's actions and their resultant effects (good or evil fortune, benefit or injury, pleasure or displeasure), that is what ethics demands. But this is a preposterous theory, for in this case pleasure and usefulness are the only motives and ends of our actions, and virtue, instead of having any intrinsic value, sinks to the level of a means to the end of self-gratification. All universally valid norms of moral conduct disappear, for obviously that which is useful or pleasurable to one is by no means so to another. And finally, history shows that the greatest achievements in the field of ethics have been made by those who have considered least the pleasure or benefit that might result from their actions.

Among the scientists utilitarianism lost its influence and significance chiefly through the rise of evolutionism. Utilitarianism bases its conclusions on definite suppositions. It presupposes a certain number of unchangeable characteristics in human nature. To

know one person means to know all; and whatever influences man in one generation will exert the same influence in any other. According to evolutionism man is not such an unchangeable entity. He occupies a place in the chain of generations between a past that influences him and a future that he in turn is to influence. And just as the moral obligations of the individual change with the different periods of his life, so the obligations of society, of nations, classes, generations, also change according to political, social, and cultural conditions. The concept "man" is but a timeless abstraction. If all this is the case, then of course the answer to the question, What is moral? must be a radically different one from the answer given by the utilitarians.

It was chiefly Herbert Spencer who drew the logical conclusions of evolutionism in the field of ethics and during the long years of his life (1820-1903) elaborated them in all directions. His evolutionistic ethics is in some respects related to utilitarianism but also goes far beyond it.

Spencer started his line of reasoning with the fact that without a doubt there is a moral conduct that is directly useful neither for the immediate present nor for the future. How is this possible? The answer, he says, is given by the theory of evolution. It teaches us to find in those decisions and actions which the utilitarian cannot explain, the effects of the intellectual and emotional experiences of past generations. An act of

this kind may not be conducive to pleasure or profit today, but it did have such a result in the experience of men in some previous stage of evolution. These experiences of past generations have left their imprint upon man organically and are thus stored up in his nature and transmitted through succeeding generations where they make their influence felt. What is generally called conscience is therefore nothing but the natural inheritance of wisdom come down to us by birth from former generations. Accordingly, if we today have a feeling of aversion to a certain course of action, it is not because *we* have found it to result in displeasure or injury but because others before us have made that experience and that experience has left a permanent impression on our nature. Since Spencer regards this inherited moral wisdom as being impressed upon our physical nature and does not consider it as a distinct entity or quality of the soul-life of man, we also see here the very close connection between his evolutionism and his materialistic and monistic beliefs.

Now each generation, according to Spencer, is not only dependent upon past experiences but is itself continually making new experiences. Thus the sum total of human experience is constantly increasing, and the new experiences react upon and modify the old. If this is so, then that which was ethical in the past is not necessarily so today; on the contrary, the concept of the ethical is in a state of constant change and flux. It was particularly Spencer who in this connection

claimed that there would be an ethical evolution *ad infinitum*. He visualized mankind rising higher and higher, crime and violence gradually disappearing, justice and peace becoming more and more universal, until finally that blessed day would break when peace would cover the earth like a river and without transition through a final judgment the time of perfection would be at hand, which would itself not yet mark the consummation but only the beginning of a new and still higher evolution.

In this system, then, the ethical is that which at any given time is known through the accumulating inherited wisdom of one's ancestors and through one's own reasoning to be useful and suitable. Here also, similarly as in utilitarianism, the useful and the ethical are identified. Accordingly, everything argued above against utilitarianism can also be applied against ethical evolutionism. And we must add that since it is the idea of evolution, of development from a lower stage of morality to successively ever higher stages that is stressed here, ethics loses its distinction of being absolute and universal and resolves itself in a conglomeration of changing relativities. What is morally right today is not necessarily so in the future, and the moral standards of one nation may be utterly rejected by another. And as regards Spencer's belief in a continuous ethical advance of mankind, it requires an unlimited optimism and a complete misconception of human nature and of the awful power of evil to take this claim seriously.

That Spencer's conception of conscience in particular is untenable is proved by the fact that the conscience sometimes objects to a course of action which promises pleasure and profit not only for the present but also far into the future for many generations, and which should therefore be adopted as approved by the experience of the past as well as by one's own reason. Conscience must therefore be an entity separate and distinct from our inherited nature.

Elements of naturalism, utilitarianism and evolutionism may be found in various combinations in empiricism, which at the present time largely controls philosophical thought in our country. It appears either in the stark naturalism and mechanism of George Santayana, or in the realism of Ralph Barton Perry, or in the pragmatism of William James and the instrumentalism of John Dewey, or in the behaviorism of John G. Watson.

Santayana (born 1863 in Spain, educated in America, professor at Harvard 1907-1921) is an exponent of extreme naturalism and mechanism. He wants us to take this world of experiences as it is. And this world is to him a wonderful, complicated mechanism or organism, all parts of which are correlated to each other. Of God, of absolute norms, categorical imperatives and of immortality he does not find so much as a trace in this world. Instead of brooding over such fantastic problems, one should rather investigate the laws of the evolution of individuals and society in their various life and cultural relationships, in order thus to discover the necessary norms for practical action.

Similarly, according to R. B. Perry every form of idealism is but an *ignis fatuus*; what we need are the sober and hard facts of mathematics and the natural sciences; only those studies are of any value in which by experimentation we can observe the conduct and behavior of nature, including man. Thus we obtain the proper directives for our life.

William James (professor at Harvard 1872-1907) himself designated his philosophy as "pragmatism," because proceeding from the realities of life it examines their influence upon human action. The extent of this influence determines their value. "Whatever

works is good." The resultant principles, then, are the norms for our conduct.

A most far-reaching influence has been exerted down to the present time by the instrumentalism of John Dewey (since 1904 professor at Columbia University, New York). Dewey rejects the literary aesthetic culture based upon the classics and would educate the coming generation to active participation in concrete life situations. According to him, our mind is the instrument by which we comprehend our place and our task in life. All concepts that lie beyond this sphere of human experience, especially all ideas of God, immortality and the soul, are worthless, "pious finalities that do not exist." With this naturalism as a basis there is combined a strongly ethical utilitarian evolutionism, which recognizes certain relative but no absolute norms of human practice. "A moral law, like a law in physics, is not something to swear by and stick to at all hazards; it is a formula of the way to respond when specific conditions present themselves. Its soundness and pertinence are tested by what happens when it is acted upon. Its claim on authority rests finally upon the imperativeness of the situation that has to be dealt with, not upon its own intrinsic nature — as any tool achieves dignity in the measure of needs served by it. The test of consequences is more exacting than that afforded by fixed general rules. In addition, it secures constant development, for when new acts are tried, new results are experienced, while the lauded immutability of eternal ideals and norms is in itself a denial of the possibility of development and improvement" (*The Quest for Certainty*, 1928, p. 278).

The philosophy of behaviorism, which in its roots goes back to the Russian psychologists Pavlov and Becterev, has been represented with increasing popularity by John B. Watson, who from 1908 to 1920 taught experimental and comparative psychology at Johns Hopkins and since 1921 has joined the staff of the New School for Social Research in New York. Behaviorism explains conduct not as a product of conscious mental activity but in a quasi-mechanical manner as the play of instincts, reflexes, and habits. It observes the behavior of living organisms, human and animal, and determines the norms unconsciously operating in them.

Much as these views and systems differ among themselves, they all have in common a naturalistic basis, the denial of any obligation whatever toward a superhuman being, the rejection of unchangeable ethical principles, a strongly utilitarian tendency, a faith in unlimited evolutionary possibilities leading man upward step by step to ever greater heights. This empirical character of modern

ethics, in turn, has caused the placing of much greater emphasis recently upon the study of sociology, inasmuch as by the study of the actual behavior of individual smaller and larger social groups the general laws and causes of social evolution are determined and in this way ethical norms are found. Modern sociology as an independent science goes back to the Frenchman Auguste Comte, that "*Foundateur de la religion de l'humanité*," who in his *Course de Philosophie*, 1830-1842, devoted volumes 4 to 6 to sociology. Comte's "positivism" and American empiricism have an inner relationship. Positivism affirmed the futility of both theological and metaphysical inquiries, abandoned all vain search after the causes and essences of things and restricted itself to the observation and classification of phenomena and to the discovery of the invariable relations of succession and similitude which things bear to each other — in a word, to the discovery of the laws of phenomena. Similarly, American sociology confines itself largely to an investigation of the behavior of individual social groups and from such study derives its ethical directions. Thus, without necessarily being so, it is frequently materialistic in principle.

Thus far in our discussion all answers to the question, What is moral? have come from those who take into consideration the natural or physical side of man only. None has gone beyond this. For that reason these answers have not been satisfactory. Others, realizing this fallacy, have assumed the independent existence and functioning of the human mind and have sought in that way to find the true answer to the question. This leads us to a consideration of aestheticism and idealism.

Aestheticism (from αἰσθησις, αἰσθάνομαι) gives the answer: "Everything that is beautiful is ethical." Here the field of the natural has by no means been given up entirely, for every expression of human thought in forms of beauty in one way or another is connected with

nature. But there is nevertheless a definite transition to the realm of the intellectual and spiritual, for the values, thoughts and ideas that seek expression in material forms are certainly intellectual and spiritual. This becomes evident particularly when we consider what is truly beautiful. The truly beautiful is that which is harmonious, that in which a multiplicity through the powers of the mind has been formed into a unity. Moreover, true beauty may be found only where eternal values, thoughts and ideas give form to material substance and illumine it. The form, or call it nature, thus becomes the transparency of the spirit.

This position is without question much loftier than any discussed heretofore. The beautiful exerts most beneficent effects: it ennobles, it mellows harshness, purifies our grief, dignifies our festivities, it weaves about our entire life a charming wreath of ivy. It does more: in the form of art it lifts the individual above the narrow circle of his life, gives him a glimpse of the hopes and aspirations, the fears and joys of others and thus influences even his will. Art also has a liberating effect. A poem, a musical composition, or a work of plastic or graphic art lifts us out of the narrowness, the misery of our existence and carries our imagination, though but for a moment, into an altogether different world where griefs and sorrows are left far behind and forgotten. Art, finally, also educates and cultivates the mind, not only by teaching us to feel the sufferings and passions of others and thus

broadening our sympathies, but also by holding certain ideals before us and spurring us on to follow them. The Greeks well knew the reason why year after year they caused the heroic characters of Homer to be presented before the people.

If the beautiful produces such beneficent effects, why should it not be identified with the ethical?

Among the chief representatives of aestheticism we count first of all the poet Goethe (†1832), at least during one period of his life. Goethe once said that the one aim he pursued throughout all the changes of his life was to fashion his own life into a work of art. Later he acquired more appreciation for the reality of action and could say, for example, "The highest, the most excellent things are without form and we must beware of fashioning them otherwise than in ideal deeds." Here he had left the ground of aestheticism. Schiller (†1805) was an aestheticist throughout his entire life. The most emphatic statement of his attitude we find in his poem, *Die Kuenstler*, in which he pictures in glowing colors but with many exaggerations the lofty mission of art. A more reasonable judgment is expressed in his letters *Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen*, and in his essays, *Ueber den moralischen Nutzen aesthetischer Sitten* and *Ueber die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schoener Formen*. He learned especially from Kant to attach more importance to the intellectual, and he also came to the realization that the good *will* must have its

roots in something other than the beautiful. This represents a decided limitation of his original attitude.

An aestheticism developed to its greatest extreme is found among the romanticists, especially in Friedrich Schlegel (†1829). At least some of these no longer merely sought to express great and timeless ideas in beautiful form; the form itself was regarded as all-important. Nor was there any longer a universally valid norm of the beautiful, but every individual carried his own norm in his own heart. This explains how it could come to pass that even things which had been considered immoral in the traditional systems of morals and education, for example, adultery and free love, could now be called beautiful, thus doing away with all true morality.

The influence of the pessimist Schopenhauer (†1860) in the second half of the nineteenth century must be considered in this connection. In his philosophy pessimism and aestheticism are strangely interwoven. Schopenhauer sees in human life an eternal movement and hence an eternal sorrow. All striving of the will, he says, arises out of a need, therefore out of suffering, and since this need is never really satisfied it leads to disappointment and thus to more suffering. There is only one escape from this continuous cycle of sorrow: one must renounce and deny the will. Once we cease willing, this world of suffering whose deceptive images are but the products of our own fancy, will vanish. What is it now that will lift man

out of this pessimism of life and put his will to silence? Besides the difficult path of asceticism, which Schopenhauer himself disdained to walk, it is the cultivation and enjoyment of art, particularly music. Here is a comforter of men held captive in a world of grief and tragedy. For though it makes us feel the storm and stress, and hear the sighs and moans of a world writhing in pain, it also gives us exultation, joy and bliss and so enables us to forget our sorrows. To cultivate the beautiful means therefore to cultivate the ethical, that which alone abides and lifts us up out of our misery.

Schopenhauer's influence was felt by Friedrich Nietzsche (†1900), at least in the first and third periods of his life. In the first period he rejected all scientific and political, even all moral ideals and declared that the cultivation of the aesthetic alone deserves our attention. In this period he was influenced by Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner. His position in the second period was the direct opposite: he now held onesidedly to the intellectual. In the third period he reverted to the aesthetic view of life, combined now with pessimism and extreme materialism, and separated more than ever from everything religious and particularly from everything in any way connected with the church. During this period he definitely affirms life with all its pleasures and wants to enjoy it without restrictions to the fullest extent. Since he himself was constantly ill, the strong, powerful, ruthlessly dominating personality now becomes his ideal. As such a

Herrenmensch, or, as he frequently preferred to say, as a "superman" (*Uebersmensch*) he would strut through life and trample into the dust whatever stood in the way of its complete enjoyment, whether religion or morality, divine or human ordinances, civil or domestic institutions. This may sound thoroughly materialistic, and such indeed was the effect of his philosophy upon the masses. But for Nietzsche himself the determining motive was not materialistic but aesthetic. There was for him a certain aesthetic fascination in depicting man as a dominating personality, as a proudly strutting lord of creation. This is evident, for example, from the advice he once gave the counsel for the defense at the trial of a criminal. "Picture to the jury the gruesome beauty of the crime," he said, "and they will acquit the defendant."

Great and beneficial though the influences may be that proceed from the beautiful, yet it dare not be identified with the ethical. For, in the first place, that would mean the negation of a generally valid norm of ethical behavior, since obviously the definition of the beautiful will always have a subjective tinge; secondly, the ethical would be restricted to a socially favored group, for it is impossible for all to cultivate the arts in the same degree; and finally, the outward form would thus be overemphasized, a condition that has ever resulted in a lack of sincerity and moral earnestness.

Aestheticism differs in principle from naturalism and utilitarianism in that it recognizes in one way or

another the independent subsistence of the spirit in addition to nature. This alone does not suffice us, but it does indicate the direction in which we may find the correct answer to our question concerning the ethical. The answer to the question, *What is beautiful?* is decided in the last analysis by taste, or, to express it more generally, by feeling. If now it be acknowledged that the emotions have a legitimate place in our discussion, why not go a step farther and inquire whether man does not also have an intellect and a will, and both as self-existent entities, distinguishable from his physical nature? This is the course followed by idealism. We are concerned here not so much with intellectual as with volitional, ethical idealism, especially in the form represented by the great philosopher of Koenigsberg, Immanuel Kant (†1804).

Kant's position towers high above every form of materialistic philosophy, as well as above aestheticism. He seeks for a firm foundation upon which to build the ethical life. This foundation cannot be in the world of natural impulse, for that is low, common, the element that links man with the animal world. Moreover, the impulses of various individuals are so different and mutually contradictory that no lasting fellowship can be established on the basis of their satisfaction. Neither can this foundation lie in profit or success, for the ethical must be done without regard to either immediate or future profit. The feelings, too, are entirely too subjective to serve as a norm that can be acknowl-

edged by all. Moral action must be based on a norm that stands above all differences, above all subjectivity, above all considerations of pleasure, profit or success, that is universally valid. When man's will affirms this norm and makes it his own, his behavior becomes ethical. This norm for the "pure will" according to Kant, is found in human reason (*Vernunft*), which is not by any means simply identical with intelligence (*Verstand*). Subjection to this norm is the basis of a steadfast, immovable character, one that is not formed by compulsion from without, nor predetermined by nature from within, nor influenced and modified by changing fortune, but one that grows from within and carries the norms of its action in itself. That is what is known as *autonomous* ethics. Even though in every case the desired goal is not reached, in this system the course of action is nevertheless pronounced good if only it is governed by this inner norm. Here a ground has been gained, standing on which man can say, "Come what may, I dare not act contrary to the norm of truth and justice."

But what if this reason, as found in different individuals, should differ widely? Then again we should have no universally binding norm for our conduct. Kant escaped this conclusion by ascribing super-individual authority to reason. In fact, he maintained that this super-individual Reason must often conflict with single, individual, unjustifiable inclinations and desires. By making this advance and rigorously accept-

ing its implications, Kant did succeed in establishing universally valid norms. It must be admitted that such norms, if inherent in man and actuating his conduct, must produce for the individual himself at least an inner satisfaction which differs fundamentally from the pleasure of naturalism and the profit of utilitarianism, and they will be conducive, not to the disturbance and endangering, but to the strengthening and stabilization of society. This twofold significance of the moral law, viz., that it makes for certainty and consistency in the life of the individual as well as of society, Kant embodied in his famous rule of the categorical imperative: Let only such a maxim govern your conduct as you would have govern the conduct of all. Which means negatively: Every principle is wrong which, though it suits me individually, cannot be followed by all. This cuts off the root of egoism. Positively stated it means: I am acting correctly, when I should want every other man in my place to act as I do. The test of the true morality of any act then would be to exchange positions (in thought) with the other person, put myself in his place, and so to judge my act. This is a surprisingly simple formula, reminding us of the Master's well-known Golden Rule (Matt. 7:12). From this basic principle Kant then deduces two others:

1. So act at all times that your will is a law unto itself; note, however, that Kant always assumes that the will is in harmony with Reason. Thus

he places man above any other authority and makes him accountable only to himself;

2. So act at all times that you consider humanity in yourself and in others always as an end in itself, never as a mere means to an end. Thus he places the individual in the very midst of society.

There can be no question that this conception towers high above the others discussed and that where it predominates it must result in a really worthwhile life both in society and in the individual. The question, however, arises: Why is it that in actual life this moral idealism is never realized, but that instead a great gulf always remains fixed between the ideal and the realization? This question has been answered in several ways. Some have maintained that nature itself has set insurmountable barriers in the way of a complete realization of the ideal. As the artist is hindered in depicting his inmost thoughts by the insufficiency of the materials he must work with, so too the very nature of man will not permit his lofty spirit to make it completely subservient to his will. But this is no explanation, for we are not asking how it happens that the will does not rule supreme but why it is that man's will itself, his intentions and inclinations are not good and so often stand in sharp contrast to the moral law. Others explain that this incongruity results from the fact that there is always a divergence between cognition, will, and deed. Cognition leads and lights the way, the will

comes straggling behind. But this explanation likewise cannot stand, for as we observe life we note many cases where the will not only lags behind but fails to act entirely. We conclude, therefore, that the incongruity between the ideal and the real has its final reason in the very nature of the will itself. The will must be changed, otherwise the voice of reason, the inner law, avails nothing. This was also admitted by Kant. He declared that a moral revolution must take place, a dethroning of egoism and the enthroning of the moral law. But when asked how this moral revolution was to be brought about and who was to inaugurate it, he had no answer. For Kant knew nothing of man and his morality in relation to God, he knew nothing of the Holy Spirit who can create a new will.

At this point a late contemporary of Kant, Friedrich Schleiermacher (†1834) took up the argument. He declared that the whole task of humanity is, to bring about a union between reason and nature. Whatever nature gives is to be formed by reason, and whatever reason thinks is to be given form in nature. A beautiful thought — but again a scheme which allows no place for God; and the question still remains unanswered, Whence the will to bring about this union?

Still another, the wellknown master of pedagogics Johann Friedrich Herbart (†1841), attempted a different solution. He proceeded from the thought that our emotions call forth an appreciation of the morally good even as they produce a taste for the beautiful.

This appreciation and cognition of what we ought to do would then stimulate the will to action. To be sure, this might be possible if the will to do what is morally good already existed; however, whence this will?*

Thus we see that even moral idealism does not give us a satisfactory answer to the question, What is morality? Much has been gained, we admit, for it has become evident that in man there really are two fundamentally divergent elements, nature and spirit, and that nature is the means by which man's spirit finds external form and expression. Four questions, however, remain to be answered:

1. Does this super-individual Reason really constitute a law for all?
2. How is the will renewed so as to become one with the moral law and bring it to realization?
3. What about the previous non-conformity of our will to the law? Are we permitted simply to ignore it and treat it as nonexistent?
4. Does man have obligations only toward himself and his fellowmen, to human society, or must we take into consideration also a relationship toward

* In our country, independent work in philosophy is of comparatively recent date. The following are the outstanding representatives of idealistic philosophy and also of idealistic ethics: Josiah Royce (1855-1906) at Harvard, Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910) at Boston, and William Ernest Hocking, since 1920 at Harvard. But they find it difficult to win out over naturalistic empiricism.

God; in other words, must we substitute a theonomic for autonomic ethics?

From Kant we turn to Jesus. He too stood for a moral law, a law which no one may trifle with, to which everyone must submit lest he condemn himself. How sharply Jesus sets forth this law in his Sermon on the Mount! Here He sets up a moral ideal that far surpasses all earlier and later man-made ideals. But does it really apply to all and is it valid for all time? Most certainly, for it is based on God's holy and righteous will which He imbedded in man's heart in creation as the inner norm of his life. This impels us to discard autonomous ethics and to put theonomic ethics in its place. It follows that moral conduct involves not merely a relation to ourselves and to human society but primarily a relation to God the Creator and Law-giver of our life. Then we can speak of truly moral conduct only as such conduct grows out of a proper relation to Him. You ask, Whence comes this proper relation to God and this will that is conformed to his will? Certainly not from ourselves. Jesus recognized more clearly, and He emphasized more strongly than anyone before Him, the total depravity of the human heart. But He also knew his own power and the power of the Holy Spirit to re-create man and to give him a new will (John 3:5), to establish a new relationship between man and God and to give man a new will capable and zealous of all that is good. But what about our previous transgressions of the divine law and our

daily short-comings which are so difficult for even the regenerated man to avoid? The answer is found in II Cor. 5:19 and I John 1:7.

Thus Christian ethics as taught by Jesus is the true ethics. It holds fast to the distinction between nature and spirit; it recognizes in nature the broad field of moral action; it sees in the spirit, the free personality, the subject of moral conduct; and it accepts God's will as the only valid and universally binding norm. Morality may thus be defined as the voluntary acceptance of the divine will as norm by free human personalities with the purpose and to the end that this will may be realized in the individual life as well as in the various social relationships.

Thus we must distinguish between natural and Christian morality, and only the latter can be recognized as true morality.

During the last 150-200 years a very extensive literature has developed in the field of natural or philosophical ethics, and the subject has been discussed from the most varied points of view mentioned in this chapter as well as others. In the English language it has been elaborated much more extensively than Christian ethics. But in its purest form, altogether uninfluenced by Christianity, it appears in pre-Christian ethics, and here again we are best informed concerning Greek and Roman ethics, the latter being based entirely upon the former. In the life work of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, in Epicureanism and Stoicism, in the writings of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, and finally in Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism, the foundations were laid upon which all subsequent philosophical ethics rests either directly or indirectly, down to the present day.

The careful and fundamental distinction between natural and Christian ethics is of the utmost impor-

tance. The Scripture admits that even the fallen man is in a certain sense a free personality; it ascribes to him a remnant of moral and religious knowledge, a remnant even of moral power (Rom. 1:19, 20; 2:14; cf. also chapters 10 and 15 of this book). It grants that from the time of his creation there is within man a divine norm and a conscience in which as in a mirror there is reflected the relationship in which his conduct actually stands and should stand to this law. However corrupted and obscured all this may be, so much so, in fact, that the same Scripture also speaks of the natural man as being dead toward all that is truly good (I Cor. 2:14; Eph. 2:1; Col. 2:13), it is nevertheless there in some measure and its presence is testified by the entire history of natural man. For this reason we may also speak here of a remnant of morality, and we must make a careful and fundamental distinction between natural and Christian morality, or between natural (also called philosophical) ethics and Christian (or theological) ethics.

Natural morality is the compliance of the will of the natural man with the demands of the law written in man's heart in creation, to the end that this law may in some manner be realized in his conduct. Christian morality is the free and voluntary compliance of the will of regenerated man with the will of God as revealed in his written Word, exemplified by Christ, and witnessed inwardly by the Holy Spirit, to the end that man may himself live in communion with God

and also perform the duties of his God-given calling in society. The source and motive of natural morality is the law written in the heart; the source and motive of Christian morality is the new spirit, the Spirit of Christ who takes up his abode in the justified sinner and makes of him a new man from within. Therefore in Christian ethics alone do we find a definite norm, a correct motive, ample power, and a proper goal for moral conduct. A definite norm, for whereas the lines of the law written in man's heart are often very indistinct, the Spirit directs the Christian to the perfect revelation of the divine will as found in the Word and exemplified in the life of Christ. A correct motive, not the fear of punishment or the hope of reward, but grateful love of God, wrought by the Spirit of God, for the gift of salvation in Christ Jesus, all other motives being subordinated to this one. Moral power, for the law written in man's heart can give no power, for which reason the natural man can at best attain only to a civil righteousness (*justitia civilis*), but the Spirit of Jesus Christ affords power toward all that is good (Augustine: *Jubes te diligere; da quod jubes, et jube quod vis*). A proper goal, for the Spirit directs us to the communion with God unto which the Christian has been renewed, requires an ever closer union with Christ and his kingdom, an ever increasing growth into the image of God, and this comprehends everything else that a proper definition of the goal of Christian ethics may include.

CHAPTER III

THE CONFESSIONAL CHARACTER OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christianity today is divided into particular churches or denominations, and there is considerable difference between the individual bodies. Naturally this difference is reflected in their respective attitudes toward moral living and in their ethical teaching.

The difference between Roman Catholic and Lutheran ethics is particularly pronounced and of fundamental importance. It can be summarized briefly as follows:

1. Roman Catholic morality is a morality of works. The Catholic aims to become good and to merit eternal salvation by his works; this makes Catholic ethics appear legalistic, slavish and mercenary. Lutheran ethics is the ethics of the justified man, justified and therefore made good by the grace of God for Christ's sake. The Lutheran Christian knows that he is a child of the heavenly Father. As such a child he is moved, yes, impelled by an inner necessity, in grateful love for the grace received to obey the Father's will, and he obeys it freely, spontaneously, not as a series of individual tasks to be performed but as the uniform governing principle of his life.

Medieval ethics was dominated entirely by Aristotle, who at that time reigned supreme in all institutions of learning. Now Aristotelian morality is not so much a matter of inner disposition as of external action. Man becomes morally good by doing good, much in the same way as the harpist gains the mastery over his instrument by constant practice. For that reason too, he considered the law as the best teacher of morality, because the law demands that I do the good. These theories of the pagan philosopher fell upon fertile soil inasmuch as the medieval church under the dominance of Semi-Pelagianism had forgotten the doctrine of the total depravity of the natural man and had joined with the scholars of the age in revering Aristotle as the master of all formal disciplines such as philosophy, logic, rhetoric, and grammar. His theories were accepted almost blindly, even in regard to morality, and the churchmen of the time do not seem to have realized that in so doing they were in fact reverting to paganism. Luther's conflict with Rome was therefore from its very beginning also a conflict with Aristotelian philosophy. In the field of formal sciences Luther was willing to accord him due honor, and Melanchthon made deliberate use of him in some of his textbooks. But his influence with respect to matters moral and religious was opposed by Luther most emphatically. "Let philosophy remain in its own sphere," he said, "for which it was given by God."

When Aristotle declares that "by doing good we become good," Luther vehemently objects and says, "As long as the person is not good his works will avail nothing. The person is first, works come in second place." In his treatise, *On the Freedom of the Christian*, he writes: "Good works do not make a good man, but a good man does good works; evil works do not make a wicked man, but a wicked man does evil works; so it is always necessary that the person itself be good before there can be any good works, and that good works follow and proceed from the good person, as Christ also says: 'A corrupt tree does not bring forth good fruit, a good tree does not bring forth evil fruit.' It is clear that the fruits do not bear the tree, nor does the tree grow on the fruits, but on the contrary, the trees bear the fruits and the fruits grow on the trees. As it is necessary, therefore, that the trees must exist before their fruits, and the fruits do not make trees either good or corrupt, but rather as the trees are so are the fruits they bear — so the person of a man must needs first be good or wicked before he does a good or a wicked work, and his works do not make him good or wicked, but he himself makes his works either good or wicked." We see then that for Luther the main question was, How can any person become good in the sight of God? In answer he refers to Baptism, regeneration, justification, and perhaps more frequently to faith which apprehends Christ. For example, "It is decided, therefore, that works cannot justify a person, but the person must

always first be justified without any works by something else, that is, by faith. Behold, faith justifies, it makes good and pious, because for Christ's sake God remits all sin. In addition, He gives to the believer his Holy Spirit and makes of him another person, changes him into a new man with new reason and a new will inclined toward the good. Such a person will do really good works wherever he is, and whatever he does will be good."

The doctrine of justification opened a new world of understanding to Luther. He now saw clearly among other things that the deciding factor was not man's relation to the church, as Rome would have it, but rather his personal relation to God. This relationship is paramount. The justified has God for his Father and he has become his child. Now there is "peace without end" between man and God. Because in justification man has been declared righteous, and because the old has been done away and with faith and the Holy Spirit new powers and new impulses toward the good have entered into him, man *can* now do what is really good for he himself has now become good. Indeed, he now *must* do the good, for the new Spirit within him will not suffer him to remain idle but constantly urges him to do it. The motive of his actions now will not be the fear of punishment or the hope of reward, as is the case over and over again with Rome, but grateful love toward his wondrously gracious God. Good works will not now be laboriously and spor-

adically produced because the stern taskmaster, the law, drives man to do them, but they will come forth voluntarily and spontaneously by inner necessity. Now man no longer counts his good works to see if they will total enough to merit God's grace. On the contrary, what Luther in the introduction to his commentary on Romans puts in these words will now be the case: "Faith is a living, active, dynamic thing that does not stop to ask whether there be good works to be done but is ever busy doing them." In another place he pictures this spontaneity of good works thus: "No one bids the sun to shine, it does so of its own accord. No one bids the trees to grow and bring forth fruit, they do so of their own accord. No command is needed to make two and two equal four, they are four. So it is with the justified: he needs no command to produce good works, he does them of his own accord." If the morality of the justified is thus produced spontaneously and as a matter of course, if it flows freely, as it were, from a living spring or fountain, then according to Luther it cannot be a piecemeal morality like the work of a hireling, but it will constitute one single, organic, growing unit, however much one individual work may differ from another. Luther emphasizes this over against the piecemeal character of Roman ethics, which requires a virtuous deed here and a virtuous deed there without any inner connection whatsoever. And the living fountain from which all moral action flows is to Luther faith, or love that is born of faith.

2. Rome distinguishes between a higher and a lower form of morality. The higher form involves a renunciation of the use of the rights and gifts of nature and culminates in the three vows of chastity, poverty, and complete subjection to ecclesiastical superiors. The lower form permits the unrestricted use of all things natural. Lutheran ethics, on the contrary, knows of but one form of morality, which is binding for all, looks upon the things and ordinances of this natural world as divinely established with its creation, and uses them freely without being brought under the power of any.

The Roman distinction between a higher and a lower form of morality may be traced back to two roots. One of them lies in ancient paganism. Stoic philosophy divided humanity in three classes: the wise, the fools, and the προσκόπτοντες, i. e., the "aspirants" or such as strove to become wise. Accordingly, since the fools have no virtues at all, two classes of virtues result: the common or lower virtues of the aspirants and the higher virtues of the wise. In his *De Officiis* Cicero has a detailed presentation of this doctrine. Inconceivable as it may seem to us, when Ambrose wrote his book, *De Officiis Ministrorum*, he adopted this distinction and popularized it in the church. In fact, he found words of extravagant praise for it, declaring that, whereas the heathen indeed were capable of setting up the ideal of the wise man and extolling his virtues, the church alone has such wise men. There are in the church, he said, not only those who

practice the lesser virtues, keep the commandments (*mandata*), who do not kill, do not commit adultery, honor father and mother, love their neighbor, etc.; but also those who take to heart and follow the evangelical counsels (*consilia evangelica*, Matt. 19), love their enemies, give their goods to the poor, fast voluntarily, show mercy, and especially practice celibacy. Here we have the beginning of the later distinction between monastic and lay ethics.

The second root is to be found in the wrong notion, peculiar to medieval theology, concerning the Christian's relation to things natural and purely human. A sharp distinction was made between nature and grace, and ere long nature came to be identified with the earthly, physical, carnal, sinful. Now if all that pertains to nature is sinful, then marriage, the possession of wealth, making use of this world's goods, government and war service, barter and trade, commerce and industry, all are sinful; then only that way of life can be properly called ethical which renounces all these things. The right to use these gifts and to live in these relationships, which after all are essential to the very existence of human society, can then be obtained only by special concessions on the part of the church as God's representative on earth. It is beyond estimation what embarrassment and confusion, what violation and coercion of conscience, and what obstruction to progress in sound social living have been caused by this doctrine.

In sharp contrast to such absurd distinctions of special classes within the church and of higher and lower forms of morality, Luther emphasized Gal. 3:28 and II Cor. 5:17. In the light of these passages of the Word of God neither racial nor cultural nor social nor even sex differences have any bearing whatsoever upon the justified man's relation to his God. Before Him all the justified stand on the same level, all are children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; how, then, could they be subject to different forms of morality? The false identification of nature and sin Luther rejected by insisting that nature and all natural orders and relations constitute a part of God's creation; how, then, can they be said to be sin, and how can the life in these relations be considered as one of lesser moral value? Luther saw in this doctrine a revival of the same dangerous error against which even Paul already had to contend. Hence such passages as I Tim. 4:2-4 and Col. 2:16-18 were of special significance to him, and by urging in addition Gal. 5:1 and I Cor. 3:23 he became the protagonist and herald of evangelical freedom.

Conditions of his day and age induced Luther to apply this principle of the divine sanction of things natural in particular to the earthly calling and to the state in its relation to the church and the kingdom of God. He considered the earthly calling as the God-given sphere of activity within which the Christian is to show forth his faith. Marriage, family,

government, the arts and crafts, all are to him truly "holy" orders and occupations, about which, considered as such, there is nothing wrong and life in which may be morally good as well as morally evil. In developing this thought, I Cor. 7:20 and the so-called "tables of duties" in the New Testament epistles, likewise the admonition of John the Baptist to the people, the publicans, and the soldiers (Luke 3:10-14), gave him valuable suggestions. As regards the differentiation between the commandments of God and the "evangelical counsels" he points out that it is based on a wrong interpretation of the pertinent passages (especially Matt. 19:21; 19:12; I Cor. 7:7), and that it can only result in placing the opinions of men above the commandments of God (cf. Augsburg Confession, Articles 16 and 27). From his many discussions in point we cite two: "It is possible that a peasant and his plowing are more acceptable to God than a nun and her chastity." "When a poor servant maid sweeps the house and does it because God has commanded her, she does a better work and renders God a greater service than did Anthony in the desert" (cf. *Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1917, pp. 43-57).

As Rome failed to recognize the holiness of the earthly calling, so it also refused to grant the right of independent existence to the state. We quote Pope Innocent: "As the moon has no light of her own but borrows her light from the sun, so the state has the right of existence and action only to the extent to which

it has been granted it by the church." To the church Christ gave both swords, it was claimed, and therefore the church can make and unmake kings and absolve subjects from the oath of obedience; and history shows how often the church acted in accordance with this claim. Luther opposed this. He derived the independence of the state and its right of existence from the divine plan of creation, and in place of the fatal mixture of state and church he demanded a complete differentiation and separation of the two as a matter of principle. Each belongs to a different sphere of life; the state to the sphere of the earthly and temporal, the church to the heavenly and eternal (John 18:36; Matt. 22:21). The state has to do with the external ordering of life, the church with soul values; the state is an organization of right with powers of coercion, the church an institution of grace and freedom; there the law rules, here the Gospel. In 1530 Luther wrote: "Now I know, thank God, that all the world is aware of how diligently and arduously I have labored and continue to labor that these two offices and governments, the temporal and the spiritual, may be clearly distinguished and kept apart, that each be directed and confined to its proper sphere, whereas the papacy has so commingled the two that neither was able to exercise its legitimate rights and powers." He states that excepting only the doctrine of justification he taught no doctrine so emphatically as the distinction of these two powers (cf. Augsburg Confession, Art. 28).

The difference between Reformed and Lutheran ethics is not so pronounced, but must nevertheless be noted. The Reformed church, in distinction from the Catholic church which stresses chiefly visible mediations, over-emphasizes other-worldliness. It makes the salvation of the individual depend immediately upon an absolute decree of divine majesty. It considers the will of that Majesty as revealed in the Scripture as the unconditional law of all religious and moral development and thus stamps a legalistic character on the life of the individual. It takes the New Testament more as a *nova lex* than as a testimony of the saving will of God.

Lutheran piety, on the contrary, reveals more the character of evangelical freedom; it fosters, not a stern and legalistic, but an open, free and joyful spirit. This may be seen in various ways. Generally speaking, Lutheran piety is more favorable to the development of the inner life, is given more to contemplation, is richer in spiritual hymns, and shows a deeper appreciation of art and culture. Lutheran ethics offers a greater latitude in respect to things pertaining to this earthly life and is not so easily brought again under the yoke of bondage with reference to their use or disuse. It trusts the efficacy of the Word and does not deem it necessary to erect special disciplinary offices in the churches, which thoroughly investigate all cases of discipline and inflict the most severe penalties, nor does it feel called upon to summon the aid of the state in the execution of the judgments pronounced by the

church. Lutheran piety does not desire the reestablishment of an Old Testament theocracy, as did Calvin in Geneva and Knox in Scotland. This could only result in another unwholesome confusion of the functions of state and church, though of a different type from that advocated by Rome, for it would amount to an attempt to force the will of God upon the unregenerate man and thus engender in him a spirit of revolt against both state and church, inasmuch as only the regenerate man is capable of fulfilling God's will.

On the other hand, Reformed piety is often richer in practical Christian work, although when we think in this connection of the work of missions we must not forget that it was not, as is usually stated, the Reformed church that first realized the duty of Christian missions and began to carry it out in practice. Already Luther recognized the duty of bringing the Gospel to the heathen, and Albrecht, Duke of Prussia, was anxious to Christianize those of his subjects who still worshipped idols. Finally, it may be said in general that the very difference in the personal characters of Luther and Calvin typifies the difference between Lutheran and Reformed piety.

CHAPTER IV

THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN THEOLOGY

Ethics as a formal discipline has been assigned various places in the body of theological science. Schleiermacher classified it together with dogmatics under historical theology; but neither dogmatics nor ethics should be reduced to the level of mere historical presentations of what Christians believed sometime in the past and of their conception of the Christian life at that time, neither must they be merely a report on the Christian faith and the Christian life as commonly understood today. Both as a matter of fact are normative in character. This was realized by Heinrici; but he in turn made the mistake of including practical theology together with the systematic branches (dogmatics and ethics) under the head of normative theology. Certainly there are some points of contact and similarity between dogmatics and more particularly ethics on the one hand and practical theology on the other; but the differences are far greater. Practical theology is the science that deals with the church's action in fulfillment of its divinely appointed tasks, while ethics is the science of the thought, will, and action of the individual Christian as they ought to be in themselves and as they ought to be worked out in the various forms of social life.

Ethics of all theological disciplines is most closely related to dogmatics. In fact, together with dogmatics it constitutes a division of systematic theology, because like the latter it aims to present its truths in the form of an articulated system and thus to impress the fact of their unity. This close connection between ethics and dogmatics accounts for the fact that for a long time ethics was not treated as an independent subject but included in the study of dogmatics, and that even today an occasional attempt is made in that direction. It was the influence of Calixt and the appearance of his *Theologia Moralis* in 1634 that gradually won for ethics an independent place alongside of dogmatics. And rightly so, for while both present the truth, dogmatics deals with religious and ethics with moral truth.

While this distinction is generally recognized to-day, the relationship between dogmatics and ethics in detail has been stated in various ways. Dorner said: "Dogmatics and ethics are independent disciplines as surely as God is different from man." This is correct in a measure, for while certainly in ethics as well as in dogmatics we can be concerned only with divine norms, nevertheless in ethics man stands in the foreground of consideration while in dogmatics that place is occupied by God. As to their relationship to each other, Dorner said: "Dogmatics busies itself with the essence, thoughts and deeds of God, which in accordance with his wisdom constitute a system and have a moral world as their goal," while Christian ethics is

concerned "with the counsel of divine love as it is realized in accordance with his will in the achievement of the good in human freedom." Similarly Harless had written even earlier: Dogmatics is the account of the unfolding of the deeds of the world-redeeming God; ethics is the account of the development of redeemed man. "Dogmatics answers the question: What thinkest thou of Christ? Ethics answers the question: What thinkest thou of the true character of a Christian upon earth?" Althaus puts it this way: "Dogmatics deals with the state of the Christian in so far as it is *given* us, ethics in so far as it is *assigned* us. In the indissoluble union of grant and assignment, of indicative and imperative, of gift and claims, God's dealing with us appears as a personal one, as history, as love. Indicative and imperative are strictly and inseparably related to each other and witness in their union the reality of God's activity with man." But the most striking and precise statement of the relationship between the two sciences has been formulated by Hofmann: Dogmatics sets forth the relation (*Verhaeltnis*) of God to man, ethics the attitude (*Verhalten*) of man to God as it is mediated through Christ. In any case, ethics presupposes dogmatics; an attitude and conduct that is pleasing to God is impossible except where God has previously established a friendly relationship or communion with us. "We love Him, because He first loved us" (I John 4:19).

CHAPTER V

THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

The extensive history of Christian ethics before the Reformation is treated in detail by Luthardt in his *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*, vol. 1 (1888, also translated into English, 1889); likewise the productions of ethical science since the Reformation in volume 2 (1893, in German only). The reader's attention is directed to this fundamental work, as well as to the most recent (though not yet completed) treatment of the same subject by O. Dittrich. Here we must confine ourselves to a brief enumeration of the most important evangelical endeavors since Luther. Luther was a pathfinder in the field of ethics, for his rediscovery of the Pauline doctrine of justification necessarily involved a rediscovery and correction of the fundamental principles of ethics. Melanchthon's labors in this field are extensive, especially in his *Loci*. Throughout the sixteenth and far down into the seventeenth century ethics was treated almost exclusively in connection with the *loci dogmatici*, but since Calixt published his *Epitome theologiae moralis* in 1634 the science achieved a more and more independent position, and from now on we find *compendia theologiae moralis* appearing side by

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side with compends of dogmatics. The representatives of Pietism emphasized the seriousness of the moral life but unduly narrowed its sphere. Under the influence of Wolff's philosophy and with the rise of the period of enlightenment the specifically Christian character of ethics was more and more eliminated until finally there was nothing left but natural ethics. With Schleiermacher and to some extent also H. Chr. Schwarz new beginnings set in; and the revival of faith proved a benefit also to the science of ethics. There now appeared from the positive Christian viewpoint the works of Rothe (1845), Wuttke (1861), Schmid (1861), Culmann (1863), Palmer (1864), Beck (1882), Kaehler (1883), Dorner (1885), Kuebel (1896), Koestlin (1899), Herrmann (1901), Haering (1902), Lemme (1905), Gottschick (1907), R. Seeberg (1911), Schlatter (1914), together with the ingenious work of the Danish theologian Martensen (1871; English translation by Spence, Affleck and Taylor, published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh). To Harless belongs the credit of having revived confessionally Lutheran ethics. The first edition of his *Christliche Ethik* appeared in 1842, two years after Sartorius began to publish his *Lehre von der heiligen Liebe*. (The sixth edition of Harless' Ethics was translated by A. W. Morrison and published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1868.) Next to Harless' work we must mention Frank's *System der christlichen Sittlichkeit* (1884), perhaps the best work from the Lutheran point of view. We mention also Vilmar's

work with its detailed treatment of the doctrine of sin; that of Hofmann, noted for its conciseness and depth of thought, and von Oettingen's *Sozialethik*. Luthardt's *Kompendium der theologischen Ethik* is valuable for the wealth of its material, especially historical (third edition 1921), as are also his *Vortraege ueber die Moral des Christentums* (English: *Moral Truths of Christianity*). Deinzer's *Christliche Ethik* (1904) should not be overlooked. A recent German production, sketchy but valuable, is by Althaus, *Grundriss der Ethik* (1931).

Lutheran authors in America who should be mentioned here include W. J. Mann, *Social Principles of Christian Ethics* (1872), based on C. F. Schmid's Ethics; R. F. Weidner, *Christian Ethics* (1891, based on Martensen and Harless); L. S. Keyser, *System of Christian Ethics* (1913); J. A. W. Haas, *Freedom and Christian Conduct* (1923); J. Stump, *The Christian Life* (1930); E. E. Fischer, *Social Problems, the Christian Solution* (1927). In the Reformed churches T. B. Strong, *Christian Ethics* (1896), N. Smyth, *Christian Ethics* (1892), and H. U. Roop, *Christian Ethics* (1926) deserve consideration.—Compare the bibliography at the end of this book.

CHAPTER VI

OUTLINE

As a systematic science ethics should be developed from a single basic principle, for that is the distinguishing characteristic of systematic presentation that everything is based upon one fundamental thought, called principle, and flows from it as from a basic source. Certainly neither Christian ethics nor Christian dogmatics can have such a principle in the same sense as *a priori* sciences (*stofferzeugendes Prinzip*). For Christian ethics the material does not need first to be created or developed out of a basic principle by the human mind; it is already given, it is contained in the Scripture. The purpose can only be to arrange the given material in an orderly manner so that all the material shall have its proper place and receive its due emphasis (*Ordnungsprinzip*). To this end various principles have been set up, such as love, regeneration, communion with God as realized through faith, God-likeness, etc. We shall be content simply to proceed from the concept of the Christian life and arrange our subject matter according to the fundamental aspects of that life (origin, development, consummation). But

since the Christian life is not a new creation in the absolute sense of the word but rather a renewal of the old, natural life to its original state, the origin of the Christian life cannot be understood without constant reference to the foundation for that life as laid in creation on the one hand, and to the depravation of man's original state through sin on the other. Accordingly our presentation of Christian Ethics as the science of Christian morality or of the Christian life will have the following outline:

I. The Origin of the Christian Life:

- A. The foundation as laid in creation;
- B. The state of sin;
- C. The restoration of the Christian life.

II. The Preservation and Development of the Christian Life:

- A. Its preservation and development as such;
- B. Its preservation and development in the various social relationships.

III. The Consummation of the Christian Life through a Blessed Death and the Resurrection to Eternal Life.

In presenting the preservation and development of the Christian life in the various social relationships

in part B of the second division of our outline, we reject the demand which has been made both in Europe and America since the rise of sociology, that ethics is to be treated as cultural social ethics, but on the other hand we do give due recognition to the fact that man, also the Christian, is a social being (Aristotle: ζῶον πολιτικόν), and that the ethical must always be realized in the community of other persons.

PART I

THE ORIGIN OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

A. THE FOUNDATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AS LAID IN CREATION

CHAPTER VII

THE DUALISM OF MAN'S NATURE AS CREATED BY GOD

Man came forth from the hands of the Creator as a dual being belonging to two different worlds. Physically he is the most highly developed animal, for like the animals he came into being by the will of the Creator from earthly material (Gen. 1:24); like them he lives only by virtue of the breath of life that comes out of God (Ps. 104:30), by which he became a living soul (Gen. 1:24; 2:7). It is a striking fact that the Scriptures use both the terms "soul" and "spirit" to designate the life of the animals as well as that of man (Eccl. 3:21; Rev. 16:3), indicating that in *this* respect both belong in the same category. This organism comprising body and soul and endowed with various gifts and powers constitutes the *nature-side* of man's being. It appears in each individual in a peculiar form differing according to sex, temperament, natural endowment, and, since the formation of national and racial groups, also in that respect.

The difference between man and woman is by no means only one of outward form; there is a difference in the entire makeup, mental as well as physical. Since the places they are to fill in life are different, God in his wisdom has constituted them different both in body and soul. To man He gave energy of will and aggressiveness; to woman submissiveness, charm and tenderness. In man reason predominates, in woman feeling. He has the greater courage, she the greater wisdom. He comes to conclusions by reflection and abstraction, she prefers intuition. He was created for public life, she for the seclusion of the home. His work is designed to shape the outward destiny of the world; hers to affect its inward development. Both have been created in such a way as to complement each other most beautifully in their differences (Gen. 2:18).

Next to the differentiation in sex there is the differentiation of temperament. This applies to both sexes equally, except that perhaps the choleric and phlegmatic are more frequently found in men while in women the sanguine and the melancholic are more likely to predominate. The word *temperamentum* (κράσις) originally denoted a mixture. The term was chosen because formerly the variations in temperament were explained on the basis of the mixture of fluids in the human body. If the blood predominated the result was a sanguine temperament, a predominance of gall (χολή) produced the choleric, black gall the melancholic, and phlegm (φλέγμα) the phlegmatic. In

reality the word temperament denotes the physical and mental disposition with which man enters the world, his innate attitude toward the world, an attitude that has its seat in the mind of course, but that is also affected by his physical condition. One man has a nature that makes him prefer to withdraw from the world round about him as much as possible. When nevertheless he does come in contact with it, there result intense emotions of joy or sorrow. His is the melancholic temperament. Another makes contact with his environment, but only as a silent spectator without desiring to influence it; his is the phlegmatic temperament. Another is highly susceptible to influences of the world about him; his soul is like a sensitive mirror reflecting every change in his environment, and his moods vary with such changes; his is the sanguine temperament. Still another seeks eagerly to influence, to change the world round about him; he would be its leader, and when his efforts are blocked or repelled his spirit is quickly and intensely aroused so that sometimes his passions will break forth with almost savage ferocity. His is the choleric temperament. The sanguine is the temperament of quick reactions, the choleric of strong, the melancholic of deep, and the phlegmatic of slow reactions. Only rarely does any one of them appear in pure form, and their mixture makes for the color and variegation of human life. The differences in temperament, like those of sex, are innate in man, a part of his original nature, hence morally in-

different and remaining throughout this earthly life. They cannot be removed, nor should they be, by conversion. The wisdom of the divine Creator is here acting and fashioning with the greatest freedom.

Attempts have frequently been made to illustrate the differences of temperament with certain Biblical characters. The evangelist John has been considered as an example of the melancholic, Peter of the sanguine, Paul of the choleric, and Nicodemus of the phlegmatic temperament. The temperaments have also been associated with the different periods of life, the sanguine with childhood, the melancholic with youth, the choleric with manhood, and the phlegmatic with old age. This is permissible if the meaning is not that an individual is able to run the course of all these temperaments as he passes through the various stages of his life, for temperament is something stable and determined once and for all. Only the peculiarities of the various temperaments are in general comparable to those of the various periods of life.

It must also be pointed out that all temperaments though morally neutral nevertheless have two sides, one that is favorable and one that is unfavorable to the ethical life. The individual's personality will determine how they are to be utilized and controlled, for they are after all only a part of the nature-side of man's being over which his personality must exercise its powers of self-determination. Differences in temperament will of course also mean a difference in obligations, but the

temperament after the fall can not be called morally neutral

obligation will always be one that man in his original state was able to fulfill.

Somewhat related to the differences in temperament are the differences in natural gifts and endowments. The one has a gift for learning, the ability to do scientific work. Another has artistic ability and produces great works of art. One is a genius that breaks new paths; another has the talents to work up materials already at hand. One does physical, another mental work. These differences give rise to the endless variety of human callings and occupations, all of which supplement each other, and all of which are ethically equal.

As the human race spread over the face of the earth it became divided in many racial groups and peoples. Each of these again has its own peculiarities more or less pronounced. These peculiarities usually find expression in their languages, for the language of a people is the embodiment of its spirit. The Romanic races, e. g., want to see and visualize, while the Germanic wish to understand and to find ultimate causes. The language of the Oriental is figurative and abounds in imagination, while that of the Occidental is comparatively dry and cold. The warmth and depth of soul in the German people finds expression in the German language as adequately as the commercial spirit of the Anglo-Saxon does in his terse and concise English.

Beside the natural bent and disposition of a people we must mention also such things as climate, occupation and history as determining factors in national individuality. It was the great geographer C. Ritter who called particular attention to this. He pointed out especially the close connection between the geography of a country and its people's destiny. That such conditions have brought about national peculiarities is evident, for example, in the history of Israel, Greece, Rome, Germany, England, and America. Although such peculiarities too are ethically neutral, one can easily understand that a nation should not want them disturbed, endangered, or even destroyed by a great influx of foreign elements. By guarding its national individuality it safeguards that which nature and history have entrusted to it as its own possession.

None of the above-mentioned differences in nature elevates man above the brute or beast. If man had nothing more than this nature-side of his being he would not be a moral creature; for in the realm of that which is fixed as an unchanging and unchangeable quality of his being we cannot speak of morality. Morality is found only in the realm of freedom.

That leads us to a discussion of the other side of man's being, his personality. The Scripture raises man above the animals and at the same time indicates what constitutes the essential difference, when it says that man was created in the image of God. Since according to Gen. 1:26 man is to exhibit this image of God in

his dominion over the rest of creation, and since such dominion necessarily presupposes personality, we may say that the image of God in man consists in his personality, that is, in the fact that, like God, man is a being having cognition and will. As a person, man is able to know himself, the world, and God. He is capable of self-determination with reference to his environment. Consequently, there exists for him no external, inevitable compulsion, so far as his person is concerned. The nature-side of his being is indeed subject to external force (*violentum*), but never his personality. He is capable of self-determination also with reference to his own nature. He cannot speak of a necessity (*necessarium*) being forced upon him by his own natural impulses and desires; they merely present the material in reference to which he must exercise his self-determination, and because of this freedom he is also accountable for his actions. He is capable of self-determination, finally, also in his relation to God. He is able to decide against God, and in the state of innocence he was able also to decide for Him. As unfree, therefore, as man is in the nature-side of his being, so free is he in his personality.

Every age has witnessed attempts to over-emphasize either the one or the other of the two sides of man's being. Pelagianistic indeterminism utterly ignores the nature-side. It severs all connections with family, nationality, race, etc., even with man's own previous moral acts, and makes him entirely independent. Deter-

minism, on the other hand, completely ignores the personal side. What is called freedom is in fact only a delusion; man is controlled either by the inexorable will of God or by the fixed and unchangeable law of nature. Both indeterminism and determinism proceed from false premises. Man was created as a *dual* being having both a natural and a personal side, and it is this fact that makes him capable of moral action. From his birth he is determined by the facts of sex, temperament, individual gifts and endowments, and nationality; but within these limitations he is free to exercise his personality and to make decisions one way or another on the basis of ethical motives. Without such freedom there could be no accountability, and without accountability no morality.

CHAPTER VIII

MAN'S MORAL CONDITION IN THE ORIGINAL STATE, AND THE MORAL TASK IMPLIED IN IT

The foundation of the Christian life as laid in creation also includes the fact that man in his original state was morally good. By God's creative act he was not only made capable of morally good behavior; he was actually a good person. It is only this fact that makes the image of God complete in him. That man was not created as a morally neutral being is suggested even in Gen. 1:31, and Gen. 2:8ff. show that he was not merely intended for communion with God but that he actually enjoyed such communion. In the New Testament these truths are brought out even more clearly, particularly in Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10. For if the new man whom we are to put on "has been created after God in righteousness and true holiness," and if he is "newly made to a knowledge in the likeness of his Creator" (i. e. to a knowledge that agrees with the knowledge of God), then man in his original state as he was created by God must have been a likeness of God in his knowledge, righteousness and holiness, which means that he was morally good. He was not only able to know God but actually did know Him; he

was actually in communion with Him. Again, he was not only able to decide for that which is righteous and holy, but he was himself righteous and holy.

But this did not at all preclude further development; on the contrary, he was to grow in knowledge as well as in righteousness and holiness. He was to grow in knowledge of the world about him, to penetrate into its hidden laws and forces and make them subservient to himself; for if he was to have complete dominion over the world (Gen. 1:26) he must necessarily have a complete knowledge of it. Thus he would find in this world ever more clearly a reflection of the Creator's glory (Rom. 1:20). But he was to grow also in the knowledge of God, to penetrate ever more deeply into the depths of his being, to rest in the contemplation of God's glory, and to find in such contemplation the ultimate aim of his life.

Man was to grow also in that righteousness and holiness in which he was created. These had to be preserved, for though man possessed them he was not conscious of such possession, nor was it impossible for him to lose them. His was a childlike, naive holiness, for he not only had no experience of the opposite of good but did not even know of the possibility of its existence. This unconscious, childlike innocence was to grow into the conscious determination of manhood. The righteousness given him in creation was to become a righteousness freely willed; this is already implied in the very notion of a moral being. It was to this end

that God gave him the command recorded in Gen. 2:17. He was to realize the possibility of being different from what he was and yet to decide freely for God and so accept the will of God as the norm according to which he would govern his life. In this way he would have become truly free, for true freedom consists in constant voluntary subordination to God's will and a desire for compliance with that will which goes above every other desire.

This, then, was man's twofold moral task: the one, to gain an ever increasing knowledge of nature within and around him and by such knowledge an increasing dominion over it; the second, an ever deeper penetration into the mysteries of God's infinite being together with a continued voluntary subjection under God's will as a means of attaining supreme happiness; and both of these simultaneously, neither of them excluding the other.

CHAPTER IX

CONSCIENCE AS A PART OF MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF MAN'S MORAL OBLIGATIONS

Man's nature as constituted in creation includes also his conscience, not as a distinct element in addition to soul and spirit, but as a special function of the spirit life. But first we must ask, What is conscience? A glance at the usage of the word indicates the abundance of applications the word has found and the difficulty of formulating a comprehensive definition. For aside from special usages (e. g., artistic conscience, scientific conscience, exegetical, homiletical conscience) the word may designate a capability, a moral quality, an act, an inward norm, the function of an inner court of justice, or some hidden attitude of mind. A correct definition should include all of these elements.

It will be worthwhile to begin with the etymology of the word, although that alone will not reveal the full significance of the term in Biblical usage. The history of the word shows that the Old Testament has no specific word for conscience, although the fact of its existence is quite evident. The functions of conscience are ascribed to the heart; they are not yet recognized

as a separate sphere of the inner life. This may be due to the fact that the law and the witness of the prophets served Israel as a most adequate substitute for the testimony of conscience. Jesus too called the attention of the Jews to the law and the prophets and is not known to have appealed specifically to their conscience (John 8:9 is not authentic). Not until the Gospel is brought to the Jews of the dispersion and to the Gentiles do we hear, in the Pauline and Petrine epistles and the epistle to the Hebrews, the word conscience. But here it is found frequently, for here the truth of the Gospel could not be attested except through the medium of conscience. The word therefore originated in the heathen world. Consequently, it must designate a function of man's spirit that takes place also among the heathen, one that is not derived from supernatural revelation but was given at creation. But even in Greece the word does not appear until a comparatively late period, at the time of the Peloponnesian War and the age of Euripides. This may be so because previous to that time the laws of the forefathers were regarded as the controlling norm similarly as the law and the prophets were in Israel, but that they were now losing their significance. Or it may be that men were beginning at that time to distinguish more carefully between the various functions of the spirit life.

It is not to be expected that the Greek term *συνείδησις* or the more classic *συνειδός* will alone suffice to give us an adequate understanding of the Biblical

concept of conscience, but they will indicate in general that function of the spirit life with which we are to occupy ourselves. Συνείδησις and συνειδός are derived from συνειδέναι. Συνειδέναι τινί = to have common knowledge with someone as a result of being together with him, hence, to be an eye-witness or ear-witness together with someone concerning something; συνειδέναι ἑαυτῷ = to know something about oneself as a result of self-observation, i. e., to be one's own witness, to be conscious of a thing in one's own mind. Accordingly, συνείδησις = self-consciousness, which is also the primary meaning of the Latin *conscientia* and the German *Gewissen*.

An inquiry into the various usages of the word in the New Testament will now be in place. We find here that συνείδησις denotes not a general consciousness of one's self but a consciousness of one's moral behavior, as for example, in Rom. 9:1 and II Cor. 1:12. In this respect there is as yet no difference between the usage of the New Testament and that of profane Greek. For in the latter, too, συνείδησις often denotes a consciousness that bears witness concerning one's own moral conduct and pronounces judgment upon it. Conscience is thus, as it were, the sense organ for the ethical. As the eye is the sense organ for the world of light and the ear for the world of sound, so conscience is the sense organ for the world of spirit, for the ethical. It is not a second or third element in addition to soul

and spirit; it is merely a special function of the soul life, that function which reacts to the ethical.

In Rom. 2:15, however, a new element is added to the meaning of the word. Here Paul makes a distinction between the moral norm as found in the heart of the heathen and the *συνείδησις* which bears witness concerning this norm, adding by way of explanation that this second element manifests itself by accusing or occasionally also (*ἢ καί*) excusing one's own acts. Accordingly, conscience is not identical with the law written in the heart but is something in addition to it. As the testimony of the prophets in the Old Testament was added to the law written on tables of stone, reminding men of that norm, pledging them anew to it, and passing sentence in accordance with it, so in the case of the heathen conscience is added to the law written in the heart, testifies concerning the presence of this norm, urges obedience to it, warns against transgression, evaluates the completed act, judges and condemns or acquits and approves, all in accordance with it. This, the consciousness of an inner norm, is the specifically new element which this passage adds to our concept of conscience. Compare also I Cor. 8:7ff.; 10:25ff.; Rom. 13:5.

While the above statement could still be interpreted in the sense of autonomous ethics, I Pet. 2:19 will lead us decidedly beyond such a conception. The combination *συνείδησις θεοῦ* in this passage, which is identical in construction with *συνείδησις ἁμαρτιῶν* in Hebr.

10:2, makes it impossible to think of a purely human norm. It must necessarily denote a self-consciousness in which one becomes conscious of his moral acts in reference to God. In Acts 24:16 we even find this expression in so many words, συνείδησις πρὸς τὸν θεόν. If conscience is such a consciousness of one's own moral behavior in his relation to God, then it indicates in each individual case the attitude which man takes toward God, no matter whether God confronts him in the norm written in the heart, or in the norm written on tablets, or in the norm contained in the New Testament and written anew in the heart by the Holy Spirit. When the attitude is in harmony with that norm, the conscience is said to be ἀγαθή, καθάρá, καλή (Acts 23:1; I Tim. 1:19; 3:9; II Tim. 1:3; I Pet. 3:16; Hebr. 13:18); when it is not in harmony the συνείδησις is evil (Hebr. 10:22), seared with a hot iron (I Tim. 4:2), defiled (Tit. 1:15). This is why the New Testament speaks of conscience as the place where the Old Testament sacrifices could not bring perfection though it was sorely needed (Hebr. 9:9; 10:2), and where purification is obtained through Christ alone, so that one has no longer a consciousness of sin after his evil conscience has been purged by the blood of Christ (Hebr. 9:14; 10:22; cf. also I Pet. 3:21). Our sin, whose presence is testified by conscience, and because of which it judges and condemns us, is taken away through faith in Christ, so that our conscience can now testify instead to our harmony with God's will and as a result can

justify us and so bestow upon us that inward blessedness.

On the basis of these passages we must define conscience as the consciousness of one's own moral action in relation to God. But experience teaches us that we must supplement this definition by adding that this consciousness is an immediate one. It does not result by way of reflection; it does not arise from other thoughts; its appearance is sudden and spontaneous. The prevailing contents of the mind are only reflected by it.

The above-mentioned Scripture passages as well as our experience also teach us to distinguish between various functions of conscience. The chief function, the one in which all the others are included, is that of witnessing or testifying. It is hardly accidental that writers before Christ as well as after Christ bear record of this witnessing function of conscience (cf. "*conscientia mille testes*," and Shakespeare's *Richard III*). Conscience testifies to the harmony or disharmony between my act, whether only contemplated or already committed, and a given norm, and its testimony is always absolute and categorical, for conscience knows but two words, Yes and No. This witnessing of conscience, then, includes three particular functions, the obligatory, judicial, and executive.

First, the obligatory function. The dictates of conscience make the demand upon man that he subject himself to its will: they bind him. And man feels that

the norm of which it witnesses requires obedience and that he cannot ignore it without condemning himself, and this is the case whether the action of conscience is positive or negative, whether it urges him to action (*impellere*) or warns him against it (*deterreere*). This sense of the inevitability of the demand of conscience as one of objective, unqualified authority is also a direct and immediate one. This obligatory function of conscience of course does not deal with logical or physical but with moral necessities. It concerns demands which man may refuse to obey, but whose justice he cannot deny.

Conscience exercises its binding force before the will has made its decision. After the decision has been made it begins to function in its judicial capacity, imputing the deed and pronouncing sentence. Now conscience becomes, as it were, a tribunal which calls man to account, determines the perpetrator of the act, the motive involved, and the effort required. Here man becomes conscious that the deed is his own and that he is responsible for it; here the quality of the act, whether good or bad, is weighed; here the degree of guilt is determined and a just penalty is imposed or an acquittal given. The imputation of conscience cannot be evaded, and its judgments cannot be bought. This second function of conscience differs from the other two also in this that it engages the intellect; for a judgment requires reflection, and reflection is a form of thinking. While the obligatory function of con-

sciences makes use of the will, the judicial employs the intellect.

The judicial function of conscience is closely connected with that which carries out the judgment, the executive function. This function operates in connection with the feelings, and thus the self-consciousness which we call conscience engages our entire personality. When the sentence has been pronounced, it is not put aside or forgotten but it is immediately executed—inwardly, of course. The execution becomes evident in the fact that the judgment of conscience is always accompanied either by a sense of duty well done, which in turn brings peace and happy contentment (James 1:25), or by a consciousness of duty left undone, and this in turn causes unrest and painful uneasiness. It is not an empty phrase when we speak of the “pangs” of conscience, or when our Confessions refer to the *conscientia perterrefacta*. If the sentence pronounced by conscience was one of acquittal, we have a “good” conscience, i. e., our self-consciousness testifies that we are in harmony with the divine norm; but if the sentence is a conviction, then we have an “evil” or “bad” conscience, i. e., we are conscious of being in disharmony with the divine norm. The expressions we use are not precise; the Latin *conscientia recti facti* and *conscientia mali facti* are more exact. The oftener our conscience can testify to our good conduct, the oftener do we experience the enjoyment of peace, until gradually a series of such experiences will be formed

which constitutes a foretaste of heavenly bliss (James 1:25). Besides rest, peace and blessedness, the consciousness of one's ethical conduct before God also results in fearlessness and joyful courage, a *παρρησία* (I John 3:21) that enables one to face both God and man with boldness and confidence, or, on the other hand, it results in fears and terrors which pursue man relentlessly like vengeful spirits, actually personified by the Greeks in their Eumenides and the Romans in their Furies. In *Macbeth* and *Richard III* Shakespeare gives us some gruesome pictures of the awful power of conscience when it judges and condemns. But we find similar experiences recorded already by Plutarch and Juvenal or in a letter of Tiberius to the Senate. Luther more than anyone else bears witness to the effect which conscience in its capacity as judge and executor has upon man. He speaks not only of the terrors of conscience when it depresses and torments him and drives him to despair, but also of the blessedness and the *παρρησία* resulting from a conscience that is at peace.

The definition of conscience at which we have arrived leads to the conclusion that conscience is not the direct voice of God in the heart. That is precluded even by the fact that according to common experience the dictates of conscience vary in different individuals (cf. Rom. 14; I Cor. 10) and by the further fact that conscience in the state of depravation is subject to error. Conscience is rather something subjective and human, which statement does not imply that it is a product of

education or gradually evolved through custom, for then it could not presume to have absolute authority as it now does. Both of these truths must be safeguarded: Conscience is something subjective, human—and yet it speaks with such authority that no-one can ignore it. We are able to reconcile the two only when we remember that all living creatures, man in particular, live only by the Spirit of God that is in them, and that man, on the other hand, is not simply driven by this immanent Spirit of God but reacts to it in a way that preserves his self-determination. The resultant of these two forces, the immanence of the divine Spirit and the personal reaction to it, is what we call conscience, the self-consciousness of man concerning his relation to the Spirit of God dwelling in him since his creation. It is the reflection or precipitation of this interaction in our consciousness.

All that has been said above, the fact that conscience testifies of the relation of our spirit to the immanent Spirit of God, that it urges us to strive for agreement with this inner norm, that it warns us against disobedience, that it acquits or condemns us after the deed is done and thus fills our heart either with joy or terror—all this constituted and still constitutes the significance of conscience for the fulfillment of moral obligations. It has been said indeed that one cannot speak of conscience as existing before the fall; but if conscience is the reflection of that interaction referred to above it certainly must have been present in man

since his creation, even as that interaction itself was present. Before the fall into sin, to be sure, its activity consisted only in testifying that man was in harmony with God as the highest moral norm. It appeared then solely as a conscience in every way pure and unsullied. When the tempter approached man, his conscience reminded him again and again of the norm given him by God; it warned Eve against disobedience. Its voice had first to be silenced before the sin could actually be committed. Conscience, in short, was to make sin difficult and the fulfillment of the moral obligation easy.

B. THE STATE OF SIN

CHAPTER X

THE FACT AND THE EXTENT OF MAN'S DEPRAVATION

The command in Gen. 2:17 was given for man's benefit, it provided an opportunity for him to exercise his freedom of choice, to prove himself and stand the test. But under the influence of Satan who tempted him from without, and in spite of the warning voice of his conscience within him, man did the inconceivable: he stretched forth his hand and took of the forbidden fruit and ate thereof, judging the good promised by Satan more to be coveted than his fellowship with God. Thus God as the highest moral good and the will of God as the highest moral norm, were set aside. The result was the fall, and with it the depravation of man's entire original state. The peace of God, that sense of bliss, was gone, and in its place fear and terror filled his heart. His conscience now began to trouble him, for his relation to God had been changed and this change was reflected at once in his consciousness: his conscience began to function in its judicial and executive capacities. Man's intelligence is now depraved: he imagines that he can hide from the presence

of God; his will is depraved: he attempts to place the blame for his evil deed upon God instead of courageously taking the consequences upon himself.

This depravation was transmitted to all natural descendants of Adam. The Scriptures testify to the doctrine of original sin in many places (Gen. 5:3; 6:3; 8:21; Ps. 51:5; Rom. 5:12) and so explain how man comes to have that sinfulness which from his very birth is an undeniable fact of his inner life. To be sure, man has retained the duality of his being, his nature and his personality together with conscience, but it is all utterly depraved. On his nature-side, all his impulses are corrupted, inclined toward evil, and the temperaments exert their influence in the wrong direction. Especially his personality is depraved; for while man still retains a remnant of the image of God (Gen. 9:6), including both his powers of cognition and willing, yet his understanding and his will are totally corrupted.

That fallen man still retained some religious knowledge is evidenced by the whole history of man's intellectual development from its very beginning. When we read the Code of Hammurabi of about 2000 B. C.; when we call to mind the hymns, the prayers and psalms, and particularly the lamentations and confessions of the Babylonians of about 800 B. C., especially the prayer addressed to Marduk and the lamentations of the Suffering Just so reminiscent of Job; when we consider the picture which Homer drew about the

same time of Grecian heroes and gods, the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, the dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles with their emphasis on the idea of retribution; when we bear in mind that the whole legal system of the Middle Ages and beyond was based on the legal code of the ancient Romans; when we remember, moreover, what is known of the Indian and the Chinese ethical systems:— then we are forced to admit that the natural man does retain a noteworthy measure of understanding, even in things moral and religious. However, that which is truly good and godly, the things of the Spirit of God, these he can no longer discern. Here he can only grope about in utter darkness, his condition is one of complete spiritual blindness, he lacks the ability to recognize spiritual realities and grasps for the unreal, for phantoms which only mock him and presently vanish away (Isa. 60:2; Job 37:19; John 3:19; Eph. 5:8; 4:18). Divine truth seems foolishness to him, he has neither the organ nor the ability to understand it (I Cor. 2:14), his eyes must first be opened, in fact, an act that is comparable to the creation of light must first take place (II Cor. 4:6), before he is enabled to discern the truly good and godly; not because he has lost every ability to see and to understand, but because his faculty to comprehend the things of the Spirit of God, the real and eternally abiding, the truly righteous and holy things, has been totally obliterated. The Scriptures, it is true, grant him a certain ability to know God (Rom. 1:20; I Cor. 1:21; Acts

17:27), but this is merely like the groping of the blind, a mere touching of the hem of the garment of God's glory, not an understanding of the true nature and the heart of God. It is only natural, then, that all the attempts of the natural man to systematize this fragment of divine revelation remaining in him have inevitably led to such aberrations from the truth as pantheism, polytheism, and materialism.

This corruption of the religious consciousness also includes the moral. Man still retains a certain moral consciousness in spite of his spiritual blindness, but his darkness in the moral sphere consists in this that he fails to see the very fundamentals of true morality: its source, its aim, its sphere, and its essence. For the source of the true moral life is to him not faith which worketh by love; its aim is not an ever more intimate communion with God and a continuous growth into the stature of Christ; its sphere he limits to a succession of individual moral acts; and as to its essence, he fails to comprehend that only that is truly good which corresponds to the divine norm, to the very holiness of the divine Being itself, and in his blindness he even judges that to be morally good which in fact is morally evil.

Fallen man has also retained the power of willing. The Scriptures even predicate to him the possibility of a relatively good conduct, and a glance into the ancient as well as the modern heathen world will confirm this, for both can furnish not a few examples of admirable

moral conduct. Among the ancient Greeks all public gatherings and all larger undertakings were opened and entered into with prayer and sacrifice, even morning, evening, and table prayers were not unknown to them. Cornelius Nepos says of Epaminondas that even when joking he never lied. Fear of the gods was an outstanding characteristic of the individual as well as of the state in ancient Rome. Cato was as immovable with respect to moral demands as in regard to Carthage. We are told that before the age of Caesar Augustus divorce was unknown among the Romans. Valerius Maximus calls ancient Rome the repository of all virtues. Tacitus praised the faithfulness of the ancient Germans. And today too we may find in the homes of avowed unbelievers some noble examples of morality, loyalty, mercy, and sexual purity.* Notwithstanding all this it remains true that the will of the

* We might also include here numerous members of secret orders. And yet between the lodge and the church there can exist only a mutually exclusive relationship: there without Christ, here with Christ; there by merit, here by grace alone; there by works, here by faith; there by one's own spirit, here by the Holy Spirit; there the work of servants, here the liberty of the children of God; there self-imposed constraint, here nothing but grateful spontaneity of one redeemed by grace; there a seeking without finding, here peace and blissful possession; there a phantom-God pale and indistinct, who ultimately becomes alive and proves to be a consuming fire, here a gracious Father who for Christ's sake lifts us up out of our sin and helplessness; there appearance, here reality; there death, here life; there hell and torment, here communion with God forever. For the religion of the lodge is the religion of the natural man, and its morality is the morality of the natural man. Cf. *Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1927, pp. 513-528.

natural man is totally depraved, that he strives always after that which is evil, being in a state of enmity against God (Rom. 8:7), that he is dead unto all that is truly good (Eph. 2:1; Col. 2:13), and that only the mighty power of God which is able to raise the dead can revive him to spiritual life (Eph. 2:5ff.), for whatever remnant of moral conduct is found in him is limited in extent and wrong in motive.

It is limited in extent, for his moral life is sporadic and fragmentary in character (cf. Rom. 2:14: ὅταν), it represents a mere putting away of excrescences, a curbing but not a conquering of evil propensities, a mere external conformity to the law, not a morality that comes from the heart and permeates the whole life. The motive is wrong, for it is either fear lest hidden sin or shame be revealed or a craving for glory and honor ("The virtues of the heathen are but glittering vices"). Even when such a life is dedicated to nobler virtues, to the service of home, or friendship, or country, or science, etc., it is not motivated by the fear and love of God the highest good, which alone can give to every other good its intrinsic value. And whatever is not done spontaneously and freely in child-like grateful love of God who first loved us, is in the sight of God not a good but a "dead" work (Hebr. 9:14).

And lest anyone be so foolish as to claim that though the intellect and the will, these faculties of the soul, may be corrupt, the soul itself is not, the Scrip-

tures add and expressly say that the very heart of man is depraved. The heart, the center of personality and its good and evil propensities, the fountain and main-spring of all life and activity, has become corrupt (Gen. 6:5; 8:21), and whatever comes out of the heart cannot but show the marks of this contamination by sin, and that always. It is not a matter of an evil desire cropping out now and then, but the whole heart is evil, a sinful condition (*habitus*) has set in, there is a constant propensity toward the evil (*propensitas ad malum*). Whereas formerly God was the life-element in which man moved and found satisfaction, the point toward which he gravitated, the pivot around which his life was centered, man now gravitates toward the world, his own ego is now his center and his god and he seeks his satisfaction not in God but in the things of the world. He is alienated from the life of God (Eph. 4:18) and at home with corruptible things. And this propensity toward the corruptible is not merely an affection of his nature from which he suffers, but an act of his person by which he continuously corrupts his nature; it is a quality of his ego to which his will is subservient and which makes him totally evil in the sight of God.

Finally, to complete the vicious circle so as to include the whole of man, the conscience too has been drawn into the vortex of this general depravation. For although the conscience by reason of its very nature rebels against sin it could not, being a part

of the moral consciousness of man, escape his general corruption. This must not be understood, however, as though the conscience no longer functions legitimately at all. When we speak of having a bad conscience, when our conscience accuses and condemns us because of sin, or when sin has burnt its mark upon it (I Tim. 4:2) and it carries this painful scar as a constant reminder of our evil deed, when conscience thus reacts against sin, it certainly is engaged in its legitimate function. The depravation of conscience consists rather in this that the legitimate functioning of conscience itself is no longer as it should be. It has been either altered or retarded. The retardation may be only a passing one, in which case we speak of a sluggish conscience; or it may be permanent so that conscience may be said to be asleep or relatively dead. The alteration or confusion of its functions is shown in the errors of conscience. We speak of an erring conscience when its obligations or judgments have a false objective; and this is the case when as a result of the general depravation of man's heart the divine norm to which conscience normally witnesses has been supplanted by erroneous concepts which man either sets up himself or adopts on the basis of some foreign authority. These, as it were, draw a veil over the eyes of conscience, dim its vision and make it weak and vascillating. All these aspects show clearly that even the conscience as originally created by God shares in the general depravation brought about by sin.

CHAPTER XI

THE ESSENCE OF SIN

The question now arises, What is the nature of sin that it could produce such a terrible depravation? We can get the correct answer to that question only from the Scriptures and on the basis of Christian experience. Human understanding, to be sure, is still quite generally willing to admit the fact of sin, but the definitions of its essence and nature that are given by human reason are either entirely false or at least very superficial. Spinoza (†1677), and in a somewhat different way Leibniz (†1716), for example, considered sin as nothing but weakness due to the fact that man is a finite being and therefore defective and limited in his capacities. This view has become quite popular and is widespread today, yet it is wrong. It denies the right to punish sin, yes, it makes divine indignation, anger, abhorrence, and condemnation of sin reprehensible; sin and sinners are to be pitied rather than condemned; and eventually materialism triumphs with its slogan, "To understand all is to forgive all." To follow this view consistently is to make the created nature of man and in the end God himself the ultimate cause of sin, for did not God create man as a finite and limited being?

Again, sin has been considered as a necessary element in the development of man, a transitional stage through which he must pass in order to advance from unconscious to conscious moral freedom. This was the view, e. g., of Schiller (Adam's sin was "reason's first venture, the first beginning of his moral existence"), Goethe (especially in his *Faust*), and especially the pantheist Hegel. But if sin is the element of evil in the world, how then can it contribute toward the development of the good? Sin is not something which is not yet good, but the very negation of the good, the direct opposite of it. Moreover, if sin were really a necessary stage in the development of man toward conscious moral freedom, we should again be compelled to hold God responsible for it, as surely as from the very beginning God desired such a development on the part of man, and still desires it.

Again, the Roman Catholic church and also the rationalists have attempted to explain the nature of sin on the basis of the preponderance of the sensuous over the rational in man. Now it is quite true that in the first stages of man's natural development the physical senses become active earlier than the intellect, and thus they easily gain a certain ascendancy over it and hinder its development; it is also true that the superficial Bible reader may find some apparent support for this theory in the fact that the Scriptures sometimes use the terms "sin" and "flesh" almost interchangeably. And yet the definition, Sin is sensuousness, is untenable. For in

the first place the Scripture term "flesh" is a much wider concept than sensuousness including as it does the functions of the natural mind as well as of the physical senses; in the second place, human experience knows of sins, such as pride and hate, which cannot be classified under this definition; and finally, the question still remains unanswered, Whence this preponderance of the sensuous over the rational?

Again, it has been maintained that sin is essentially nothing but ignorance; do away with ignorance and you will do away with sin. Thus Socrates and Plato held that "we fail because we err; improvement of understanding means improvement of morals." Even A. Ritschl inclined toward this view. He indeed, understood sin to be a lack of fear and trust in God and the setting of things of lesser value above the highest good, but he found the cause of both these errors in man's ignorance of God as the highest good. However, this theory involves an overestimation of the intellect which has always proved disastrous; and it does not take into account at all what remains an unquestioned fact to the enlightened Christian consciousness, namely, that sin is guilt, that it separates between God and man, and that it provokes God's wrath.

The Scripture judges quite differently concerning the nature of sin, and Christian experience has always corroborated the Biblical view. Of course the Scriptural definition of the nature of sin cannot be given

by simply referring to I John 3:4 and to the Biblical names for sin. In I John 3:4 the apostle has no intention of defining sin, he merely mentions incidentally a single and ever present characteristic of it, viz., lawlessness, transgression of the law, ἀνομία. And it is precisely this concept which links all Biblical designations of sin together, whether sin is spoken of as חטא, חטאה, ἁμαρτία, aberration from the right way; or as פשע, παράβασις, παρακοή, παράπτωμα, transgression, trespassing, defection; or as עון, ἀδικία, deviation by conscious turning away from the law; or as רעה, רע, κακία, πονηρία, insolent, malicious transgression; or as רשע, ἀσέβεια, wanton ignoring of God and his norm, insurrection against God; or by still other names, such as און, נבלה, סרה, שגגה.* Were the Scripture to define sin no more closely than by these names, such a definition would still differ in principle from, and mark a distinct advance over, the definitions given above; but it would be after all no more than a formal definition. There would be as yet no answer to the question why and to what end sinful man transgresses the divine norm.

But the account in Genesis 3 of the origin of sin takes us beyond a formal definition. It reveals the

* Cf. the Latin *peccatum* derived from *peccare*, to stumble, blunder, make a mistake. Cicero: *Peccare est tamquam transilire lineas*. Our English word sin is derived from *sun*, *syn*, *synia*, deny, refuse; *synn*, renunciation of peaceable relations, breaking the peace; *sunia*, insurrection of vassals, rebellion; also used as a translation of *crimen*, *lapsus*, *peccatum*, hence, rebellion against law and order.

material side of sin. Here we find that the essence of sin is selfishness, or more exactly, the desire of the human will to seek satisfaction in something besides and outside of God, the highest good, and therefore in opposition to the norm of God. For certainly Eve's sin consisted in this that she permitted to be aroused within her a desire for divine discernment of good and evil and hoped thus to gain a happiness of a higher order than that which she enjoyed in communion with God. Self-satisfaction she might have sought, and man may seek it today; but she should have sought it in God, the highest good, in whom alone she could have found it. Instead, she sought it outside of God and away from God. She sought a substitute for God as though He had not the means to make her completely happy, and she did it by deliberately transgressing the divine prohibition, Gen. 2:17. That was her sin.

It follows that sin is a perversion of the highest religious and moral task of man. His religious task was to grow into ever more intimate fellowship with God and to find blessedness in Him as the highest good, and his moral task was to recognize his will as the highest moral norm and to live in full agreement with it. But sin is the very opposite of this, it is a turning away from God as the highest good and a disdaining of his will as the highest norm, both born out of selfishness, i. e., an overestimation of the personal ego.

The Scriptures characterize sin in the same manner in other passages. We read concerning sinful Israel,

"We have turned everyone to his own way" (Isa. 53:6), that is, they aimed at nothing but the satisfaction of their selfish desires. On the other hand, Christians are admonished not to seek their own (I Cor. 10:24; Phil. 2:4, 21), to overcome the selfish ἐπιθυμία (Rom. 7:7; Gal. 5:16; James 1:14), not to love the world (I John 2:15), to live unto God, not unto self (Rom. 14:7).

It would be a grave mistake, however, to understand all this as though sin occurred only when the ungodly selfishness of the heart becomes manifest in open transgression of the divine norm by word or deed. Here again the Scriptures testify that not alone the word or deed, much less some isolated word or deed, but even the intention behind it, the very inclination that works itself out in the external act, is sin. For surely selfishness is always first an inner impulse, and the Biblical terms ζητεῖν (I Cor. 10:24; Phil. 2:21) and still more clearly σκοπεῖν (Phil. 2:4) and ἐπιθυμεῖν (I John 2:15ff.) plainly point to inward activities. Three things always precede the actual external transgression: an inner estrangement from God and an incipient lack of faith in God as the highest good and in his assurances that He always means well with us; a false assertion of the personal ego, proudly substituting self in the place of God as the goal of one's ambition; and a forfeiture of self to the world which takes the place of God in the heart, with the inevitable result that one finally stands disillusioned and empty-handed inasmuch as the soul can find no lasting satisfaction anywhere outside of

God.' Thus man, unable successfully to make himself the center of his life, must finally lose himself to the world (Matt. 16:25). This is what the Scripture means when it speaks of the deceitfulness of sin (Gen. 3:13; Hebr. 3:13): bliss and contentment are promised; vacuity, loathing and misfortune are received.

Finally, it would be an error fraught with the gravest consequences to maintain with the Roman Catholic church that only a conscious and willful turning away from God and his will constitutes sin. To be sure, we can speak of sin only in connection with a free person, and sin, generally speaking, belongs to the sphere of the will, the *voluntarium*, but the conscious subjective participation of the will only determines the measure or degree of the individual transgression. There is sin even without such conscious participation of the will, for Paul in Rom. 7:7-9 designates even that as sin which lies behind the ἐπιθυμία, that hidden quagmire in the uttermost recesses of the heart from which it comes forth. We define sin, then, as the lust for self-satisfaction in opposition to God as the highest good and the absolute norm, whether this lust crops out externally in words and deeds, or gains merely the inner consent of the will, or remains dormant and latent in the depth of the heart.

Is it so much to feel sin as a lust for self-satisfaction in opposition to God as the highest good and the absolute norm?

CHAPTER XII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIN

Adam's sin did not yet spring from an evil condition; it resulted from an abuse of his free will. But this abuse caused an evil condition, a corrupt *habitus*, which, transmitted through original sin, is now found alike in all natural men. And just as it is found in all descendants of Adam begotten after the ordinary course of nature, so it consists in all alike in these two elements: a total inability toward all that is truly good and a constant propensity toward all that is evil. All men, says our Augsburg Confession, Article 2, are born "without true fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence" (*sine—cum*), and the Formula of Concord emphasizes that the natural man in regard to all that is truly good is like a pillar of salt, like a block of wood, or like a stone (Ezek. 36:26), even worse than these, for man at the same time resists God (Gal. 5:17 ἐπιθυμεῖ), rebels and contends against God; even as according to Rom. 8:7 everything the natural man thinks is enmity against God. In acknowledging this condition of total depravity Lutheran ethics differs from that of Synergism, Semi-Pelagianism and Pelagianism; in evaluating the extent of this sinful condition it differs at least from Semi-Pelagian and Pelagian

ethics, inasmuch as the Roman Catholic church virtually denies the sinfulness of the inherited *habitus* in utter disregard of Rom. 7:8ff. and considers the element of actual *voluntarium* as essential to the concept of sin (cf. chapter 11).

Now this sinful condition common to all men from birth is not merely a *res otiosa*. Indeed, the evil lies dormant within us for a time, but it is there and soon awakes and proves to be a veritable fountain and mother of sin out of which all sinful impulses, thoughts, words, and deeds are born. From it springs first of all the active lust (*concupiscentia actualis*), which differs from inherited lust (*concupiscentia inheridata*) in this that it always aims at something definite and individual and is therefore found in different form in different individuals. In Rom. 7:7ff. Paul draws a graphic picture of the rise of this active concupiscence out of the inherited sinful state. He does this in connection with the question concerning the relation between law and sin. The law, he says, helps us to become sadly aware of that hidden sinfulness which we unknowingly harbor within ourselves; for the dormant lust reposing within us from birth is aroused by the demands of the law and thus its manifold desires are revealed. This universal experience Paul presents as his own. There was a time, he says, when as yet no law existed for him, the time of his unconscious infancy. At this time sin, this inherited condition—note that he expressly designates it as sin—was dead

so far as his experience of it was concerned. It had not as yet become a factor of his conscious will, nor could it, for at this time he did not even have a conscious will. As soon, however, as he became a conscious being and was confronted in his consciousness by the individual commandments, the lust that was dormant within him until then became active and opposed the commandments. Thus he, who up to that time had already as a descendant of Adam been subject to the common curse of death, was now likewise brought as a personal ego, a conscious personality, under the judgment of death.

This active lust in turn, if not resisted, produces the sinful deed. The apostle James describes the process of development from active lust (*concupiscentia actualis*) to sinful act (*peccatum actuale*) in a very vivid manner by using a combination of illustrations taken from the fisherman's profession, procreation and birth (James 1:14f.). Lust (ἐπιθυμία) tempts the "I" of man to come forth from its security in God by holding before it a bait (δελεαζόμενος) that the "I", i. e., the will, might grasp at. Lust chooses for this purpose a moment when man has given himself over to a feeling of dissatisfaction with God. The bait, that is, the good that is held out to the will by lust is to supply that satisfaction which he craves. The "I" accedes to the wooing of lust, unites itself with the lust. Thus lust is impregnated (συλλαβοῦσα) and must now as a matter of natural necessity give birth to the sinful

deed. While the apostle is writing to Christians, his argument applies also to man's condition before regeneration in this respect: the will is tempted by actual lust which comes forth from the sinful *habitus* like stench from a bog; the will is the father, actual lust which makes the personal will do its evil design is the mother, and actual sin is the fruit of this union, and this fruit, if the process continues to its logical conclusion, of necessity must bring forth death. As soon as the will has yielded to lust there is enacted what is called *peccatum actuale*, whether sin has broken forth in the evil word and deed or not.

When the active lust has thus gained room in the heart and has repeatedly brought forth the sinful act in thought, word or deed, it becomes a sinful habit, which like all habits soon exercises a certain control over the will. When this control becomes so powerful as to enslave the will, so that sin can hold her own against the warning and judging voice of conscience and will not release man from her grip, then the habit has become a ruling passion. Now even the world can recognize the enslaving power of sin, without, however, being aware of the fact that this enslavement is at the same time a manifestation of God's punitive reaction to sin (Rom. 1:21-32). Again it is Paul who describes the enslaving power of sin for us, especially in Rom. 6:12ff. With this passage must be compared all those Bible passages which speak of the atonement of Christ as a ransoming or redeem-

ing from the bondage of sin, e. g., I Pet. 1:18f., and also Paul's admonition to "crucify the flesh together with the affections and lusts thereof" (Gal. 5:24; Col. 3:5).

When passion has succeeded in breaking down all resistance of the will and the latter becomes entirely a willing tool, an "instrument of unrighteousness" (Rom. 6:13, 18), then we speak of vice. Once in the clutches of vice, man surrenders to his passion in the most shameless manner without giving any heed to the voice of God, of the world, of his own conscience, or even of common sense. "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin" (John 8:34), and there is in every sin, not only in the so-called gross sins, the tendency to mature into a vice, the potential power to coerce and totally enslave the heart. Sin becomes vice because man either underestimates or overestimates its nefarious powers. When he underestimates it he plays with it, imagines that he can rid himself of it at any time; then presently it has grown out of control and he struggles helplessly against its power only to be mocked and derided by it. When he overestimates sin and sees in it an all too powerful enemy, he suffers it in dull resignation to drive him on, he gives up the struggle against it without even an attempt to ward it off, in the mistaken notion that his would be a losing struggle anyway. Thus his members become willing servants of sin ever ready to do its bidding. His whole life is now a service of Satan, the driving power behind sin, instead of being

dedicated to the service of God who created him for freedom.

And finally, the ultimate degree in the development of sin must be mentioned, viciousness. When sin has become a vice, man has relinquished all moral resistance in one or another respect. But when it reaches the stage of viciousness he abandons all moral resistance whatsoever, sin is now the element in which he lives and moves and has his being, he relishes it like water no matter what name or form it may have.

Thus far we have discussed the development of sin in the individual. A similar development may be discovered in the history of different nations and in respect to humanity as a whole. Consider the history of sin in the ante-diluvian world as it runs its course (almost in a straight line) from Cain to Lamech, to the Cainites, to the commingling of the sons of God with the daughters of men, progressively unfolding itself in estrangement from God, glorification of self, abandonment to the world, and culminating in the complete deadening of conscience and enmity toward God. This development of sin is characteristic of the entire human race before the Flood with but a single exception, that of Noah and his family. We observe it again in the history of individual generations and nations, in that of the Canaanites, symbolically in the dream of Nebuchadnezzar, actually in the ancient heathen world, in imperial Rome, the Italian Renaissance, the French Revolution, and again in most

recent times when a bald paganism and an obscene materialism defiant of all morality strut arrogantly in the very midst of Christendom. This development is destined to reach unbelievable heights, and when finally the κατέχον (II Thess. 2) shall have been removed a revelation of the μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας will ensue more terrible than that before the Flood. Then sin will spend its vital force to the limit, wickedness will exhaust its hidden depths, its bestial character will be fully revealed and the judgment of God will come upon it in a new and awful manner.

CHAPTER XIII

DISTINCTIONS IN SIN AND THE THREE CATEGORIES OF SIN

All sin is sin against God and his holy will, and in every sin the essence of sin is somehow revealed. Fundamentally there is but one sin, alike in all its forms, even as the will of God is always, in all its demands, one will, for God himself is One (James 2:10). Nevertheless one manifestation of sin differs from another and thus we may speak of distinctions in sin.

Sins differ according to their external aspects, for they have different form according to age, sex, nature, nationality, position in life, tendency of the times, etc. They differ according to the extent of operation, for we speak of sins of thought, of word, or of deed, sins of omission and commission. They differ according to the degree or measure of guilt (Matt. 10:15; 11:22; Luke 12:47f.), for guilt is measured by the extent to which sin is carried out and by the moral state which may be presupposed. For this reason a distinction is made between greater and lesser sins; between sins of commission and omission; between intentional and unintentional sins; between willful sins and sins of weakness, of haste, of ignorance, or sins that cry to heaven, etc.; between a first transgression and the sin

indulged in despite repeated warnings and perhaps even with special effort of the will. Other customary distinctions usually presuppose the beginning of the new life within man. These distinctions are quite in place and of importance for pastoral care, for moral training, and for self-examination; we must, however, be on our guard lest by emphasizing such distinctions we lose sight of the more important truth that all sin, even the least, is truly sin and merits condemnation, for each sin is not only an insult to the majesty of the law but an insult to God himself, the lawgiver. In other words, man must never ask, *How far may I depart with impunity from the straight and narrow way, because every sin is a deviation from the straight line, even the "smallest" sin.*

But however multiform and ramified sin may be, in the wide expanse of its area we may distinguish after all but three categories, in which all individual sins may be classified. Augustine already spoke of such three classes, basing his distinction on I John 2:16 and corroborating it by reference to the threefold temptation of Christ. He considered *superbia* as the fundamental or capital sin and this view was held throughout the Middle Ages. Gregory the Great called it the *radix et regina* and considered it the root of the seven deadly sins which were later enumerated in this order: *superbia, avaritia, luxuria, invidia, gula, ira, acedia* (memory word: *saligia*). But because here the most outstanding sins in man's direct relation to God are not included,

the Reformation emphasized unbelief as the real root of all sins. Later, however, even in the evangelical church many again reverted to I John 2:16 when classifying individual sins and considered the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life as the three chief categories, in other words, the threefold craving for pleasure, possession, and power. Vilmar gives the latest and best description of them. However, all these attempts must necessarily fail, first, because the chief sin in man's relation to God is not included or at best can be drawn in only artificially, and secondly, because the apostle in I John 2:16 has no intention of describing sin in general but only the sinful craving for the things of this world, more particularly its driving power which constantly presses outward from within, even as ἀλαζονεία τοῦ βίου refers merely to one special form of pride, the boastful manner of living.

If a distinction of various categories seems necessary at all, it will be best to take them from the story of the first sin. We have already observed in an earlier study of this sin, first, that Eve gave herself over to doubt and unbelief and thus became estranged from God, secondly, that in sinful pride she wanted to assert her independence and become like God, and in the third place, that by doing so she lost herself and became enslaved to the things of this world. These are the three elements or steps in Eve's fall: estrangement from God, or unbelief; arrogant self-assertion, or pride;

desire for things earthly, or worldlimindedness. In the history of sin each of these three presents a whole category of sins.

Unbelief—what a vast field of sin is opened to our view by that word, and how varied in form and appearance! We can only indicate the important stages in the development. First man begins to doubt God's Word. Instead of accepting it as absolute authority he asks with Eve, Should God have said? Man substitutes his own reason for divine authority. Then he questions the very existence of God and all heavenly realities. Finally he becomes a gross materialist, denying even the existence of an independent soul-life—a barefaced lie and terrible self-deception, which shows how the whole range of lies grows out of unbelief.

Pride, or arrogant self-assertion—this word opens another wide field of sin. Here man must at all costs assert himself, whether it be over against God or over against his fellowman. This self-assertion in his relation to God may show itself in contempt for God's person, his Word, his name, his every command; or again it may appear as defiance, ranging from a stubborn resistance all the way to titanic rebellion against God. In respect to man this self-assertion may appear as vain and arrogant presumption, flagrant disregard of the rights of others, a contempt of men so heartless that it is capable of sending thousands into certain death merely for the sake of gaining personal glory, and finally as a hatred so insane as to persecute

all who do not bow to it and to sign the death warrants of thousands who resist it.

Still more extensive, perhaps, is the third category, *worldlimindedness* or *lust of the world*, when man gives himself up to the world, whether it be its possession, its enjoyment, or its control. His craving for possession takes the form of covetousness, when without regard for the moral principles involved he reaches out and greedily seizes whatever he can touch; then it turns to avarice and miserliness when he ruthlessly holds what he has acquired. In his craving for enjoyment his heart and his eyes will be set upon the beauties, the vanities, the ugly and sinful things of this world and his belly craves to be filled with them, or, he will shun every exertion of mind and body and spend his time in indolence and effeminacy; or again, he will want to taste the full measure of all the lusts of the flesh, from coquetry to adultery, masturbation, onanism, sodomy, and pederasty. His desire for control will drive him to ever greater attempts to extend his power over man, money, and the material things of the world; it finally ends in world-weariness and often in suicide.

There is some truth in the saying that the words, *Hath God said*, prefigure rationalism; the words, *Ye shall be as God*, pantheism; and the words, *And the woman saw*, materialism. Unbelief, pride, lust, these constitute the three categories of sin, these are the fundamental trends appearing again and again in the history of natural man. But one must not expect to

find them always strictly separated, the opposite is much more frequently the case. A rationalism which has ceased to believe in spiritual things becomes materialism, and a materialism which would subject everything unto itself is closely akin to pantheism, which proudly elevates man to the level of God. And interwoven as these three categories of sin often appear, it is easily possible for one and the same vice to result from entirely different points of origin. Thus, envy may be the result of pride as well as of worldlimindedness. Because of the many combinations and shades of sin it is impossible to compile a catalog of sins in which every sin is given a fixed and definite place. Yet this much remains an indisputable fact that the one or the other type of sin will predominate and characterize individuals, nations, and entire periods.

CHAPTER XIV

GUILT AND PUNISHMENT AS THE UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES OF SIN

Whether we consider sin as a sinful condition or a sinful act, guilt is an immediate and unavoidable consequence of it. It attaches to sin as the shadow to the body. *Ενοχον εἶναι is the Biblical expression for this condition, and its literal meaning is, guilty under the law, forfeited to the judge (Mark 3:29; Matt. 5:22; James 2:10; in Rom. 3:19 ὑπόδικος). The troubled conscience is the mirror-like reflection of this condition. As we distinguish different degrees of sin, so we must also distinguish degrees of guilt (Luke 12:47f.; Matt. 11:22). Inasmuch as guilt is always a correlative of sin it is proper to speak of inherited guilt just as we speak of inherited sin (Rom. 5:12, 18, 19; Eph. 2:3; John 3:36), to which then is added further guilt on account of conscious sins.

Guilt demands punishment. This is a part of God's world order; it is demanded by the majesty of the law and of the offended Lawgiver, testified by conscience, and required by the very essence of God. As the absolute personality God cannot permit the sinner simply to ignore Him; as the Righteous and Holy One

He hates sin and all ungodliness and must banish it from his presence (Ps. 5:5; Hab. 1:13). "Be ye holy, for I am holy," that is the fundamental requirement; where God meets ungodliness his holiness becomes a consuming fire. "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (Rom. 1:18), even here in time, and it will be even more clearly revealed at the end of the world (Rom. 2:1-10). The whole world of sinful men is subject to the judgment of God (Rom. 3:19), yes, in principle it is already judged (John 3:18). Guilt, forfeiture to the law of God, would be a mere farce were not the punishment to follow with absolute certainty.

Now the punishment for sin is death (Rom. 6:23), and the word "death" must be taken here in its widest Scriptural meaning as denoting the severance of those life-ties which unite God and man. Bodily death is the external evidence of this severance, its evil beginning is spiritual death, and its terrible consummation eternal death. Now if death was the immediate consequence of Adam's sinful deed, if it constitutes the wages of inherited sin (Rom. 5:12), of active lust (Rom. 7:9), and of every individual sinful act (James 1:15), how much more must it be the inevitable consequence of every life with its whole catalog of unnumbered personal sins! Since death is the severance of every vital connection with God, it is merely another way of stating the same fact when the Scriptures in

many other passages testify that man on account of his sin has come under the guilt and dominion of sin, under the power of bodily death, and under the tyranny of Satan.

We have already shown how man has come under the guilt of sin. That he is also under the power and dominion of sin is expressed by the preposition ὑπό in Rom. 3:9, and we note in this passage that it is God who delivers the sinner up to the dominion of sin, who causes sin to enslave him as a punishment for sin in such a manner that, though he can still choose between one sin and another, his choice is always limited to something sinful. And even the choice between sins is possible only in the beginning. For the oftener the sinner decides in favor of a given sin, the more power will that particular sin exercise over him until finally it becomes a πάθος that will never release him. And this is not merely the natural development of sin (cf. chapter 12); it is at the same time also the punitive reaction of God against the sinner, as is clearly shown in the whole section, Rom. 1:21ff.

This life of sin ends with bodily or temporal death, which is a further act of God's judgment over sin. Death is a grim ruler. Since the days of Adam he wields his iron scepter unmercifully and often puts in his appearance at just such a time when life is being enjoyed the most, for even the natural man is to understand that death is a punishment; he must learn that of all rulers death is the most tyrannical and most to be

dreaded, yes, he must through fear of death all his lifetime be subject to bondage (Hebr. 2:15). Intimately connected with bodily death are all those bodily evils in a thousand shapes and forms which pave the way for actual death and are in fact a part of the dying process.

And finally, to cover the whole range of death, we must also include the dominion of Satan to which the sinner is delivered. Since the fall the world lieth in wickedness, that is, in the power of the evil one, locked in his deadly embrace. John in particular emphasizes this truth; Satan is to him the prince of this world (14:30), he calls the whole world a kingdom of sin and death and says, "He that committeth sin is of the devil" (I John 3:8); because of his powers to deceive Satan is the murderer from the beginning (8:44). It is Satan who has the power of death (Hebr. 2:14), and through sin and death he draws men into his kingdom. In all these things, however, he is merely the executor of God's judgments, who carries out the punitive will of God among men.

The natural man is not altogether ignorant of this hopeless subjection to the guilt and dominion of sin, to the power of death and the tyranny of Satan. He may not always be aware of it, but he does feel it at times. And though all humanity should never be conscious of it at all, that would not alter the fact itself, for we must be careful not to confuse the state of guilt and punishment with the consciousness of that guilt

and punishment. The state and relation is an objective one; it is possible that the sinner may become conscious of it and feel it, but the objective situation will always be more serious and far-reaching in its implications and consequences than the subjective feeling and consciousness of it. Guilt and punishment are imputed to the person, and this imputation stands even when the sinner knows nothing of it or refuses to recognize it. Complete ignorance of guilt, however, is unthinkable so long as man's conscience continues to bear witness of the divine norm and the sinner's compliance or non-compliance with it. But it is possible that man may become so depraved morally that his consciousness of the divine norm and of his guilt have all but vanished. In such a case even the punitive reaction of God against sin fails to accomplish its holy purpose, which is, to arouse in man a disgust with sin and a desire for freedom; and it becomes evident beyond the shadow of a doubt that the natural man cannot by his own reason or strength be renewed to a truly moral life.

C. THE RESTORATION OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

CHAPTER XV

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAW AND THE EXAMPLE OF JESUS FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NEW LIFE

The utter depravity of human nature resulting from the fall makes it absolutely impossible for man to return to a truly moral life, that is, a life of communion with God and harmony with the divine norm, by his own reason or strength. His very sin consists in this that he has not even a remnant of spiritual life left in him and that his impulses and tendencies are always away from God. He is in a state of complete spiritual death. However, one comforting fact remains: depraved and corrupted as his nature is, man has not lost the capacity of being renewed to a moral life. In accordance with the divine plan of salvation even his sinful depravation could not rob him of his personality, that formal capacity to know and to will, that remnant of the image of God in him, which includes also the fact of his conscience, and thus man still retains the capacity of being redeemed and sanctified (*capacitas passiva*). But since all real liberty, which consists in

the divine content of those formal capacities, has been lost, it becomes evident as a result of our previous investigations that if a restoration of his spiritual life is to take place at all, if a new man is to come forth within him, this renewal can proceed only from a source outside of him, outside the sphere of sin, that is, from holy God. This does not mean that it *must* necessarily proceed from Him; on the contrary, if a new man is created at all, it is entirely the work of unfathomable and unmerited divine grace. But granting this fact of God's grace, we may consider man's very need of divine help in a certain sense as a sort of prophecy of such help.

One of the sad results of the sin of man was the fact that God withdrew into seclusion and that man could no longer enjoy his blessed communion. In a most impressive way He came forth again from this seclusion and face to face with man when He gave the law on Mt. Sinai. To be sure, this law was given primarily to Israel, but it is valid for all men. This is evident from the fact that its basic traits are in harmony with man's inner law (Rom. 2:14); from the peculiar position of Israel among the nations as the bearer of revelation to the Gentiles (Gen. 12:8; Isa. 49:6); from the statement of Paul in Romans 3:19; from the fact that the Mosaic law is the expression of God's will which is essentially one even as God is one; and from the further fact that Christ reaffirmed the essential content of the Mosaic law, although it was deepened

and intensified by Him as witnessed by his repeated "But I say unto you," and it was always brought in connection with the fear and love of God as the fundamental requirement of the law and the only root of its fulfillment.

But what is this essential content of the law? To simplify its definition a distinction is frequently made between moral, civil, and ceremonial law, and the civil and the ceremonial law are then said to have lost their authority. The former, because it was based upon the possession of the land of Canaan, presupposed the Old Testament theocracy, and was adapted in a peculiar way to the people of the Old Covenant; the latter, because according to St. Paul it was only a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16f.), found its fulfillment in the coming of Christ and his vicarious atonement, and with the destruction of the temple lost the necessary basis of its observance. Both are said to have constituted only the local and temporary coloring of the will of God, not its essential and eternal content, which is to be found in the moral law alone. All this is correct if we bear in mind on the one hand that the decalog in its original form as given on Mt. Sinai cannot be called the summary of the moral law as is done so commonly, and if we do not forget on the other hand that even behind the local and temporary regulations, abrogated though they be, there were divine thoughts of universal and abiding validity. The decalog in its Mosaic form is at the same time both too com-

prehensive and not comprehensive enough to be called the summary of the moral law. It is too comprehensive because it contained elements of the ceremonial (cf. the Third Commandment) and even of the civil law (cf. the wording of the promise of the Fourth Commandment: "upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee"); and it is not comprehensive enough because the *ius talionis* and the regulations concerning unlawful marriage (Lev. 18) likewise belong to the moral law. And behind such transient regulations as for example those concerning the guilt offerings we recognize the abiding divine principle that where there is sin there must be satisfaction.

Paul expressly includes the Mosaic command concerning the Sabbath among those features of the law which have fallen away with the coming of Christ (Col. 2:16f.); his struggle with the Judaizing errorists in Galatia was at the same time a struggle against the re-introduction of the Sabbath law (Gal. 4:10f.) The Christian observance of Sunday, the roots of which go back to New Testament times (Acts 20:7; I Cor. 16:2; Rev. 1:10), did not originate as a transfer of the Old Testament Sabbath observance to the first day of the week; it was freely arranged by the apostles in commemoration of the day of Christ's resurrection, in a sense a weekly recurring Easter festival. For that reason it was considered as a day of joy and worship, on which the daily occupations ceased only as long as the divine service required. The Jewish Christians in addition freely retained Saturday as a day of rest, but not so the Gentile Christians. Among the latter the observance of Sunday as a day of worship was universal as early as the beginning of the second century (cf. Pliny's letter to Trajan ca. 112, and Justin's description of Sunday observance ca. 150); but it never entered the mind of any Christian to consider Sunday as the continuation of the Jewish Sabbath, much less to call it Sabbath. Even as late as the fourth and fifth centuries we find only vague indications of such a view. It was only when Constantine in 321 had officially appointed the Day of the Sun as

a universal *day of rest* that individuals here and there in the church began to place the Christian observance of Sunday under the viewpoint of a day of rest (thus Eusebius of Emesa ca. 350) and to suggest that Christ had transferred the Sabbath to Sunday. Later, when the unruly, still half-pagan Germanic tribes had to be subdued, it was deemed necessary to force them by harsh penalties to an observance of Sunday which consisted chiefly in the cessation of labor. It was in this connection that the doctrine gained ground that the Christian observance of Sunday was the Sabbath observance commanded by God through Moses. It was this view that Luther encountered. But here too, Luther returned to the evangelical liberty of the Christian. In his Small Catechism in explaining the meaning of the Third Commandment he did not mention the word "day" at all, and in his Large Catechism he developed the thought that the Sabbath commandment was meant only for the Jews. The same thought was embodied in the Augsburg Confession in Article 28, where Rome's contention that the church had transferred the Sabbath to Sunday was branded as an invention of the Middle Ages and a snare and delusion to consciences. Calvin shared the Lutheran view, as may be seen from his Institutes of 1536 and his Catechism, likewise the Reformed confessions of the sixteenth century and the Heidelberg Catechism. It remained for the wellknown opponent of Lutheranism R. Hospinian of Zurich in 1598 to pave the way in the Reformed church for the error that the Mosaic Sabbath command was still in force and that the Sunday must be kept like the Old Testament Sabbath. — Cf. Zahn, *Skizzen aus dem Leben der Alten Kirche*, 3rd edition, 1908, fifth lecture; *Zur Geschichte des Sonntags, vornehmlich in der Alten Kirche*.

If then we must recognize in the essential content of the Mosaic law a revelation of the immutable and eternal will of God, there can be no question as to its importance for man's moral conduct, for man can be said to live morally only when he lives in harmony with God's will as the highest moral norm. At present we are concerned only with its importance for the formation of the new life in man. In this respect we must first of all concede that the law, being a revelation

of God's will, helps man to understand what is in harmony with God as the highest norm and what is not. The law written in man's heart from his birth has become dimmed by sin, education, etc., its features are veiled and indistinct and sometimes not even recognizable at all; but in the revealed law the will of God can be clearly and unmistakably recognized, here it is formulated in definite commands and prohibitions that will never grow dim or fade away and that regulate all relations of life, and here it stands before man as the will of a personal God who is both Lawgiver and Judge. Again, it is more readily possible for the law engraved in tablets of stone than for the law written in the hearts of men to produce a certain moral conduct. Indeed, by strict adherence to the letter of the law man can attain to a certain facility in the external doing of God's will, a legalistic virtue which habitually avoids what is forbidden and does what is commanded. Yet on account of man's spiritual blindness even this knowledge of God's will as transmitted by the written law must of necessity be incomplete and extends only to the outward act. Only when Jesus or the Spirit uses the law as his instrument can it produce a thorough knowledge of the will of God. And the moral conduct engendered by the revealed law is subject to similar imperfections as the morality brought forth by the law written in the heart. Therefore man under the law in spite of his (partial) knowledge of the will of God and his (external) obedience to it can never rid himself

of fear. The law can at best produce only a troubled and despondent conscience and a dread of God which is totally different from the fear and love demanded by the First Commandment; moreover, the law has no means of quieting this fear. It is just this fear, and not as it should be the love of God, that impels man to fulfill at least the external demands of the law. Regarding this fear produced by the law it is equally true that God intends it and that man is to blame for it. God intends it, for by this fear of the condemnation of the law He would direct man to Him who alone can help. Man is to blame for it, for insofar as he will not permit the pedagogic function of the law to hold him in the direction toward Christ (παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν, Gal. 3:24), he must continue to be subject to fear and the end is hopelessness and despair. Creative, regenerative power which can bring forth new life in man is never in the law. It has power, but only a power to kill (II Cor. 3:6) and not to make alive (Gal. 3:21); and yet in view of the fact that man is spiritually dead it is precisely such a power that is needed, a power to make alive, to create anew.

The law cannot give new life, but it is intended to, and can, prepare the way for it. The law impels man to struggle for its fulfillment, to contend earnestly against his own evil inclinations, and in doing so he finds that his own evil inclinations are in contradiction even to his own reason. Such knowledge is painful to him and it produces a desire to be different than he

is. This longing is not yet the beginning of the new life, as little as hunger is the beginning of satiation, neither can it silence or even weaken the inner contradiction in man's heart against the true righteousness demanded by God, but it does prepare the way for the attainment of the new life. We may consider this operation of the law, which produces the works of the law and the desire for a change of life, a work of pedagogic grace (Gal. 3:25). Because man, though yet under the guilt and the power of sin, does not willfully despise the law of God and its correction—to do so were merely to increase the height of the wall of separation between himself and God—he is now, though not yet *in* the kingdom of God, in a place appreciably nearer than he was before. This means a great deal. This longing, however, to be free from the contradiction to God's will as well as this consciousness of such contradiction itself is to be found only in noble souls; in others their success in meeting the external demands of the law produces a sense of pride and haughty self-sufficiency which hinders the work of restoration just as much as, or even more than a flagrant disregard of the law.

Neither can more than a mere preparation for the new life be accomplished by imitating the examples of pious lives in the Old Testament or even the example of Jesus himself, in whose life the holiness demanded by the law became a tangible reality, took on flesh and blood, as it were. It is said, "*Exempla trahunt*" and

"pictures and examples have educative value." And we shall have to admit that especially the contemplation of the holy life of Jesus can most certainly and readily prepare for the reception of the new life. The moral ideal is seen more clearly, man recognizes how much he comes short of that ideal and is stimulated to greater effort to meet it. But the final result does not reach beyond that attained by the law. Examples, too, can give no new powers to a man that is dead in trespasses and sins, they cannot fill him with the breath of spiritual life. But if the dead law graven in tablets of stone is able to bring men nearer to the kingdom of God, then certainly the law as enlivened by the examples of holy men can effect this all the more.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL BASIS AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE CREATION OF THE NEW LIFE

Since the law alone could never have produced a new life, God revealed himself anew in his Son Jesus Christ, and He did this precisely at the time when it had become evident that the law was insufficient for this purpose and when the Gentile world had become conscious of its own impotency to rejuvenate itself, in other words, in the fullness of time (Gal. 4:4). He sent Him to the end that by his perfect obedience He might accomplish the great work of satisfying expiation, the *satisfactio* and the ἱλασμός or covering up of sins (I John 2:2; Rom. 3:25f.), the blessed consequences of which were reconciliation with God, the καταλλαγή (II Cor. 5:19), and redemption, the ἀπολύτρωσις, ἐξαγοράζεσθαι (Gal. 3:13) from sin, death and the devil. This work of expiation was to be the basis for the creation of a new life in man as Paul clearly states in Rom. 7:25b-8:11, especially in the purpose clause: "that the requirement of the law might be fully met in our case." The ultimate purpose of the work of Jesus was not expiation. This was rather to be the means toward the final goal, which was the creation of a people of God who should rest in communion with their God, recognize the will of God as their highest and only norm, and

live accordingly. Compare in this connection especially Exod. 19:6; I Pet. 2:9; Tit. 2:14, and all those passages in the Savior's last discourses where He speaks of going to the Father in order to send the Holy Spirit to his own, for example, John 16:7. Only when by the way of suffering He had entered into glory could Jesus send the Holy Spirit, and He does send Him now for no other purpose but that He should be the Creator of the new life on earth, that He might subjectively renew man even as Christ had objectively already made all things new. All the Old Testament prophecy pointed to this coming of the Spirit made possible by Christ's redemptive work (cf. Joel 2:28ff.; especially Ezek. 36:26f.). And when the Spirit did appear as a "harvest blessing from the grave of Jesus," Paul could point to Him as the most distinctive feature of the New Testament in comparison with the Old (Gal. 3:2) and say expressly that Christ redeemed us to this end "that we might receive the promised Spirit through faith" (Gal. 3:14). Through the Spirit, then, God would create unto himself that peculiar people zealous of good works, after it has been justified by faith created by the selfsame Spirit (Tit. 3:5f.). Thus the work of Christ forms the basis for the creation of the new life. And even all spiritual life manifested under the Old Dispensation was possible only because of the work of Christ, which was accepted by faith as a future reality Rom. 3:26, and this accepting faith in turn was wrought by the word of promise.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CREATION OF THE NEW LIFE THROUGH REGENERATION BY THE HOLY SPIRIT

The creation of the new life is brought about by the Holy Spirit, whose coming was made possible through the redemptive work of Christ, and who is present for us in the Word and in the sacraments. The Scriptures testify to this when they speak of regeneration (παλιγγενεσία, Tit. 3:5) through Word and Spirit, or of being born of God (γεννηθῆναι, John 3:3-8; 1:13; I John 3:9; 4:7; 5:1, 4, 18; I Pet. 1:23; cf. James 1:18) or of a καινὴ κτίσις (Gal. 6:15; cf. 2:20; II Cor. 5:15, 17); and when they declare that Christians are "his workmanship created in Christ Jesus unto good works" (Eph. 2:10).

The very words "regeneration" and "creation" indicate that the establishment of the new life means more than a mere change or improvement of something already present; they imply that, even as in the first creation and in physical birth, a new beginning is made, a new life which did not exist before is called into being. However, although an actual generation takes place, it appears in the form of a re-generation, that is, the present substance of man is not destroyed, the

result of the first creation is not annihilated, but man as he is is reborn, in which act that part of him which is of God is preserved and merely purified thoroughly of the depravity which had permeated it entirely. The natural man is taken back as it were into the womb of divine creative power and comes forth from it a new creature. His past life of sin is wiped out by the forgiveness of sin, and by the Holy Spirit a new man, a new beginning, is brought forth endowed with new powers and faculties which he did not possess before. Regeneration is a process that takes place in the very center of life, the heart, and by it the innermost and essential parts of the human personality are transformed; but—again corresponding to physical birth—in such a way that the re-creation takes place primarily only in that center, from which it will then gradually penetrate the entire sphere of human nature. *Figuratively* speaking, a germ is planted which is to develop and has in itself the power to develop, but which is not yet the fully developed spiritual life itself.

Again, the Biblical terms “regeneration” and “new creature” also indicate that the creation of the spiritual life is exclusively an act of God which man can only experience but in which he cannot in the least take any active part; when effected he can comprehend it as something that has taken place in him but he can add nothing to it himself. In regeneration man remains entirely passive. This excludes every kind of semi-pelagianism and synergism, according to which the

natural man being only more or less dead, is merely assisted by the life-giving powers of the Spirit, or his inherent spiritual powers, which are bound and enfeebled by sin, are said to be freed and revived so that man can at least submit himself to the gracious operations of the Spirit when He approaches him.

While it is necessary to maintain most emphatically that man's relation to his regeneration is a purely passive one, yet this must not be understood as though man were dealt with as a mere thing or impersonal object. Regeneration is not a matter of divine coercion whereby the new life is forced upon man. It is an established fact of Christian experience that man can effectively resist the gracious work of the Spirit and thus frustrate the regeneration intended by God. Even in his sinful state man retains his personality, which includes a *capacitas passiva* for regeneration. There remains in the natural man a point of contact for the Holy Spirit working through Word and sacrament since he, though despoiled of his capacity of knowing and willing what is good in God's sight, still retains his capacity to know and to will as such. The Spirit adapts his work to this capacity and respects man's personality.

These three factors (a really new creation, complete passivity of man, regard for man's personality and absence of all coercion) constitute the limits which must be observed in any sound doctrine concerning the restoration of the natural man to a new life.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RESTORATION IN DETAIL

In order to awaken man who is dead in trespasses and sins to a new life, the Holy Spirit comes to him as the Spirit of the exalted Lord. He would produce in him a personal relationship, hence He appeals to those personal capacities which man retains even in his most depraved condition, the capacities of knowing and willing. Now the best means of appeal to intellect and will is the word, and therefore it is in the Word that the Spirit approaches him (*vocatio, invitatio*). Man can in no wise prepare himself for the Spirit's work, for in his heart dwells enmity against God: he can only resist the working of God's Spirit. This innate resistance found in all natural-born descendants of Adam and therefore termed "natural resistance", however, includes the possibility of a twofold attitude on the part of man toward the Word. Either he avoids it, refuses to hear it, ridicules and scoffs at it, and thus forestalls the approach of the Spirit to his heart from the very beginning so that He cannot even begin his beneficent activity through the Word—in this case the innate enmity of man toward God becomes strikingly evident and rules uncontested

and supreme; or man represses these active manifestations of his innate resistance by means of the remnant of moral powers which are still his according to Rom. 2:14 and Gen. 4:7, and, impelled by the warning voice of his conscience, he hears the Word, hears it perhaps even with attention and interest. In this latter case nothing which lies beyond the pale of natural man has yet occurred, man has merely become conscious of the Word in the same manner as he receives anything else into his consciousness. But he has come under the influence of the Word of God, and this Word, though the natural man fails to distinguish it from the word of man, is nevertheless different from every other word inasmuch as there is creative power (*efficacia verbi*) inherent in it and this power is effective even in those who do not as yet recognize it as God's Word. Of course, its creative power does not become effective in all immediately upon the first contact. It is a part of the majesty of divine pedagogy that God's Word is proclaimed to, and proves its creative power in, nations as well as individuals "where and when it pleaseth Him" (Augsburg Confession, Article 5). Whenever God's time has not yet come for the individual, the Word indeed has an effect in him, but only to this extent that it stirs up within him that which is already present in the natural man. For when the Word of God proclaims the seriousness of God's judgment and the mercy of his love, man's conscience is touched, a desire is awakened for something higher and better, he

tells himself that he simply cannot go on this way any longer, his soul longs to be delivered from its present condition. But neither does such an attitude signify a real surrender of self nor does it involve a God-pleasing desire for salvation; the innate resistance still continues in the hidden recesses of the heart and opposes the longing for salvation (Rom. 8:7). Such a condition may continue for a long time, and unless God takes hold anew no actual regeneration can take place.

But when God's time and hour for the individual have come (Augsburg Confession, Article 5; cf. John 3:8) and man, perhaps through some providential experience in life, has been made more susceptible to the divine Word, that Word now begins to exercise its full creative power. It may be that it is preached to him anew, it may be that what has been heard before now returns from beneath the threshold of his consciousness—in either case it now begins to affect him in an entirely new way (*vocatio efficax*). He is pricked in his heart (Acts 2:37), his heart is opened (Acts 16:14), the drawing of the Father to the Son sets in (John 6:44). The illuminating work of the Word (*illuminatio legalis*) begins, God the holy and righteous Judge becomes an awful reality, and in a flash as of lightning his whole past life of sin stands revealed before him. His heart trembles with fear, his punishment looms up ominously, and he would like nothing better than to escape from the presence of the Almighty. For he is not yet a new man, the new life

which turns away from sin and looks longingly to God and Christ is not yet present within him; he has merely become conscious of God's terrible wrath over sin and this consciousness strikes him down (*terrores conscientiae incussi*), crushes his heart, and temporarily brings to a halt his natural resistance, i. e. it makes him *mere passive* (Form. Concord, Art. II, 54).

But the Word of God is also Gospel, it is the message of divine grace, of forgiveness of sins through Christ, full of lifegiving power. In *the very moment*—because Scripture knows of no state of religious neutrality—when man through the law has been made entirely passive, the Gospel points him to Christ and his inviting Savior-love, and the Spirit working through that Gospel in a mysterious, creative way brings about a new understanding and new powers of the will, new inner motions. He provides, again through the creative power of the Word, the organ which is able to receive the Word, even Christ himself as a personal Savior. This organ is faith which, depending on the Word, says, "I know that the Father will forgive and receive me in grace for the sake of his Son." Immediately connected with this faith is deep contrition at having offended such a gracious God, for without this contrition there can be no justifying faith. Where this faith has been created in the heart of man there the new life exists. It may be weak as yet, but it is there, a new man has been born. The old man, to be sure, has by no means been extirpated, he too is still there and

will continue to be there as long as man lives, but he has been driven from the center to the periphery and the tendency of the renewed will is to oppose the flesh and to submit with ever increasing determination to Christ. Man's mind is now renewed, repentance, μετάνοια, that complete change of mind, has taken place; man has turned away from sin and turned to God.

The above mentioned workings of the Law are involuntary and inevitable (*motus inevitabiles*) according to Acts 24:25; all who do not from the beginning close their hearts to the Word are subject to them. It is otherwise with the workings of the Gospel. These are not inevitable, man can close his heart to them, for there is no *gratia irresistibilis* (Matt. 23:27). Whenever therefore a new life has been wrought in man, it exists by virtue of an act of divine creation indeed and man's part has been a purely passive one, yet his personality has not been violated, for all along it was possible for him to will otherwise and to resist. Should man, therefore, decide to close his heart to the faith-creating voice of the Gospel, then, of course, in the same moment his momentary condition of pure passivity ceases to exist, he naturally revolts against the judgment of God, though he may feel that it is impending and that he will never be able to rid himself of its prick (Acts 7:51). Natural resistance has now taken the form of willful resistance and the time of grace has passed unheeded; the burden of guilt, however, which already rested heavily on man has now become much greater.

Often God grants additional times of grace (Job 33:29), but not always, and herein lies the awful seriousness of the hour of grace. For this reason the Scriptures admonish us, "Today if ye hear his voice, harden not your hearts" (Ps. 95:7). Why to the one an additional hour of grace is granted and not to another is a question that belongs to the realm of God's hidden will.

If now the question is asked whether the creation of the new life (repentance, conversion, regeneration) constitutes a process or a momentary act, the answer will depend upon the sense of the question. If it is intended to include the invitation of God to enter his kingdom, then certainly we must speak of a process, one in fact which may extend over a period of years, so long indeed that one might speak of a history of his conversion. Should one, however, leave out of consideration all the so-called preparations inasmuch as they do not in any way change or regenerate the heart, and include only that activity of God which begins at precisely the time and hour set for the particular individual, even then we can speak of a process, provided we want to maintain that the *terrores conscientiae incussi* must necessarily precede the creation of faith. In this case it is important to remember that the *terrores* in no sense bring about something new, they merely strike down the natural resistance of man and that only momentarily, and also that frequently the *terrores* and the creation of faith are so nearly contemporaneous

that only a logical, not a temporal separation is possible. But if we mean to exclude entirely the *terrores conscientiae* brought about by the law for the reason that they do not effect anything new, if we mean to speak exclusively of the creating of the new, as is done in Acts 11:21, then conversion is an act and not a process. In other words, the statements, "Conversion is a process" and "Conversion is an act" must always be precisely defined before we can give a satisfactory answer.

If by conversion we mean both the *terrores conscientiae* and the creative planting of faith, it is quite possible to recall the exact time of conversion; to maintain, however, that this must always be the case is an error of Methodism. The possibility of a definite recall depends upon the circumstances surrounding the experience, on the individuality of the convert (with choleric characters the struggle is more vehement), and on the ability of self-observation. It is much more important to stress the necessity of *daily* conversion—a matter which Methodism likes to forget or denies outright—than to be able to state definitely the time of conversion.

In our discussion above we had in mind adults and unbaptized persons. The New Testament passages proceed from the same basis. In the case of persons who have been baptized in infancy allowance must be made for certain differences, although the essential factors remain the same. In the case of persons baptized in infancy who have fallen from baptismal grace, God will be concerned about bringing his grace to them anew in his Word so that it may produce faith in them; on their own part the process will be as described. The claim that the "seed of regeneration" remains in all who have been baptized even though they lose their faith, is either a purely human invention or else it is based on a misunderstanding of I John 3:9. Those, however, who were baptized in infancy and who by God's grace have been preserved from willful sinning and have retained their baptismal grace, are in need only of daily conversion, which we shall discuss later.

The passage I John 3:9, which has just been referred to, is frequently misunderstood. The perfectionists appeal to it in their

effort to prove that a Christian here on earth can reach a condition of perfect sinlessness. Others use it as a basis for the claim that a baptized person retains the new life that has been planted in him even when he has sinned deliberately and consciously. Both views are wrong. If I John 3:9 is not to be taken as a direct contradiction of I John 1:8 it can only mean this: The Christian, inasmuch as he still has the old man in himself, indeed sometimes sins by reason of his ignorance, weakness, or because for the moment he has been caught off his guard, and for that reason he still daily needs forgiveness; but the regenerate man, that is, the Christian *in so far as* he has the new man within himself, does not sin; he *cannot* sin, for how could the new life that was given him by God turn against God and sin? But when the Christian on account of the old man that still cleaves to him does fall into such sins of ignorance or weakness he does not on that account lose the "seed" that was planted in him in his regeneration, that is, the Holy Spirit who has entered into him in his regeneration as the Creator of the new life remains in him notwithstanding such sins of weakness or ignorance. However, sins that are committed with a deliberate purpose will entail the loss of that "seed," that is, the Holy Spirit will leave such a person and with his departure the new life that was called forth by Him in man will die. God's arms opened in Baptism, of course, will remain open for him to the end that he can turn back to them, but the Holy Spirit and the new life created by Him are lost. Cf. chapters 21 and 24.

As we consider in detail the effects brought forth by the divine activity in the human heart which constitute the new life (repentance, conversion, regeneration), we must discuss in particular contrition and faith, for it is by the production of these two that the new life in man is brought forth. Of contrition our Confessions, in distinction from Rome, insist that it is a moral event taking place in the center of personal life, the heart, and that it consists essentially in the pangs of conscience before the divine Judge (*terrores conscientiae incussi*). The penitential psalms (Ps. 6:2,

4, 7; 51:8, 12, 17), Luther's experience, and our own personal experience corroborate this view. When God in his Word faces man as the Holy and Righteous One who cannot condone sin (Ps. 5:4f.) but opposes it with all the rigor of his holiness, i. e., his wrath (Rom. 1:18; Ps. 38:1; cf. Deut. 32:22); and when man then, enlightened by the Word, looks at his own life and beholds nothing but sin and unrighteousness, not merely a number of individual sinful deeds but his whole life and nature poisoned and contaminated by original sin; and when every effort at self-justification before the all-knowing God appears futile—then it cannot be otherwise but that man is terrified by the holiness of God and his avenging wrath, that fear and trembling fill his very heart and soul, and that he stands thus smitten before his Judge. The degree of fear will vary with different men in accordance with their individualities and experiences in life, but in some form it must always be present where there is true contrition.

Faith is produced in the very moment when the impending judgments of God have made man purely passive. It may be defined to begin with in a purely formal way as *fiducia*, that is, a Spirit-wrought trust and confidence, a rocklike assurance. This is indicated by the Hebrew word for believing, אָמֵן, which connotes "holding fast to something, leaning on something", as well as by the Greek word πιστεύειν, which etymologically signifies "to have confidence in, to rely upon," and in connection with which above all the

personal object used with it and the construction πιστεύειν ἐπὶ τινι and ἐν τινι are to be noted, the latter signifying "to rest upon, to rest in". It is further indicated in Hebr. 11:1, where faith is characterized as ὑπόστασις, a firm assurance of things hoped for, and as ἔλεγχος, a state of being confident, convinced of things not seen. The things upon which faith relies, then, do not belong to the sphere of this visible world with its laws of cause and effect, they are not things which can be investigated, seen, understood, and known after such investigation, but they belong to the world of invisible things that cannot be apprehended with our natural senses. Faith is the eye with which we see the things of that invisible world, placed before us by means of the Word, it is a conviction concerning the things held forth by Scripture not to be shaken, even where the evidences of the physical world and of natural experience seem to contradict. Compare what is said of Abraham, Rom. 4:18: "Who against hope believed in hope," and the contrast drawn by Paul in II Cor. 5:7-8 between believing on earth and seeing in heaven: "We walk by faith and not by sight." Again, faith is a conviction of things which belong not to the present but to the future time, or if to the present time then never to sensible, tangible things but to the invisible realm which can be recognized and apprehended only with a new organ created by the Spirit. And these invisible things are so sure to the believer that he

would rather depend on them than on visible things, that he would even forego the latter in favor of the former. They are so real to him that he would "die for them a thousand times." The opposite of faith is doubt, which can be assured of things only by physical sight or sound.

Materially we can determine the essence of faith by considering its object and content. The object of justifying and saving faith is not simply God in his almighty power, goodness, etc., but Christ (John 3:16; 6:40; I John 5:13). "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ" is the motto of the entire New Testament. Whosoever denieth the Son denieth the Father also, for He will be known and believed only in the Son (John 8:19; 12:44; I John 2:23). But Christ is the object of faith not as a worker of miracles nor as a teacher and prophet who reveals the divine will, but as the crucified, risen and living Christ who became our Redeemer by passing through death and resurrection. Again, Christ is the object of faith not because He is the Savior of the world but because He has become my Savior (cf. the classical passage Gal. 2:20). The Savior who for me has passed through death and resurrection is the person in whom my faith confides, on whom it depends. He is the foundation on which it rests (πιστεύω ἐπὶ τῷ Χριστῷ, Rom. 10:11), the area over which it extends (πιστεύω ἐπὶ τὸν Χριστόν, Acts 16:31), the point toward which it moves or the goal toward which it strives (πιστεύω εἰς τὸν Χριστόν,

John 3:36), the person in whom it rests (πιστεύω ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, Gal. 3:26, or, if this passage should require a different construction, Eph. 1:15). Thus faith is a relationship of person to person. Man, who feels the terrors of conscience, who in contrition has come to the conviction that he cannot stand before God the Holy One but has deserved his wrath and must flee from Him, this man by his faith, that God-given organ for the apprehension of supernatural realities, that eye, that inner light (II Cor. 4:6; Eph. 1:18), beholds Christ the Savior, the Mediator, standing between him and God's avenging justice, and he trusts Him, trusts that He can save him, that He has already saved him, has borne the burden of his sins, has propitiated his guilt, that is, covered it up, and has effected for him and for all the world a change from a relationship of wrath between God and man to one of peace. Christ comes to man in the means of grace, outside of them He is nowhere to be found. In these man apprehends Christ and receives Him into his life as the great *Expiator* and *Reconciliator* in whom there is righteousness even for him; through the means of grace he gains the confidence that for Christ's sake the Father's heart is no longer filled with wrath toward him, but with tender, gracious love. And finally, it is the nature of this inner life-movement which we call faith that it not only receives Christ but that, in turn, the believer also surrenders himself unreservedly to Him.

We may say, then, that *fiducia*, that trust in Christ as my Savior from sin wrought by the Holy Spirit through the means of grace, really includes three factors, which are separable logically though not in time: 1. A cognition and recognition of salvation in Christ as wrought for me and intended for me; 2. An apprehension of Christ and that salvation and a reception of it into my heart; 3. An active and confident surrender of my whole self to Christ.

Now in the very moment when faith is thus created by God in the sinner who is smitten by the wrath of God, deep mortification also seizes him at having so grievously offended God. Having come by faith to a knowledge of the wonderful grace of God, his entire past life now appears to him as one of continuous base ingratitude, and a deep sense of shame fills his heart on account of his sins. Faith is not genuine without this mortification as an immediate and ever present concomitant. It is only this sense of shame over the disgracefulness of sin and this heartfelt sorrow that one has so deeply insulted and angered such a kind and gracious God, that really "crushes" (cf. the meaning of *contritio*) and mortifies the love of sin and the purpose to sin again—not indeed as though that love and that purpose now could never return, for the old man after all has not been eradicated in conversion—but at least for the time being, for how could sorrow for sin and the purpose to continue in sin be found together? On the other hand, it

is only by faith that man comes really to hate and abhor sin for its own sake because it pollutes him and separates him from his God. It is only this heartache that really makes contrition complete. Where faith and its inevitable companion, sorrow and grief over sin, are wanting, where man is only struck down by the judgment of God (*terrores conscientiae incussi*), there contrition has only been forced upon him, it is a *passio et afflictio quam conscientia velit nolit pati cogitur*, a sorrow like that of Cain or Judas, a dread of God's anger and judgment, a sorrow because of the consequences of sin and not because of the very sinfulness of sin. This is the "sorrow of the world which worketh death," it cannot lead to true μετάνοια, to faith, and therefore not to life and salvation. On the other hand, where faith has laid hold on the good and gracious God and where the pain at having so grievously offended such a God fills the heart, there we may speak of true μετάνοια, a μετάνοια εἰς σωτηρίαν (II Cor. 7:10).

Such μετάνοια marks the beginning of the new life in man, it is not, however, regeneration in the wider sense of the term. This includes also justification and mystical union. God the Father for the sake of Jesus Christ declares the sinner justified, and they and the Holy Spirit, the entire Trinity, enter in and take possession of man's heart as the governing principle and power of the new life. Were it possible to distinguish between the three elements of faith in a

temporal sense—it can be done only logically—then the sinner's justification would take place after the second element and before the third, the surrender of the whole self to Christ. Justification consists in this that God the Father for the sake of Christ appropriated by faith no longer looks upon man's old sinful self, that by forgiveness He removes it from his sight, so that the same man now stands before Him new, just and holy, his beloved child in whom He is well pleased. And the immediate consequence of this justification is the indwelling of the Spirit, yes, of the entire Trinity in the justified man (John 14:23; 17:23; Gal. 2:20; cf. II Cor. 13:5; Col. 1:27 and Hosea 2:19). A union thus results which is not merely an ethical union as we have it already at the moment faith is born, nor a personal union such as exists between God and man in the person of Christ; the difference between creature and Creator is in no sense abrogated; yet it is a union as real and intimate as can possibly be conceived without abrogating this difference; and again, this union is capable of becoming even more complete and intimate in the life to come when "we shall be partakers of the divine nature" (II Pet. 1:4). This completes regeneration in the wider sense; man has now indeed become a new creature, a *καὶνὴ κτίσις* (II Cor. 5:17; Gal. 6:15). It corresponds to the divine economy of salvation that Father and Son should work through the Spirit. Since Pentecost He stands in the foreground. He is now the source and principle, the

abiding foundation and the supporting power of the Christian's life.

Of course, sin has not been eradicated from man's nature because of his regeneration and the indwelling of the Spirit; it is still present in man both as a defect and as an affect, as lack and weakness as well as evil desire and inclination; but it has been forced from a central to a peripheric position, into the sphere of the elemental impulses and the urges arising from temperament. The Scriptures refer to this whole sin-infested sphere by the term *σάϑξ*. Its continual presence is a fact, but its dominion over the intellect and the will has been so restrained that the new man can now speak of sin as of a strange force separate and distinct from his "I" (Rom. 7:17). The blindness which disabled the natural man from discerning spiritual things has been removed from the eyes of his intellect, and through the power of the indwelling Spirit it is not only possible for him to recognize spiritual things but the light of the true knowledge has actually been kindled in him (I John 2:20, 27; I Cor. 2:15). The impotency of the will has been removed and real freedom restored, so that man can now will the things that God wills (John 8:32, 36), in fact, the Spirit that dwells within him impels him in that direction (II Cor. 3:17; Rom. 8:2, 14; Gal. 5:18). Selfishness and indifference have been removed from the heart and the love of God that was poured out upon him has filled the believer's heart with thankful love for God (Rom.

8:15; I John 4:19). Peace and joy in his communion with God give him a foretaste of eternal bliss (Rom. 5:1ff.). The conscience, too has been renewed, although on account of the influence of the old man it is not yet restored to absolute trustworthiness. And even the body has been made to share in this renewal of the soul, for it is now a temple of the Holy Spirit and an instrument for the manifestation of the new life (I Cor. 6:15ff.; Rom. 12:1).

PART II

THE PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CHRISTIAN LIFE

A. THE PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AS SUCH

CHAPTER XIX

THE NATURE OF THE NEW LIFE BROUGHT ABOUT THROUGH REGENERATION

The new life which is present in the Christian after his justification and mystical union with God consists essentially of contrition and faith. Without contrition and faith man could not become a new creature; without it he cannot remain one. Properly combined these two elements constitute the Christian life. The Christian must not remain in a state of mind where the grief over sin completely dominates him but must ever again advance by faith to an appropriation of the divine comfort in the forgiveness of sin; yet he must never think of the grief over sin as something now outlived and antiquated and hence to be cast aside in favor of a continuous indulgence in sentimental feelings of grace. Both his contrition and his faith must suffer in such a case. His contrition becomes formal, artificial; his faith is reduced to a mere feeling if not to a vain imagination, and the entire Christian life becomes a matter of sentimental emotionalism. And where there is no continual advance in the

appropriation of grace by faith, the Christian life will lose its character of peace and joy, and gloom and despair will be forever knocking at the door. In the normal Christian life the terror and grief of contrition must ever be inseparably united with that comfort and peace which is brought about by faith (cf. Augsburg Confession, Article 12), so that the *mortificatio* is always dissolved by the *vivificatio*—not once and for ever, but ever again anew. This continuous contrition and continuous faith in their constant interaction is an evidence of the soundness of daily repentance and conversion, and thus also of the soundness of the new life brought about by regeneration.

Inasmuch as genuine faith can neither come about nor endure in truth and fullness without contrition it is also proper simply to say that faith is the essence of the new life. Christian life is a life of faith (Gal. 2:20; Rom. 1:17). Where the Christian daily turns away from sin and toward Christ, the Redeemer, so that not he but Christ may live in him, there we have the new life. By faith we become Christians, and by faith we are Christians. Where faith ends there the new life ends and the former spiritual death reigns again, for Christ is appropriated only by faith and dwells in us only by faith; and where Christ and his Spirit dwell not in man, how can the new life continue in him?

Where true faith is, there is also love. One is created together with the other. To be sure, in the act

of justification faith is considered as the *organon leptikon* and in no wise as the root or germ from which good works proceed, but that does not exclude the fact that love and faith are born together. This is evident from the nature of each, for love is an emptying of self for the purpose of surrendering to another, and faith is precisely that also; nowhere else in all the world can such a measure of self-abandonment be found as where man in faith capitulates, despairs of himself and everything that he is and has, and sinks into the arms of God's grace, there to find the fullness of life and complete and true satisfaction. As little as heat and light can be separated from fire but belong to its very nature, so little can love be separated from faith: it is *eo ipso* a part of it. For this reason John frequently uses the term "love" where we should expect him to use "faith", for example in John 14:23f., in explanation of which passage Luther says, "Faith and love are one." The older dogmatists called this side of faith the operative side in distinction from the receptive side which alone is considered in the act of justification. "*Sola fides justificat, at nec est nec manet sola,*" compare Formula of Concord, Art. III, 41.

According to I John 5:1 faith already includes both the love of God and the love of the brethren. Nor could this be otherwise, for those who love God must needs love those also who bear the image of God (James 3:9). Love of God without love of the brethren is self-deception and a lie (I John 4:20).

Again, the consequence of brotherly love is charity in general (II Pet. 1:7) including the whole wide circle of those not yet members of the Kingdom. To be sure, he who believes in God and loves Him will avoid, oppose, even hate them insofar as they are enemies of God (Ps. 139:21, 22); but since he is also aware that they have been created in God's image, that they are lost without Christ, that Christ has redeemed them, and that it is the Father's will that they should become God's children and the Christian's brethren in the faith, he is constrained to include them also in his love. How could he truly love God if he were to exclude from his love those whom the love of God embraces? Now we can understand too, why a love of God that is born of faith must even include the love of the enemies, and why in fact this love must ever be a mark of the perfect Christian man (Matt. 5:44). This love is possible because the Christian's love for his neighbor is not determined by motives of natural sympathy or antipathy, but because his love proceeds from the love of God who with the floodtide of his love covered even the sins of his enemies and made atonement for them. We observe then that love in all its ramifications is *eo ipso* posited with faith, and so we are justified in speaking of the Christian life not as a life of faith and love but simply as a life of faith.

But the fact that faith and love are synonymous in no wise precludes the other fact that consequent acts of the will must with conscious intention bring about

those very things which unconsciously and instinctively have already been effected and continue to be effected; even as the direct acts of faith by which salvation is immediately apprehended do not preclude those purposeful later acts, those activities of the intellect and will, which make us ever more conscious of God's grace and seize upon it with ever increasing energy. The Christian life is a life which daily experiences the grace of God as an ever new and greater element of consciousness. And every experience of such love and grace constitutes a new motive for the Christian to return love for love; every remembrance thereof impels him to resolve anew to love God and thus to set in motion what is already in him by reason of his faith. That which he feels within him as a natural impulse now appears to him as a duty (ὁφείλομεν, I John 4:11). And in the same measure as the Christian experiences God's love and becomes conscious of it, he now feels it as a duty, in fact a command, to requite that love (John 13:24), and this is an ever new motive for him to exercise, with a will, his urge to love. For this reason Jesus calls the commandment to love, which He gives, a new commandment (John 13:44; I John 2:8), notwithstanding the fact that the Old Testament had already demanded love of God and based this demand on God's love for man (Deut. 11:1 compared with chapter 10). The love of God had never been revealed so perfectly as in Christ, in Him it appeared in an altogether new way, and therefore

on the part of the Christian the demand to love cannot but be felt as a new commandment. He is now to love even as Christ loved (John 13:34b). If Christ's love was a new love never before revealed in so rich a measure, then the Christian's love must also be new and in a measure never before asked or practiced. And that in the course of the Christian's life every new experience of divine love is a new challenge to requite such love, is plainly evident from I John 2:7-8. But this new self-determination to love does not exclude the fact that love is already given with faith. Love is simply faith in action; hence we reiterate the statement that the Christian life is a life of love only insofar as it is a life of faith.

And again, because it is a life of faith it is also a life of hope, for hope too is already contained in faith. Both apprehend invisible realities: faith those realities which have been accomplished, hope those which are yet to be accomplished. For this reason the outstanding characteristic of faith in the Old Testament was hope. Faith has the same relation to hope as our present state of grace has to the future state of glory. Now our future state is not essentially different from the present as though something entirely new were to be added to it, but the present rather already includes the future and the latter is but the fuller realization and development of that which is present even now as a germ or vital beginning. As we lay hold on Christ by faith we also take hold

of our salvation in all its essential fullness; for his sake and in Him all is already ours. We live in a state of blessedness even now for we are in actual communion with Christ, but we also wait for our future bliss. Cf. John 5:24; I John 3:14; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:15; Rom. 8:15ff. with 8:23; Eph. 4:30. And just as we shall enjoy no future salvation which is not already somehow a present salvation and included in it, so hope is included in faith. For this reason the Epistle to the Hebrews can define faith as a "conviction about things that we cannot see," which corresponds to the usual definition of faith, but also as the "assurance of what we hope for," which corresponds to the usual definition of hope. And for the same reason Paul can contrast hope and sight in Rom. 8:24-25 as well as faith and sight in II Cor. 5:7, and can say that we are saved διὰ τῆς πίστεως (Eph. 2:8) just as truly as τῇ ἐλπίδι (Rom. 8:24).

The Gentiles are referred to in the Scriptures as those who have no hope (Eph. 2:12), and the Christians are admonished "that ye sorrow not even as others which have no hope" (I Thess. 4:13). Hope is, therefore, no less characteristic of the Christian life than love (John 13:35). However, both love and hope are already contained in faith and it follows then that the Christian life, although a life of faith, love and hope, in its last analysis is a unified life. These three elements are so intimately united with each other that where the one is there the others are also. They

represent one and the same life-principle, manifesting itself in three different ways and so indicating the richness of its essence. Nor can I Cor. 13:13b hinder us from giving first place to faith. Paul's judgment as expressed in this passage is not absolute but relative, determined by the context and limited to the importance of love for the Christian social relationships. (Bengel: *Amor proximo plus prodest quam fides et spes per se.*) Harless once characterized the unity of the essence as well as the diversity of the manifestations of these elements of the Christian life as follows: "Faith hangs on the word of promise, love on that God who gives, hope on the promised inheritance. Faith receives and has, love gives, hope waits. Faith makes the heart firm, love makes it soft, hope expands it. Faith holds fast to what it has received, love gives up what it has received, hope triumphs over what is wanting. Faith capacitates us for dominion over this world, love for ministering to this world, hope for renunciation of this world. Faith rests on that wherein it has for this present time full sufficiency; love acts and finds employment in that in which it can never satisfy itself; hope loses itself in that which lifts it above all the sufficiency and insufficiency of this world. Faith is the confidence in what one hopes for; love the proof of this, that one has faith; hope the taking possession, before we have reached the goal, of that which we have learned by faith to love and to yearn

after." (*Christian Ethics*, Morrison's Translation, p. 165f.)

This unity of the three essential elements of the Christian life cannot be called into question on the ground that the Scriptures sometimes mention them separately side by side, as in I Thess. 1:3; 5:8; Col. 1:4; especially I Cor. 13:13; for here each individual element is mentioned separately for pedagogical reasons lest the manifestation of the unity fail in any respect. The final proof for the unity of this triad in the Christian life on earth is found in I Cor. 13:13, where even the life to come, the consummate life, is said to be a life of faith, love, and hope (The *νυνὶ δέ* is not to be taken in a temporal but in a logical sense: "And now", while all those charismatic gifts, γ. 8, shall cease, faith, love and hope shall remain). It will be a life of faith, for the believing soul clings ever anew to Christ and confides in Him; of love, for it lives in constant communion with God; of hope, for it will experience ever new unfoldings of the eternal glory of God.

We repeat then: the Christian life is a life of faith, and because it is that it is at the same time a life of love and hope.

CHAPTER XX

THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

The Christian life, which we have described as a life of faith, must be preserved as a precious gift of God's grace. The disciples, who have become branches of Christ the vine, are repeatedly and earnestly admonished to abide in Him (John 15:1-10), and the aged St. John never tires of this same admonition (I John 2:28; 3:24; 4:13). Abiding in Christ is the simplest term for self-preservation, for maintaining the new life that has been begun in us. The other admonition is essentially the same: "Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown" (Rev. 3:11). We are victors even now because by faith we are members of Him who has overcome the world (John 16:33) and because our life is a life that is born of the life of Christ and permeated by it. But we cannot remain what we have become without moral effort on our part. Only he can remain what he is who daily becomes anew what he is. Personal effort is necessary to retain, in spite of all enemies, that which one has and to "stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free" (Gal 5:1). To this

end the Holy Spirit and the new man must work together. And nothing is more self-evident for the Christian who has become assured of his salvation in Christ than that he must now abide in Him and preserve his new life. If he continues as a child and heir, which he has become through justification, he knows that he will also obtain the final God-given goal of his life. The greatest thing about the evangelical doctrine of grace is the assurance that our final redemption and salvation do not depend upon our attainment of this or that degree of moral perfection but exclusively upon our being found in that state of righteousness into which we enter by faith. The true Christian understands that this does not in any way suspend his own need of continued progress in sanctification, in fact, this is so obvious to him that he cannot do otherwise than to strive for it daily. But his chief prayer will always be: Lord, let not the consolation of faith depart from me!

Now if this self-preservation is of the right kind it will necessarily also include self-development. By remaining what he has become the Christian gradually undergoes a change. Life does not stand still, as it endures it develops and grows, its inner powers unfold, that which was contained in it from the beginning as a living germ takes on form so that it becomes apparent to all. The new life would not be a real life at all if it did not unfold and develop, for all life is movement, growth. Besides, the spiritual

life produced by regeneration is in fact only the beginning of a new life. The heart, the center of human personality, has been renewed, and now the whole of life from this center to its utmost periphery must be permeated and renovated. For this reason the Scriptures so frequently declare that the Christian must increase in the knowledge of God, be filled with the knowledge of his will in all wisdom and understanding, grow up into Him in all things which is the head, even Christ, that the man of God may be perfect (Col. 1:9, 10; Eph. 4:15; II Tim. 3:17). Self-preservation and self-development, therefore, constitute the twofold obligation for every Christian.

1. THE PRESERVATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

CHAPTER XXI

THE PRESERVATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AS TAKING PLACE THROUGH DAILY CONTRITION AND FAITH

It is an old saying that an empire can be maintained only by the same means through which it has been founded. This saying is true also of the Christian life, for this too can be maintained only by the constant repetition of those experiences through which the Christian originally entered the state of grace and justification. Now those experiences were contrition and faith, for in contrition he turned away from sin and in faith he turned toward God. Only the constant repetition of these inward experiences can preserve him in the state of grace.

Aside from these general considerations the necessity of a daily renewal of contrition and faith for the preservation of the Christian life becomes evident from several particular facts. The necessity of a daily renewal of contrition follows from the very nature and the constantly repeated experience of the believer. The Christian knows that in his regeneration his old ego, that is, the original content of his formal

faculties of knowing and willing, has indeed been driven from the center of his life, but it has not been eradicated. Now, after he has become a believer, this old ego tends ever to turn back to the things of this world which were left behind in conversion, to restore them to their dominant position and to find satisfaction in them. The Christian, the new man in him, would rise to ever greater heights and be entirely "the Lord's", but in these very efforts he becomes aware of the heavy weight of his old sinful nature which constantly drags him down so that at times his surrender to Christ is only half-hearted or does not take place at all. And these contrary motions and opposing tendencies remain active in the Christian in some measure until he dies; for that the evil lust is never entirely eradicated is proven by the experience of the apostle Paul (cf. I Tim. 1:15; Phil. 3:12) and of all serious Christians. The more earnestly the Christian strives after sanctification, the more strongly will he become conscious of his inability to attain it perfectly and the more painful will be the realization that the Old Adam is still active in him and threatens with his evil lusts to spoil his enjoyment of the heavenly gifts. Neither can it be said that the Christian is not responsible for these ungodly tendencies of his old nature. True, he does not sin any more in the same manner as the unregenerated, since there is now a discord between sin and his will so that his will cannot be said to be the author of his sinful deeds but rather the sin

that dwells in him as distinguished from his personal will (Rom. 7:17); but nevertheless it is his own sin that he does, his own guilt that he contracts, his own state of grace that is endangered thereby. He was guilty even when he sinned before he was able to oppose his sinful tendency by a will unto godliness; he is all the more guilty now that by the grace of God he has the power to resist the sin in him. But if all this is true, then there can be no preservation of spiritual life without daily contrition for these retrogressive tendencies, without daily turning away from sin and daily returning to the Savior by faith.

The necessity of a daily renewal of faith for the preservation of the Christian life is evident from the peculiar character of the Christian faith. For faith is not like knowledge, which once we have it is retained by the memory whether we desire it or not, whether we make an effort to retain it or not, so long as the powers of memory and reason function normally. Faith is not something we possess once and for all time, so that we can draw upon it and use it any time we desire. Faith is the application of a power which God must always first give to man anew before he can use it, and which ceases to exist in the very moment when man refuses to let God bestow it upon him. This explains why in the Gospel of John we repeatedly find the statement that the disciples ἐπίστευσαν, "became believers," even after they had already come to faith (cf. 1:50 with 2:11, 23; 4:39,

41 etc.). For the same reason the Scriptures repeatedly urge the Christians, who already are believers, to remain in the faith (e. g., Acts 14:22; I Cor. 16:13; I Tim. 6:12; II Tim. 4:7; I Pet. 5:9; Rev. 14:12), a faith which the Scriptures certainly do not conceive as without contrition for it cannot possibly exist without it. Moreover, according to the Bible it is not only at the beginning of the Christian life that faith is brought about by a creative act of God, but also during the continuation of that life it is constantly being re-created by the Holy Spirit. St. Paul clearly shows this in Phil. 2:13, for here he urges the justified and believing Philippians with fear and trembling to carry through to the very end (*κατεργάζεσθαι*) that salvation which they as Christians enjoy since their Baptism, and then continues significantly, "For it is God which worketh in you (*ἐνεργῶν ἐστίν*, note the present tense!) both to will and to carry out that which is willed" (*τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐδοκίας*). Similarly, the apostle in Eph. 1:19 says not only of those who first come to faith but also of those who are now believers that "we believe according to the working of his mighty power." Thus the Christian life depends every moment solely upon the grace of God, for every act, every movement of faith is wrought by God—which of course must not be understood as meaning that it is God in the believer who actually believes—but that, in fact, the Christian cannot believe otherwise than by the continuous operation of God in him.

Furthermore, the necessity of a daily renewal of faith is evident also from the nature of the Christian life itself. It is a peculiarity of life in general that it ceases when the supply of life-giving materials is cut off. Now, the source of all spiritual life is Jesus Christ. But Christ and his life can be received into the life of the Christian only by faith; therefore there can be no continuation of spiritual life without constant renewal of faith. Christ does not remain my own simply because I have once accepted Him, I must ever again renew my hold on Him. To rest and bank upon the primary act of faith can only result in a loss of Christ. The very nature of the Christian life consists in contrition and faith; how can that life be expected to continue when its two essential factors cease to exist?

Of course it cannot be denied that there is a certain difference between the primary acts of contrition and faith and this daily repetition. Essentially they are the same, but the subject in whom contrition takes place and to whom faith is ever given anew is now a different one. He is now regenerated, and as such he turns daily to God and implores Him for true contrition and true faith. He already lives in communion with God, but daily he reaches out anew for this blessed gift that he may never lose it. Contrition and faith are now no longer like the beginning and end of a movement, they occur together. In the consciousness of her lost estate without the Father the

soul of the Christian nestles closely to his bosom; in the consciousness of having found rest and peace nowhere else but here, she daily stretches forth her hands toward Him and brings Him down into her life. This daily contrition indeed is not without its pangs of conscience, but these no longer dominate the experience; contrition is no longer that violent upheaval of the soul which borders almost on despair; its chief characteristic is not the fear of God's consuming holiness but a heartfelt sorrow and a sincere shame at having grieved such a loving Father. As this sorrow and this grief become more profound during the course of the Christian life with every new and abundant experience of God's sustaining and forgiving grace, it also becomes more pure, more inward, more quiet, and above all more childlike in its nature. Contrition is now as the tear in the eye of faith. With reference to faith, too, there is a difference. True, even during the course of the Christian life it always remains first of all a receptive faith before it becomes an active faith. Yet when the Christian daily embraces his God in faith, he no longer leaps as it were from the depths of despair to the rock of salvation, he rather deliberately clings to that rock on which he stands, which has saved him in the past, knowing from many a blessed experience that here alone there is refuge and safety in every storm of life.

CHAPTER XXII

THE PRESERVATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE THROUGH FAITHFUL USE OF THE MEANS OF GRACE

The saying that an empire can be maintained only by the same means through which it was founded also proves the necessity of a faithful use of the means of grace for the preservation of the Christian life. Through these means it came to be, through them contrition and faith are wrought today, and through them and in them alone the believer has Christ, who is the center, the source and the goal of his new life. There can be no preservation of the spiritual life where there is no faithful use of the means of grace.

Within the Christian church Baptism is the fundamental means of grace. The very nature of this sacrament does not permit its repetition, nor is a repetition necessary. We need to consider Baptism, therefore, in this connection only insofar as the Christian life should ever again be grounded upon it. Baptism stands at the beginning of the Christian life as an accomplished fact, permanent in its effects and consequences. It is like a mighty fortress and a firm foundation to which the Christian may withdraw at any time and on which he may build with assurance. In Baptism God has declared himself our Father and has opened the arms

of his grace toward us, and ever since then they continue to be extended as a standing invitation to seek refuge in them. It is especially for times of trial and affliction that this gracious act of Baptism stands as an objective fact, independent of our changeable and uncertain feelings, a definite guarantee assuring us of God's mercy.

Faithfulness toward this means of grace on the part of the Christian implies that he must make use of this assurance. Whenever he feels that by his sins his state of grace has been endangered and his heart is filled with contrition, he should return with perfect confidence to this fountain of grace that is flowing for him and draw from it the consolation of forgiveness. He should say with Luther, "Nevertheless I am baptized; but if I am baptized then it is promised me that I shall be saved and have eternal life, both in soul and body" (Large Catechism). Thus his repentance becomes a true *regressus ad baptismum* and, instead of being an independent sacrament (a "second plank") as Rome would have it, its relation is subservient to Baptism. Cf. Book of Concord (Jacobs' Edition), pp. 471:41-46; 475:80-88. It is precisely in this constantly repeated return through repentance to the foundations laid in Baptism that the Christian must be found faithful.

To be real and effective, Baptism requires the use of the Word. We cannot, therefore, speak of returning to the foundation of Christian life as we have it

in Baptism without also discussing the Christian's constant submission to the influence of the divine Word and his absorption of the life-giving powers that flow from it. Faithfulness in the use of God's Word is another necessary element in the preservation of the Christian life. The Word of God is the channel through which the powers of the other world are led into this present world and brought to the heart of the Christian. Without these powers it is impossible to abide in Christ. The Word of God is the bread of life of which we must eat, the living water which we must drink; the alternative is death. It is the way, the truth, and the life, because Christ dwells in it; if we would walk in the right way and abide in Christ, we must hold fast to the Word. Behold how the saints of the Old Testament lived and moved and had their being in the Word! Of the early Christians it is said, "They continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine," and thus they set an example for all time (Acts 2:42). The Bereans "searched the Scriptures daily, whether those things were so" (Acts 17:11). And O how much Christ was at home in the Word! It gave Him comfort and direction, He lived in it and by it (Matt. 4:4), used it as a weapon of defense against Satan and other enemies, and died with words of Scripture on his lips. He also prayed for his disciples, "Sanctify them through Thy truth, Thy Word is truth" (John 17:17). These examples should encourage us to be faithful in our daily use of

God's Word, for to continue in the Word leads to better discipleship, to better knowledge of the saving truth, to fuller freedom and greater independence from men and man-made teachings (John 8:31f.).

But the Word of God must be rightly used if it is to result in the preservation of the Christian life. It must not be used for entertainment, for increasing one's knowledge or theological understanding, or for criticism; but for edification, that is, with the intention of meditating upon it, following up its inner connections, and applying it to oneself that it may satisfy the longing of the soul for salvation, be profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness (II Tim. 3:16), and that the good work of faith and sanctification which has been begun in one may be furthered. Of Jesus' mother it is written "But Mary kept all these sayings and pondered them in her heart" (συνβάλλουσα, Luke 2:19). It certainly is highly desirable to lay up in one's memory as large as possible a treasure-store of individual Bible passages to be an abiding possession and to afford comfort and admonition, light and strength, direction and rule in all the varied situations of life. We should memorize especially those passages which in concentrated form give crystal-clear expression to God's thoughts concerning our salvation. Still greater edification can be derived from careful meditation upon larger portions, entire chapters and books of the Bible, and eventually on the Bible as a whole.

When we speak here of God's Word we do not wish to have the term limited to the Word as it is presented in the Bible but we would include the Word also as used in public worship and as found in the various kinds of devotional literature. The use of the Bible as such for devotion and edification is difficult for many people because they cannot always readily apply the Word to their own time and circumstances. Ability along this line must be achieved gradually, by constant practice. But once the individual has acquired this ability he will naturally prefer to turn to the Bible itself, and that is as it should be. The Bible demands repeated study; and unlike human interpretations of God's Word which sometimes grow tedious and outworn, the Bible never grows old, for though parts of it were originally designed after the pattern of their time with its peculiar needs, after all it is universal in its scope and timeless in its import.

Inasmuch as the Christian should daily apprehend Christ he will do well to establish a definite rule and order for his devotions, not in order to set up for himself a law to which he will consider himself bound under all circumstances and the faithful observance of which might even become a cause for self-gratification on his part, but rather because of his inherent weakness and indifference and in order to bring regularity into his life. The time set aside for devotion, whether it be long or short, should always be a "quiet

hour," when the door of the heart is closed to all outside influences (cf. Matt. 6:6). Luther says: "The Gospel is so clear that it does not require much interpretation, but it does want to be carefully considered, contemplated, and taken deep into the heart. And no-one will derive greater benefit from it than he whose heart is quiet, who shuts out all other thoughts and things and searches diligently, even as the sun can be seen better in a quiet water and warms it better than a turbulent stream. Therefore if thou wilt be enlightened here and experience divine grace and miracle, that thy heart may be warmed and enlightened, devout and happy, then go where thou canst be quiet and canst impress the image deeply upon thy heart, then shalt thou find wonder upon wonder."

In its most concentrated form the Word as a means of grace is found in Absolution. We should ask for it frequently. Private absolution in particular is most beneficial, especially for those who are sorely troubled and tried; it is expressly designed to meet their needs. Any believing Christian may impart it, and it may be requested of a minister of God at any time, whether Communion is to be celebrated or not.

This leads us to the discussion of faithfulness in the use of the Lord's Supper. If there is anything at all that will serve in a special measure to keep the Christian in fellowship with Christ, it is the diligent use of this sacrament. For all that Christ has done and suffered for us, all that He has been and continual-

ly wants to be for us, is communicated to us here: forgiveness of sin, life, and salvation. And although the Christian lives continually in fellowship with his Savior, communion days are as it were the culminating points of that fellowship, for here the heavenly gift is imparted to us in its most concentrated form and in a manner that is at once spiritual and corporeal, and normally the Christian is in the most favorable spiritual condition to receive this gift when he appears at the Lord's Table. Communion days are the summits in the Christian's fellowship with Christ, even as Sunday is for him the summit of the week. The Christian lives from Sunday to Sunday. This day affords him a welcome interruption of his earthly existence, when he emerges from the hustle and bustle of his daily toil to cleanse himself of its dust and pollution and to replenish his spiritual store against the hour of need in the days to come when the restless activity of everyday life leaves but little time and inclination for quiet meditation. Just so the Christian's life should also be a pilgrimage from Communion to Communion, descending from the Mount of Transfiguration into the valley of daily toil with its pressing duties, its sorrows and trials, and again ascending to Tabor heights where the Lord himself will prepare his table before him and from whence he may view the promised land of future transfiguration and eternal communion with the Lord.

But how is the Holy Supper to be received in order that it may aid thus in the preservation of the Christian life? It is a meal for disciples, hence it presupposes discipleship, and we are disciples if we live in repentance and faith. By this sacrament faith is not to be kindled, but strengthened. It is intended particularly for the "bruised reed" and the "smoking flax" and the "feeble knees", while of course there is no stage in the life of a Christian where it will not be necessary and wholesome for him. But where there is a sincere desire to be strengthened by it, there will also be honest, childlike contrition and the firm resolve to amend one's life, which in turn also of necessity includes a sincerely conciliatory spirit. Especially members of the same family should mutually ask and grant forgiveness before going to the Lord's Table. If the Lord's Supper is a supper for Christians, then it is not intended for one who by committing a grievous sin has for the time being ceased to be a Christian. In his case a restoration or re-conversion is required before he can again be admitted to Communion. And the more grievous the fall, the more advisable it will be for such a one to avoid the Lord's Table for a time, lest he come in superficial repentance as an unworthy guest. In such cases the blessing of private confession with its pastoral counsel and admonition becomes apparent. All of this indicates the necessity of searching self-examination for all communicants. One who sincerely strives to walk

always as in the presence of God will naturally require less time for this than one who is more inclined to carelessness, indifference and worldliness; the latter ought not to come without having made a careful, thorough, searching analysis of his spiritual condition. Even the more advanced Christian will not approach the Table of the Lord without having prepared himself, but his preparation will have more of the character of a holy joy than of somber gravity, a joy over the privilege of entering again into this communion with his Lord.

How often should a Christian commune? No definite rule can or should be made. The history of the church records a variety of usages in this respect, ranging all the way from a weekly communion to a communion only once a year. And the latter was sometimes actually enforced by the laws of the church! When such laws were abolished attendance at communion in some cases fell off to but one participation immediately after confirmation. Luther's position is wellknown, cf. *Book of Concord* (Jacobs' Edition), p. 362:21-27. The custom now generally established in our churches of celebrating Communion at stated times has its disadvantages, for only too easily attendance at the Lord's Table thus becomes a matter of habit and external form, so that the oft-repeated dictum, "The number of communicants in any congregation is an indicator of the degree of spirituality in that congregation" becomes an exceedingly doubtful assertion. Nevertheless we must not over-

look the fact that all sound life is a life of ordered regularity; and besides, such regularly recurring communion seasons may well become useful occasions for self-examination as to our spiritual condition and for giving an account of our stewardship before God, and this is of considerable importance in view of the feverish haste so characteristic of our modern life. Provision should be made, however, aside from the regular Communion days, for the administration of the Lord's Supper whenever it is desired. Any member of the church of Christ who does not use this sacrament can only be urged to ask himself in all seriousness whether he can expect to abide in Christ while at the same time he despises the means which more than any other enables us to remain a branch of the Vine, which is Christ. What would we think of an Israelite who refused to eat that first Passover believing that he had no need of such a food for the journey before him?

CHAPTER XXIII

THE PRESERVATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE THROUGH THE FAITHFUL USE OF PRAYER

Faithfulness in prayer is a necessary supplement to faithfulness in the use of the means of grace. For becoming a Christian there is no other means save the means of grace; but after one has become a Christian and has received the Holy Spirit, the road to the ever-flowing fountain of salvation is open and the Christian may now approach the heavenly Father as his child and reach out his hands in prayer for every blessing necessary for the preservation of his spiritual life.

To be sure, the prayer of the regenerate is not primarily a means for appropriating the spiritual gifts of the heavenly realm, but rather the immediate and self-evident expression of the child-relationship between him and his heavenly Father (Ps. 19:14; especially Gal. 4:6). Prayer is to the Christian what breathing is to life. By regeneration and justification he has become a child of God, as such he is filled with love for God and trust in God, and to this he gives most natural expression in childlike conversation with the Father, in immediate approach to God and confident discussion with Him of all that moves the heart.

Prayer is the evidence of this relationship, its natural expression. When the soul has become conscious of it, it turns involuntarily to God in prayer, regardless of any command or need to do so. That is what Luther meant when he said, "As the cobbler makes a shoe and the tailor a coat, so shall the Christian pray; prayer is the Christian's handiwork." In another place he calls prayer the "pulsebeat of the inner life which never ceases." For this reason the Old Testament in describing the lives of the saints who were wont to converse with God makes no mention of a command to pray, but simply records that men did call upon the name of the Lord (Gen. 4:26), that the things which moved them caused them involuntarily to turn to prayer (Gen. 49:18), that their very emotions were frequently expressed in sighs of prayer (Isa. 8:8). The admonition to "pray without ceasing" (I Thess. 5:17) is no contradiction, it simply takes into account the fact that the flesh still dwells even in the child of God and that it tends to obstruct his free communion with the Father.

There is another view of Christian prayer. It holds that prayer results from a feeling of dependence upon the all-powerful God. Ritschl defines it as "the conscious expression of faith in God's providence, and of humility." But aside from other false assumptions that enter in here, this definition fails to take into account the fundamental difference between the prayer of the unregenerated and the prayer of a child of God.

To be sure, there is a possibility of prayer also before regeneration and justification, but such prayer is motivated solely by the consciousness of dependence upon God and the desire to improve one's condition. Such prayer has its place; and it is proper and necessary that one should be trained in it even from early childhood, by memorizing and repeating certain formulated prayers, by fixing and observing certain hours of prayer, by arranging for common prayers at stated times in the home and the church, by instruction how to withdraw the attention while praying from all earthly things and to concentrate one's thoughts upon God, and above all by cultivating the idea itself of dependence upon God. As an educational means this kind of prayer is indispensable, as indispensable as was the daily prayer of Cornelius or the daily offering of incense, etc., in the Old Testament. Even the prayers and sacrifices of the heathen may be mentioned here as a natural and necessary expression of this feeling. Training, command, and exhortation to prayer belong to the sphere of the law and may well be considered also as a παιδαγωγός εἰς Χριστόν (Gal. 3:24), a preventive in the hands of prevenient grace which will not let man turn away entirely from God and sever all connection with Him. But great as may be the importance of this prayer of the unregenerated, we are not considering it here. We are discussing here the prayer of the Christian, who through regeneration and justification has become a child of God and whose

prayer in spite of much similarity as to external form and appearance must nevertheless be considered as something essentially new and different, even as the very spiritual condition of the Christian itself is an altogether different one from that of the unregenerated (Rom. 8:15). This does not exclude the fact that even the Christian, on account of his sinful flesh, also needs to be trained in prayer, as we shall see later.

Because the prayer of the Christian is a direct and natural expression of the faith that is in him, it is also absolutely essential to the preservation of his spiritual life. In prayer the love of the child speaks to the Father—where that voice is silent the child-relationship itself has ceased to exist. Prayer gives wings to the Christian's hope—where that hope fails to soar it is already dead. Since prayer is as breathing in God's presence it is also a means of inhaling of his strength, a means whereby the Christian lays hold on God's gifts of grace and makes them a part of his life, for the Christian's prayer is not only praise and thanksgiving, it is also supplication and imploration. This is the sense of innumerable passages of Scripture, such as the penitential psalms, the psalms of prayer in general, the many places where the believer is urged to call upon God in every need (e. g., Ps. 50:15; Matt. 6:9ff.; 26:41; Phil. 4:6). It is this prayer of the believer that has the promise of being heard and answered (John 14:13, 14; 15:7; 16:23; Matt. 18:19), whether it be for spiritual or for temporal gifts, both

of course, and especially the latter, in such measure and manner as according to the wisdom of God will best serve the perfecting of the man of God within us. The one essential gift, for which Jesus teaches his disciples to pray, is indeed the gift of the new dispensation, the Holy Spirit (Luke 11:13), but we note that at the same time the apostles instructed their readers to bring *all* their needs and desires before God in prayer (Eph. 6:18). Paul prays for the removal of a physical affliction because it hinders him in the work of his calling (II Cor. 12:8), while James even advises his readers to pray for the prevention of death (James 5:14), as Hezekiah successfully did (Isa. 38). We should pray for a brother who has fallen into sin (James 5:16), in fact, for all men (I Tim. 2:1). Only in case of a "sin unto death", when repentance and conversion have become impossible, does the duty of intercession cease for the Christian (I John 5:16); otherwise we are to "continue instant in prayer." And in case the Christian should not know what he should pray, the Spirit himself within him will aid him with "groanings that cannot be uttered" (Rom. 8:26).

As to contents, the Christian's prayer will generally be thanksgiving and petition. The Christian will always feel the need of acknowledging before God the fact that he owes his very existence and all that he has and is to the grace of God, as well as of giving thanks to Him for the many special gifts and favors which he experiences. The gifts of God will prove a

blessing to him and can be retained by him only when they are appreciated as such. No less will the child of God, in view of his own weaknesses and the manifold temptations constantly besetting him, feel the need of ever again coming back to Him out of whose fullness alone he may receive grace for grace and all things needful for the continuation and consummation of his life. Thus both thanksgiving and petition will always be intimately united in the Christian's prayer, and should be, according to Phil. 4:6 (μετὰ εὐχαριστίας) and I Tim. 2:1. The Christian simply cannot approach God with a request for a gift without gratefully remembering what he already has received; he knows that the very way to the Father's heart has been opened to him only by God's gift of grace, and this in itself is a cause for continued thanksgiving; while every petition that he brings before the Throne of grace, he knows, is already answered or will be answered without a doubt, and this again moves him to thank the Father even while he asks of Him.

If prayer in either form is really a "conversation of the heart with God" (cf. Ps. 19:14), if it is an actual personal communication with the personally omnipresent heavenly Father, it also presupposes, especially in the form of petition, a response on the part of God, an "answer" to our prayer (the Hebrew word *ענה* means "answer"). This answer in fact is promised in many places in the Scriptures (cf. John 14:13, 14; 16:23, 24), and the Christian firmly

believes these promises. To him God's answer to prayer is a genuine reality, for he knows that God is not only his Father, but also the sovereign Ruler of the universe, of all things great and small, and so he is sure of his ground no matter what carping critics may have to say about the impossibility of a fulfillment of his petitions in view of the immutability of God and the inviolability of nature's laws. He knows that from eternity God, in planning the universe and formulating its laws, already made provision for the answering of such petitions of his children. When the devil, the world, and the flesh attempt to shake his confidence in the efficacy of prayer, he reminds himself of both the command and the promises of God, which no doubt were recorded in Scripture for such very occasions, and also of the many experiences of God's wondrous grace through Christ in his own past life, and thus he always reassures himself and overcomes all temptations to doubt. The "how" and "when" and even the "what" of God's answer he cheerfully leaves to his Father's wisdom and will; "not the dearest, but the best" is what he wants God to give him after all, and he knows that in some form or other, external or internal, the answer must always come. Luther once said: "All who call upon God earnestly and in true faith will surely be heard and receive according to their petition; though perhaps not at the very hour and time nor in the measure of their petition nor exactly what they pray for, yet they

will receive something much better, greater, and more glorious."

To be sure, the Christian can have this absolute confidence only if his prayer is offered up in the true faith. Although God in his goodness to all his creatures also hears the prayer of the unregenerated (Ps. 145:9, 18; cf. 147:9), still the solemn promise of fulfillment presupposes discipleship, the Christian child-relationship. It is to the prayers of the disciples that Jesus gave those comprehensive promises recorded in John 14 to 16. For praying in the name of Jesus means nothing else but this that our prayer is to be an evidence and active manifestation of our communion with God through Jesus Christ. Only by virtue of that communion with God which was brought about by Jesus can our prayer really go up to the Throne of grace, and only because of that communion can God's answer come back to us.

While the entire spiritual life of the believer is to be characterized by the spirit of prayer (I Thess. 5:17; Eph. 6:18; Luke 18:1), this disposition will inevitably crystallize again and again in words and sighs, and certain definite acts and times of prayer will develop when all other occupation ceases and the Christian is engaged exclusively with his God. Such special acts and hours of prayer are necessary also because of the flesh within him and the ungodly forces around him, which ever tend to destroy the communion of the soul with God. They come most naturally

at the beginning or end of a definite period of life, or when the Christian is receiving some divine gift or blessing. But one thing must be guarded against: the practice of observing regular hours of prayer must not degenerate into a mere external habit, a mere performance of routine acts. Habitual prayers at stated times after all are to be only the expression of that ever present inner communion of the soul with God, even as this communion can and will find utterance sometimes in the very midst of our daily toil. But if on account of this danger we should disparage the value of regular hours of prayer, we should make the serious mistake of overlooking the fact that the soundness of our entire spiritual life is based on the principle of regularity. Regularity in prayer is important if for no other reason but this that the Christian cannot at all depend always upon his readiness to pray, but on the contrary many serious Christians must often complain of a lack of eagerness and willingness to exercise this privilege. In such cases the regularly recurring time of prayer will serve to remind the Christian of this privilege, and if then by an effort of the will he overcomes his spiritual slothfulness and forces himself as it were to meditation and prayer, he will find himself gradually returning to that state of spiritual life which really effective prayer presupposes, and to a real enjoyment of his communion with God. This is something of a reward that God bestows upon faithfulness in prayer. Besides,

even though perhaps at times our prayer may be merely a matter of habit, it will nevertheless be a point of contact where the work of the Holy Spirit may set in to change it into that which it ought to be.

In the matter of the external form of prayer we must guard against onesidedness in two directions. Since prayer is essentially the spontaneous expression of the Christian's child-relationship to God, in the very nature of the case the prayer of the individual will be first of all a prayer of the heart, a highly personal prayer, in which he brings his own individual needs and his own individual thanks before God. Thus the psalms, especially the earlier ones, originally were spontaneous utterances of the heart and became formal prayers only in course of time. Prayer indeed is a most personal matter between the individual and his God. However, fundamentally the needs of all Christians are very much alike, and other children of God before me have experienced very much the same divine providence and guidance in their lives as I. Even their special needs as well as their special occasions for thanksgiving have been largely the same as mine. Hence it is only natural that I can appropriate to my own use the prayers they formulated under similar circumstances without losing anything of the individuality of my own life and without making my own prayer, though it be but a repetition of their prayers, an empty and meaningless formality. In fact, the use of formulated prayers and prayerbooks has its

own special advantages. It will help to keep the fundamental needs of salvation and the great objective facts of divine grace which are of paramount interest to every Christian in the foreground; it will help the Christian to rise above the personal and sometimes petty interests of his own little self and place him in line with that great congregation of believers of all times and places which constantly appears before the Throne of grace in behalf of itself and all the brethren; it will make him conscious of the fact that "the same afflictions are accomplished in his brethren that are in the world" (I Pet. 5:9). Finally, the use of prayers formulated by others also leads to self-examination, for in their prayers we see dangers, shortcomings and sins which we perhaps ourselves also have or which beset us too, but of which we might otherwise not become conscious. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the use of formulated prayers and manuals of prayer can never fully satisfy the needs of the Christian. The spontaneous prayer of the heart is indispensable and must always be found together with such use. The one will stimulate the other.

The indispensableness of prayer will be realized more fully and the desire to pray will be more intensified when we recall that all the outstanding men in the history of God's kingdom on earth have been men of fervent prayer: Abraham, Jacob, Moses, David; that the Book of Psalms is a prayerbook second to none; that the Lord's Prayer is *the* prayer of all

prayers; that the life and labors of Paul would be unintelligible were we to eliminate his prayerlife; that to the early Christians nothing was more self-evident than to commune in prayer with their glorified Lord and in his name with the Father; and that the entire life of Jesus on earth was an uninterrupted life of prayer.

What is the relation of prayer to the means of grace in respect to the preservation of the Christian life? While it is true that in prayer the soul of the Christian ascends before the Throne of grace and brings back strength and power, it is nevertheless a mistake to place prayer on a par with the specific means of grace, the Word and the sacraments, and even to imagine that the praying soul has no further need of these. It was through the means of grace that the Christian first entered into a direct and immediate relationship with God, and it is in them that God has given him the means of a constant renewal of that relationship. To forego their use would be equivalent to foregoing the continuing mediatorship and intercession of Christ after He has once opened the way to the Father. Even the praying Christian needs the means of grace, if for no other reason but this that his prayer life is so very vacillating; frequently he is least disposed to pray when he is most in need of new life-giving powers of divine grace. The means of grace, on the other hand, always retain their objective fullness and purity, uninfluenced by the changes in the subject-

ive life of the individual. Praying the Christian submits to the effects of the means of grace; and by their use the spirit of prayer will ever again be renewed in him. The daily study of God's Word can be made fruitful only when we approach it in the spirit of prayer; and again, our prayer is stimulated and broadened so as to include the deeper, wider and higher thoughts of God only when it proceeds from and centers around a definite Word of God. In fact, the spiritual gifts, which form the chief object of the Christian's prayer, are so intimately bound up in the means of grace that without them they cannot be obtained. In prayer we stretch forth our hands for these spiritual gifts, and through the means of grace God presents them to us and assures us that we do receive them. It is precisely when we stand pleading before God that He himself directs us to the Word of his promise and thus quiets and reassures our anxious hearts. Thus in prayer indeed we get whatever we need for our spiritual life, but the Word is the means by which God bestows these gifts upon us.

Diligent use of the means of grace, constant communion with God in prayer, coupled with incessant watchfulness, those are the means for the preservation of the Christian life. Especially in the hour of temptation they must be used to fight the good fight and obtain the victory.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE PRESERVATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AS IT IS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH FAITHFUL WARFARE AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

Inasmuch as the creation of the new life in any individual means the loss of that individual to the kingdom of darkness, it is to be expected that the latter will put forth every effort to recover its loss and to regain the soul of the Christian. It follows then that the preservation of the Christian life becomes a struggle against all hostile forces, a warfare so necessary that Christian self-preservation is unthinkable without it. It is not too much to say that this spiritual warfare against the enemies of the soul, passing indeed through many defeats, but ending eventually in glorious victory, is the distinctive characteristic of the Christian life.

The Scriptures speak frequently of this warfare. It is called ἀγών, and thus it is compared with the contests connected with the Olympic games of ancient Greece (I Tim. 6:12; II Tim. 4:7; Hebr. 12:1); in the same figure it is spoken of as ἀθλος and ἀθλεῖν (II Tim. 2:5; cf. I Cor. 9:24ff.) and πάλη, the latter term comparing the Christian struggle with the wrestling

matches of those contests (Eph. 6:12); while *σπουδαία* (II Cor. 10:4) reminds us of military service with its labors and hardships. This struggle is to be carried on with grim determination ("unto blood," Hebr. 12:4), regardless of wounds and even of the danger of life itself, for so the Lord repeatedly pictures it to his disciples (cf. Matt. 10:17ff.).

The first enemy in this spiritual struggle is the flesh, that is, not simply man's sensuous nature but the old man which dwelleth in him, the *ἐπιθυμία* which exerts its influence both in the mind and the body. James says (ch. 4:1) that the *ἡδοναί* war in our members against the new life. Hence we are admonished not to yield our members, that is, our entire mental and physical organism, as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin (Rom. 6:13), but to yield ourselves and our members unto God as servants of righteousness unto holiness (Rom. 6:13, 19; cf. 12:1), for the old man in us constantly strives to seduce and abuse even the new man which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness. 7C34

Through the flesh the second enemy, the ungodly and anti-godly world, in which the Christian still lives, exerts its influence upon him. It strives to sever his communion with God, to turn his love for God into love for those corruptible things to which it is enslaved, it resorts to every means of force and cunning, of promise and threat, to win him over to its side. W0124

SATAN
 But behind the flesh and the world there stands the "old bitter foe," Satan himself, who would estrange the Christian from his God and against whom in the last analysis the Christian's entire warfare is directed (Eph. 6:12; I Pet. 5:8). Thus the Christian is placed in the very midst of that great universal conflict which is being waged between God and Satan; and this in turn shows him the importance and the awful seriousness of his conflict, while it also assures him of his final victory if indeed he be found faithful in his warfare (Rom. 8:37ff.; I John 3:8).

ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙ
 Now whenever one of these enemies attacks the Christian and endeavors to destroy his spiritual life, a temptation, *πειρασμός*, sets in. The verb *πειράζω* originally signifies "to try, attempt" and is distinguished from *δοκιμάζω*, which is also used in this sense, only by the fact that *πειράζειν* implies a physical effort while *δοκιμάζειν* designates an intellectual act, hence may also signify "to examine, probe, approve." But the difference has become so obscured that both verbs are often used indiscriminately, as in II Cor. 13:5. When *πειράζειν* is used with an object, its meaning will depend on whether the object is a personal or impersonal one. If it is impersonal, that is, when *πειράζειν* is used with an infinitive, it retains its original meaning, "to try, to attempt" (Hebr. 11:29; Acts 16:7; 24:6). When coupled with a personal object (*πειράζειν τινα*) it signifies "to test someone, put him on trial," in order to ascertain what he is or what he can do, for example

in I Kings 10:1, where נִסָּה is translated, as always, *πειράζειν αὐτόν* in the Septuagint. *Πειράζειν* retains this meaning in ethical connections, no matter if used of God, man, or Satan. Of course—and this must not be overlooked—the significance of this “testing” will depend upon the subject of which it is predicated. When God is the subject, *πειράζειν τινα* means to prove man in order that the innermost condition of his heart may become evident to all the world (cf. especially Gen. 22:1; in the New Testament Hebr. 11:17; John 6:6). When man is the subject and God the object (*πειράζειν θεόν*), it means testing or tempting God as an evidence of distrust (cf. Exod. 17:2; I Cor. 10:9). With man as the subject and another man as the object, it means to try or tempt with evil intention, viz., to get control over him and to ruin him. It is used thus especially of the attempts of the Pharisees to set a trap for Jesus; then too of the assaults and tribulations that emanate from the world or from Satan and are intended to endanger the Christian’s state of grace (cf. I Cor. 10:13; Rev. 3:10). Finally it also signifies a trying or testing with the direct purpose of tempting to sin. In this sense it is used of those very powers of evil against which the Christian must contend. Thus of the flesh in the wellknown passage, James 1:14, where the readers are warned not to say of their trials and tribulations that they come from God, that is, in order thus to excuse themselves if they should fall into sin on account of them; and where they are

told that while such excuses would be utterly foolish they must rather be on their guard against another temptation, a temptation unto evil, which comes when a man is drawn away and "baited" by his own lust. Of Satan it is used in I Thess. 3:5; I Cor. 7:5; Rev. 3:10, even as in reference to this activity of his he is directly called ὁ πειράζων, for example in Matt. 4:3. Of the world a temptation in this sense is not expressly predicated, but it is evident that many of Satan's temptations are offered through the world; moreover, the afflictions and tribulations caused the Christian by the world are often called πειρασμοί, and these in the opinion of the world certainly become temptations to sin.

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The flesh and the world in these temptations are only instruments in the hands of Satan by which he endeavors to carry out his evil plans and designs, though sometimes he also exerts his tempting influence directly as many mature Christians can testify. At least he always holds the threads in his hands, devises the plans, and supervises their execution. From these temptations that are traceable in some manner back to the tempter himself, we must distinguish those external occasions, conditions, and situations which may turn into temptations for us, as indeed any situation may. These are in no sense of Satan's making, but can be traced back to God who directs all our ways in accordance with his holy will. All temptations are historical processes, and God is the governor

of history in its larger as well as in its most minute aspects. It is a matter of his will, therefore, whether or not we are to be confronted with a temptation, that is a situation in which we experience not only an incitement in the direction of the good, but also, and perhaps more particularly, an impulse unto evil. Neither must it be supposed that in such situations God is merely passive; no, He is really active in them, for Christ directs us in the sixth petition to pray to Him who not only permits us to come into temptations but actually leads us into them. The Scriptures indicate this in other places as well, for it is precisely with a view to the varied situations into which one may be led by God day after day that Job declares (7:18) that God tries man "every moment"; and in I Cor. 10:13 we are told that God "will with the temptation also make a way of escape." But it is just these situations that Satan makes use of to execute his evil designs. They are, as it were, points of exposure against which he brings his weapons into play, just as in the case of Jesus the natural desire for food and the equally natural horror of death were his contact points. In such situations he stirs up the world against us with its enticements and its threats, he calls out his visible and invisible allies, he incites our flesh so that it rebels at the burden of a cross as though it were a fiery trial (*πύρωσις*, I Pet. 4:12), or becomes arrogant because of good fortune. And always his tactics are adjusted to the peculiar disposition and weakness of

each individual, for "deep guile and cruel might are his dread arms in fight."

But this too is in accordance with God's will that in such critical situations the Christian should experience an actual enticement to sin. For if there were only an incitement toward the good, such as comes, for example, from the functioning of conscience, and not also an incitement to sin, there would be no real test at all. Just as God desired such a test at the beginning of human history, so He desires it still today. He uses the *πειρασμοί* as pedagogical means, and that in all their fullness as incentives of evil as well as of good, to the end that through the very conflict resulting in the Christian it may become plainly evident to all concerned in which direction he inclines, and that by his conscious decision against the evil and for Christ and his will he may become all the more firmly established in the good and ever more strong to resist the allurements of Satan. Thus God makes use of the evil designs of Satan to serve his own ends and purposes. Satan imagines that he is acting quite independently in the *πειρασμοί* when he attempts to destroy the spiritual life in us; but after all he is only carrying out the will of God, whether it be that the hardened sinner is turned over to the seductive power of Satan as a punishment for his impenitence, in which case Satan must serve as an executor of God's punitive justice (which however does not concern us in this connection), or whether it be that through Satan's

enticements God would increase the Christian's powers of resistance, strengthen and stablish him in his determination to do the will of God, and make him ever more impervious to Satan's arts. It is in this difference of their intentions that we find the chief distinction between the *πειράζειν* of God and of Satan; on the part of God it is the strengthening of the spiritual life in us, on the part of Satan, its destruction.

We are now ready to discuss the details of Satan's temptations. The general objective of these temptations is to "mislead" us, that is, to lead us away from the right way, the way of faith and a God-pleasing life, into the way of "misbelief, despair, and other great shame and vice"; away from the faith and trust in God's fatherly goodness and almighty protection, in the merits of Christ and the gracious work of the Holy Spirit, and into the way of carnal self-reliance, which in the evil day must inevitably turn to despair when the anchor of faith has been lost; away from a life by the Spirit and into the life according to the flesh, which is so graphically described in Gal. 5:19ff. To accomplish this objective Satan first attempts to deceive us. Allurement, deception, seduction, these are the three steps in the development. We see them in the first temptation, in the temptation of Christ—though in his case despite all the cunning of Satan there followed no deception and hence no seduction—and in our own temptations. Satan dangles the "forbidden fruit" in all its alluring colors before the eyes

of the Christian in order to dull his sense of discrimination and cause him to believe that it is really a desirable good offering a sweet enjoyment, far more desirable and sweet than anything the Christian can possibly find in his communion with God. If he succeeds in this the deception is complete—and it will prove a deception even if the good attained is really a desirable one, for every good loses its value and becomes an illusion when it is sought away from God, aside of God, and over and above God. Once Satan has succeeded in deceiving man, it is but a step to his ultimate goal, seduction. Through seduction he aims to despoil and annihilate the Kingdom of God in order to build up his own kingdom on the ruins of the Spirit's work. To tear down and destroy is his delight, his very life. Hence the Scripture calls him the deceiver, the murderer from the beginning, the roaring, devouring lion.

The preservation of the Christian's spiritual life requires a constant and determined warfare against these enemies of his soul. In view of the great weakness of our flesh which opposes the willingness of the spirit (Matt. 26:41), Christ indeed instructed his followers to pray that the Father in heaven would not let them come at all into such situations in which they might be tempted unto evil and thus have their spiritual life endangered; but to be kept entirely free from all such temptations is impossible in this world—not indeed because God has not the power to protect

us but because such temptations are necessary for the proper development of our moral and spiritual life. But when according to the wisdom of our Father such temptations do come upon us and we feel them powerfully drawing us away from our God and back into sin, we must fight the good fight of faith in order that we may finally prevail and obtain the victory. It is the nature of the new life within us not merely to exist but to maintain its existence and like Christ, who is the author of that new life, to "rule in the midst of our enemies" (Ps. 110:2). Christians are to be conquerors, and our faith is the victory that overcometh the world, because it holds to Him who has already overcome the world. By faith in Christ we have, in principle, already won the victory over our spiritual foes (cf. I John 5:5). Besides, the Christian has the blessed permission to call upon God not to forsake him but to aid him in his temptations (Hebr. 2:18), and the promise that God will see to it that no temptation will come upon us greater than we can bear, as well as the assurance that God also has the proper ἐκβασις in his power (I Cor. 10:13). He is, in fact, assured of the active intercession and help of Him who himself was tempted like as we are and who therefore can be touched with a feeling of our infirmities (Hebr. 4:15).

Theoretically there is a possibility that in his warfare with his spiritual foes the Christian may never suffer such defeat as will result even in but a tempor-

ary breakdown of the control of the Spirit and loss of the state of grace, for the strength to avoid such defeats has actually been given him and as a matter of fact his own conscience tells him after every fall that he could have avoided it. But the actual and far more frequent experience of every Christian shows that in the vicissitudes of his spiritual warfare there will also be reverses, when the old bitter foe, once vanquished, discomfits the Christian anew and succeeds in striking him down. As such defeats we do not count those experiences in every Christian's life where the sinful lust that still cleaves to the believer momentarily stirs within him or even breaks forth in a sinful thought, word, or deed, contrary to his better knowledge and against his regenerated will, or when that lust is called into action by temptations that come to him from without and find his spiritual self momentarily unprepared. Such activity of the Old Adam in us is indeed sin and will as such disturb the peace of the Christian and cause him to repent and to ask forgiveness for it, as he does daily, in fact, even for his hidden and unknown faults (Ps. 19:12; I John 1:8f.; 2:1); but since the believer does not consciously and deliberately turn away from God but rather turns away from his sin in the very moment when he becomes conscious of it and clings only the more closely to his God, we cannot properly speak of a defeat and a fall in such a case.

Such a defeat and fall, and with it an interruption of the state of grace, a loss of divine favor and forgiveness, however, does take place when the Christian contrary to his better knowledge and in spite of the warning voice of his conscience nevertheless purposely does the will of the evil one. The wellknown passage in James (1:13, 14) clearly shows the origin and nature of such a fall. When the Christian indolently and in a feeling of false security tolerates the stirring of the evil lust within him, when he prides himself in his spiritual possessions and fails by daily contrition and faith to renew the spiritual life within him, when thus he gradually loses his delight in his communion with God and slowly begins to long, be it ever so little, for the enjoyment of the pleasures of sin (*delectatio morosa*), then he is already started on that road which may sooner or later lead to defeat and disaster. It is for this very reason that Christ so often warns his disciples to watch and be on their guard continually. Little sins may be just as dangerous to the spiritual life as great ones; and in more than one case a most serious relapse has been brought about by some supposedly minor sin which gradually permeated and poisoned the entire nature of the Christian.

When the Christian sins with deliberate purpose, the Holy Spirit departs from his heart and the Christian loses the spiritual life which God wrought in him. Cf. above, page 134f. But from the account

of Peter's and of David's fall we learn that it is also possible to recover from a fall, though never by a mere gathering up and reasserting of one's own powers but only by the intervention of divine grace. And we do have God's own most serious promises that He will "raise the fallen" (cf. Ezek. 33:11; Luke 15:4; I John 2:1; Luke 22:32). If Christ wants his disciples to forgive their erring brethren seventy times seven (Matt. 18:22), how much more may we be assured that God's merciful love will never be withdrawn from the fallen sinner who turns to Him in true repentance. The manner and the form of the restoration may vary in individual cases; the essence will always be the same: a new taking hold of the righteousness of Christ, rejection of sinful lust, restoration of the control of the Spirit over the flesh, in other words a renewal of contrition and faith. The contrition will of course apply chiefly to the particular sin that has caused the fall. Especially in cases where the sin has been committed consciously and with full intention, it may occur that the sinner continues for some time to lie prostrate lamenting his sin without attaining the confidence of forgiveness and the courage to take up the battle anew. But such an experience must not be taken as an evidence of divine rejection but rather as a proof of God's pedagogical grace. For an ethical renewal after such sins is impossible unless the sinner has tasted thoroughly the bitterness and misery of his condition, and nothing is more perilous

than a hasty return without genuine sorrow over the deed committed and in superficial confidence that one's own strength is sufficient. Even the repetition of the sin does not make the restoration impossible; one sinner may be utterly lost after the first fall while another may still be saved after the tenth. Nor is the sinner's own belief that his sin is unforgivable an evidence of the impossibility of a return: the very fact that he grieves over that sin is an encouragement and should be pointed out to him as such.

This does not mean, however, that there is no such thing as an irreparable fall, an unpardonable sin. On the contrary, the Scriptures plainly and emphatically teach that there is such a sin. The passages that come into consideration here are Matt. 12 and its parallels, Hebr. 6 and 10, and in a certain sense I John 5:16. This last passage is the most general one and leaves many questions unanswered. It does speak of a ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον, mentioning it in contrast with those sins which still leave open the possibility of δοῦναι ζωὴν and thus implying that it is unforgivable without actually saying so. From the manner in which the "sin unto death" is introduced here, it is reasonable to assume that the readers knew from John's oral discourses what sin he had in mind. It is not illogical to think of the anti-Christian denial, to which he also refers elsewhere in his letter. It could not well be the sin of denial in general, for this sin might also be due to fear etc., and would hardly cause one who had fallen

into it for such or similar reasons to be exempted by the apostle from intercessory prayer. It must be a denial resulting from conscious and willful opposition to Christ.*

That which is left more or less vague and indefinite here is expressed very definitely in Hebr. 6 and 10. In Hebr. 6:1 the author had declared that he would now leave behind the elementary teachings concerning Christ and advance toward maturity. He would not at this time lay again the foundations of Christianity by discussing the doctrine of repentance from dead works, etc. This latter, he said (v. 3), he would also (καί) do sometime, but not now. Of course, it could be done at all only if God would permit it, for there are cases (v. 4) in which it would be impossible to carry out this intention. It cannot be done where a renewal unto μετάνοια is out of the question. In verses 4 to 6 he then proceeds to set forth the details of such cases. He enumerates a

* I John 5:16 is claimed as a *sedes doctrinae* for the Roman Catholic dogma of mortal sins (*peccata mortalia*), but wrongly so. According to Rome those very sins which it calls mortal sins can be forgiven, though only by way of sacramental penance; while that which John here calls a "sin unto death" is in direct contrast to those sins for the forgiveness of which he wants his readers to pray. Besides, the sin itself in this passage is of an entirely different nature from that which Rome conceives it to be. John understands it to be that denial of Christ which results from a conscious and deliberate opposition to Him, while Rome has expanded the concept of mortal sin more and more until it has finally come to be practically identical with the seven capital sins (*peccata capitalia*), which are *superbia, avaritia, luxuria, ira, gula, invidia, acedia*.

number of spiritual experiences which the persons in question have enjoyed. They have been once for all, that is, fundamentally, enlightened concerning Christ and his redemptive work. They have tasted the peace of conscience that comes with the heavenly gift of righteousness. They have had the Holy Spirit dwelling in them as a result of this justification which they have experienced. They have had the testimony of the comforting Word of promise in their hearts. They have—perhaps in Holy Communion—felt something of the powers of the future world to which that Word of promise points. And yet, after all these spiritual experiences, they have fallen away. Such persons, he explains, cannot be renewed unto repentance for the simple reason that in their own persons (ἐαυτοῖς) they repeat by their apostasy what the Jews once did to Christ; they declare Him to be a false Messiah who properly belongs on the cross, and they hold Him up to the contempt of the world; and they do this despite the fact that they have unmistakably come to know Him in their heart and conscience as the υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ.

Those who are thus described cannot be called back to repentance; for how could this be done when the very means by which such repentance is brought about, the Gospel of Christ Crucified, cannot be applied to them? They are like the barren soil, the very condition of which is such that despite frequent showers and careful tilling it produces only thorns and thistles, they are fit only for judgment. If such should

be the case in any of his readers, God himself would forbid the author to begin again teaching them the basic principles of the Christian doctrine.

In connection with this passage chapter 10:26ff. must be considered. Here the author urges his readers to consider why they should continue faithfully in the work of mutual exhortation in view of the approaching Day of the Lord. They are to do this because that day is to be a day of judgment for all apostates. For whoever sins willfully, that is, deliberately chooses to go another way than the way of truth which he has come to know, must not expect to find any further sacrifice for such a sin; not because it were too great a sin for the sacrifice of Christ or because that sacrifice were insufficient to atone for it, but because he rejects that very Christ and his sacrifice, and other sacrifice there is none on that other way which he has chosen to go. Instead there is for such a one only a certain fearful looking forward to the terrors of judgment and the fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries. And such a judgment is fully deserved, for if even the violator of the Mosaic law was inexorably punished with death, how much greater the penalty must be which he deserves who willfully sins after having come to the knowledge of the truth! He has committed and continues to commit no less an outrage than to trample under foot the Son of God, that is, to treat Him like something we utterly despise; he has counted the blood of the divine covenant wherewith he was

sanctified an unholy thing, the blood of a sinful man (cf. 6:6); he has looked upon the gracious gifts of the Spirit with proud disdain and cast them aside as a contemptible thing.

Both passages show with utmost clearness that there is an unforgivable sin, an irreparable fall. The following points are plainly brought out: 1. the subject of such a fall is a regenerated man, one who is conscious of his regeneration, having actively experienced the beneficial effects of Christ and of faith in his own person; 2. a fall is not an irreparable one when it is the result of being overpowered in a spiritual struggle and when it is accompanied by a sense of grief and shame, but only when it takes place *ἐκουσίως*, voluntarily, when the powers of the life to come though known to be good have been deliberately cast aside, when the Christ who has been recognized as the Savior is deliberately rejected, when the Spirit of truth who has proven himself such by his operations in the subject's heart has been deliberately cast out, and when in outspoken enmity the opposite way is chosen while Christ is mocked and blasphemed; 3. the evidence of such a fall is a continuous re-crucifixion of Christ, a continued exposure of Christ to the mockery of the world (cf. the present tense in 6:6).

In the light of these passages we shall now be able to understand what the Scripture calls the Sin against the Holy Ghost in Matt. 12:31 (cf. Mark

3:28ff.; Luke 12:10ff.), and thus to advance an important step beyond the first of the three points in our summary above. Matthew shows most clearly the connection in which Jesus came to speak of the sin of blaspheming the Holy Spirit. He had just healed a demoniac who was both blind and dumb. The effect of this miracle was so tremendous that the people were inclined to consider Him the Son of David. In order to counteract this impression the Pharisees announced that He cast the devil out through Beelzebub, in other words, they traced a work of the Spirit of God back to an evil spirit inimical to God. Jesus showed them the folly of this assertion, proved by a reference to their own disciples that the power of God was revealed in Him, and called upon them for a definite decision in regard to Himself. Then He continued in v. 31: "All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven etc." The peculiar statement of this verse can be correctly interpreted only on the basis of the correct and self-evident assumption that v. 32 does not imply a higher *personal* rank or dignity of the Holy Spirit than that of the Son of Man, but that the reference is to both insofar as they come in contact with the sinner. In the case of the Son of Man one might be in error, on account of the difference between his humble external appearance and his inner essence one might possibly consider Him a mere man instead of the eternal Son of God, and this possibility might be considered an extenuating circumstance in judging

man's utterances concerning Him. But such a mistake was not possible, and is never possible, in regard to the Holy Spirit, this divine organ that directly influences the inner man. In Him God confronts the sinner as a purely mental and spiritual potency, unconcealed by the cloak of human form; He touches the human conscience in a way that the one who experiences that touch cannot escape the conviction: Here I am face to face with divine truth, with God himself. No self-deception or mistake is possible. When therefore a man has experienced this work of the Holy Spirit in himself and still blasphemes against Him, he is guilty of direct antagonism to God, of conscious and determined negation and contempt of the truth *because it is the truth* and he does not want to be obedient to it. Owing to the deceitfulness of sin the opposition of man to God is usually only an indirect one, and the sinner does the evil not because it is an evil but *sub ratione boni absoluti* or because a caricature of truth instead of truth itself had been put before him; but this is the chief characteristic of the sin against the Holy Ghost that it is a direct and open enmity against God and a mockery of everything divine *because it is divine*. That is the satanic feature of this sin; and because of it the *capacitas passiva* is lost and with it the first prerequisite of a restoration. Matt. 12 also shows that not only the regenerated and converted may fall into this unpardonable sin but also the man who is still in the process of conversion. For

plainly it was the Pharisees who were warned here not to persist in their obstinacy until they had reached that end. And it is certainly a fact that even during the process of conversion the moment may come when the sinner clearly realizes that in the Word of God the Holy Spirit is confronting him and when despite this assured knowledge he resists the Spirit and blasphemes Him, not from fear or weakness but in direct hostility toward the Word of God as divine truth.

In either case, whether the subject be already converted or whether the Holy Spirit has only begun his work in him, the sin against the Holy Ghost is not an isolated act without any connection with the general internal development of the individual. It is rather an act that has its very roots in that development, is most closely connected with it, and marks its final culminating point. It is, as Harless once said, "an act of rupture, the bursting of a ripened bud of hostility toward Christ, the documentation of a state of the soul which in conscious opposition shuts itself out from the source of salvation." While this sin is unthinkable unless preceded by deliberate resistance, yet such obstinacy must not necessarily reach the final stage of actual verbal blasphemy of the Spirit and of holding Christ up before the world as an object of mockery; neither can every case of persistent obduracy as such be identified with the "sin against the Holy Ghost." But wherever this last stage is reached it is a sure indication that the irreparable fall has occurred.

However, we must hasten to add, it is such an indication only for the individual person himself, for he alone can know whether all that this terrible sin involves has really taken place in his own experience.

But if there really is such an irreparable fall, then the following observations for the Christian will suggest themselves. In the first place, he will not assume the right to accuse another of having become ensnared in this sin, for no man can judge whether the person in question has actually experienced that which he blasphemes. Secondly, he will find comfort in the knowledge that he cannot precipitately fall into this sin by some act of indiscretion, but that on the contrary he can guard against its preparatory stages and overcome them by constant contrition and faith. Likewise, in case Satan would deceive him into believing that he has already committed this sin and is lost forever, he has the unmistakable marks by which this sin may be identified, and he can thus find consolation and reassurance in the fact that he has not become guilty of it. And finally, he should be warned to contend with fear and trembling, with constant prayer and watchfulness, against the enemies of his soul (cf. especially Eph. 6:10-18), lest he finally fall into this awful sin.

In conclusion we may note the four elements that must invariably characterize the Christian's warfare for the preservation of his spiritual life. The first of these is watchfulness and sobriety coupled with

constant prayer, to which the Scriptures so frequently exhort us (Matt. 26:41; I Pet. 5:8; Eph. 6:17, 18), and which is the more important because the flesh tends naturally to a feeling of false security. Then there must ever be a firm hold upon the Word of God and a diligent and copious use of it in our spiritual self-defense, in accordance with the example of Christ and the admonition of Paul (Eph. 6:17), for just as soon as Satan succeeds in making us doubt the Word or in taking it away from our hearts we are lost, but as long as we wield that "sword of the Spirit" we shall be able to ward off every attack of the enemy. There is needed also that lowly virtue of humility, which in the consciousness that "without Christ I can do nothing" reaches out constantly for Him and his gifts of grace. Note particularly Isa. 57:15 and Matt. 5:3; I Pet. 5:5; James 4:6. But with this humility there must always go that spiritual courage which comes from the assurance that Christ the Conqueror of all our foes is ever present with us. When I am weak, then am I strong. True humility is the mother of that courage which says, "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me" (Phil. 4:13). In humility and courage the Christian goes forth to battle. The strength of his enemies does not intimidate him; he thanks God in humility for his redemption from their power, and the assurance of such redemption gives him the courage of victory. Yet he never forgets to be sober and vigilant (I Pet. 5:8) and to continue

steadfast in the Word. And because he knows from experience that incentives to sin are often attached even to material things and gifts of nature, which in themselves are not sinful, he will also learn to forego the enjoyment of such things whenever he feels that they may be a hindrance to him in his spiritual warfare. This leads us to the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXV

THE PRESERVATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AIDED BY ASCETICISM

The term asceticism may be used to denote all the various activities of the Christian for the preservation of his Christian life which we have discussed in the preceding chapters (cf. Acts. 24:16; II Pet. 1:5; I Tim. 4:7). Here, however, we take it in the narrower sense as designating the voluntary abstinence from things which in themselves are good and therefore permissible to the Christian but which under certain personal circumstances become an occasion for sin to him.

Our Lord speaks of this kind of asceticism in Matt. 18:8, for the sense of this passage evidently is none other but this: The Christian must be ready to deny himself the use and enjoyment of things which are valuable, in fact seemingly indispensable to him, rather than to permit such things to cause him to stumble and thus to loose the highest good, his eternal fellowship with God. Cf. Matt. 5:29, 30. With the apostle Paul the Christian certainly shares the conviction, "All things are yours . . . and ye are Christ's"

(I Cor. 3:21, 23); but for the very reason that he is Christ's and would remain Christ's, he will gladly forego the use of certain things of which he knows that for his own individual nature they are fraught with danger. He has learned from the apostle Paul that "every creature of God is good and nothing to be refused" (I Tim. 4:4), and he considers it only natural that "no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it" (Eph. 5:29; Rom. 13-14); but as soon as he feels that the use of something that is in itself good and permitted is dangerous to the preservation of his own spiritual life because it tends to bring him under its power (I Cor. 6:12), he will have none of it and voluntarily denies himself the use of it. In I Cor. 9 Paul employs the wellknown example of the runner in a race, who is temperate in all things of which he knows that they will weaken his body and make him unfit to obtain the prize, instead of making him more fit and nimble to win it. So the Christian by faithful asceticism, that is, by faithfully keeping under his body and bringing it under subjection, makes it more fit for the fulfillment of his moral obligations. In doing so he is not simply following an "evangelical advice," of which Rome has so much to say, but he is actually performing a personal ethical duty, even as Christ also did not simply advise the rich young ruler to dispose of all that he had but expressly demanded that he do so in view of the young man's peculiar nature (Matt.

19). To be sure, the more perfect life would no doubt be the one in which the Christian used all the gifts which God has given him in the Master's service; however, where the moral strength for such a God-pleasing use is lacking the duty of self-denial is in place, at least so long as the possession or use of such gifts involves a powerful incentive to sin for him. In this respect the spiritual life is like the physical life: even here it may become necessary to remove a certain almost indispensable member in order to save the whole (cf. Job 2:4).

It would be an almost interminable enterprise to attempt even so much as an enumeration of all the various forms of ascetic action, for they vary as widely in their nature as the peculiarities of character in each individual. It may be the case that one Christian has the duty of self-denial in respect to something which another Christian may freely use and enjoy, not to mention as yet the special obligations arising from our various callings and occupations. There is one particular form of asceticism, however, that is rather prominently presented in Holy Scripture and should be practiced in some manner or other by every Christian: fasting. Of course the reference is not to that abstinence from food which is a natural and involuntary concomitant of a depressed state of mind (Mark 2:19), nor to such abstinence as an evidence of the grief of contrition (Acts 9:9), but only to fasting that is entirely self-imposed and voluntary and intended as a

means on the part of the individual Christian to make his soul more fit for spiritual things. Such fasting is in place not only as a wholesome antidote for gluttony but also as a valuable check on every kind of natural impulse. In all things the Christian must practice moderation, and in some respects an actual self-denial is necessary in order to secure the control of the spirit over the impulses and organs of nature. Luther says, "To turn your back upon worldly desires, that is true and daily fasting." But as soon as we take the word fasting in this wider sense it ceases to be a special form of ascetic exercise and becomes merely another name for asceticism in general.

Certainly such asceticism is to be only a means to an end, never an end in itself as Rome would have it. It must never be co-ordinated with the daily renewal of contrition and faith, the use of the means of grace, prayer, and the spiritual warfare of the Christian, but it does afford a valuable aid to the free and unobstructed use of these exclusive means of Christian self-preservation. It is wrong to consider asceticism as something meritorious in itself and to exalt it as a higher stage of perfection, as Rome does. It is equally wrong to practice it to the extreme of enfeebling or even destroying the body or any of its members, for the purpose is not to weaken the physical organs but rather to enable them to render better spiritual service. Strict mastery of self, a firm hold on the reins, complete control of all powers and organs and endow-

ments to make them subservient to the highest purposes in life—that is the proper aim of asceticism; and by that aim many forms of ascetic exercises which are merely perversions of the truth based upon a radical misconception of God's creation stand condemned. Luther's words are sane: "The flesh should be mortified in such a way that it will serve the spirit and be subject to it, and will not throw the master out of the saddle; but also in such a way that the horse will be able to travel and to carry the rider." Even in the days of the apostles that peculiar asceticism appeared which Paul describes as an ἀπειρία σώματος (Col. 2:23), and which would actually annihilate the physical life as something unclean in itself (I Tim. 4:1ff.). Over against such radical views Paul in I Tim. 4:7f. states the true nature of asceticism. Our Confessions deal with the subject in the Augsburg Confession, Article 26:30ff., and state as the purpose of aceticism: *ne saturitas aut desidia exstimulet ad peccandum*, and a little later, *ut corpus habeat obnoxium et idoneum ad res spirituales*.

Faithfulness in the daily renewal of contrition and faith, faithfulness in the use of the means of grace, faithfulness in prayer, faithfulness in our warfare against our spiritual enemies, and all this supported by faithfulness in asceticism—all these are necessary for the preservation of the spiritual life. If *we* are thus faithful—for God is and remains faithful under all circumstances—then we cannot lose the spiritual life

that has been implanted in us, then let the final hour of our life come at any time. If we are true to Him who has loved us and regenerated us, we can die in peace. In contrition and faith we use the means of grace while we pray and fight, and by the strength they give we cling to Him in life and in death who even in death is still our life and our hope.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

CHAPTER XXVI

THE NECESSITY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW LIFE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SUCH DEVELOPMENT, AND ITS RELATION TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE NEW LIFE

Development is as necessary to the Christian life as its preservation, as surely as in regeneration only the beginnings of the new life have been planted in man, and as inevitably as life, true life, always means growth, never stagnation. Luther said, "The Christian on earth is constantly in a state of becoming, not yet in a state of having become." For this reason the Scripture speaks so frequently of the necessity of growth for the Christian (for example, Col. 1:9-11; Eph. 4:12ff.; II Tim. 3:17). This development is essentially not a mere gradual external addition of various virtues (Rome), but the unfolding of that inner life which is already present through faith. It is an organic unfolding resulting from the very urge of that life, a development that takes place by a holy necessity. Hence the Scripture calls all that which belongs to

this development the "fruit" of faith (Gal. 5:22; Eph. 5:9; Matt. 3:8, 10; James 3:18; Phil. 1:11; and especially II Pet. 1:5-7). This also implies that it is a development from within. It is not enough to adorn oneself externally with a few rags of good works, the works must be a living expression of the inward faith of the heart. Thus alone will the full harmony of the Christian life be assured. It must be noted however, that while spiritual growth is absolutely necessary, it is not necessary for salvation that a certain degree of that growth be reached, for it is not the works of faith but faith alone that justifies and saves.

Logically, we must distinguish between the development and the preservation of the Christian life. The latter deals with the holding of that which we have become; the former with the increase and growth of that which we already are. In point of time, however, the two cannot be separated, for the one takes place together with the other. If the Christian really remains what he is he will also ever more become what he is; but once the roots of his faith have become loosened his development will also be stunted. Moreover, there are no other means by which the spiritual life is developed than those by which it is preserved. As the Christian applies these means to hold his own against the enemies of his soul, he also at the same time uses them to develop his spiritual personality and bring it to perfection.

To ascertain the scope of this development, we might simply refer to the unlimited range of the love for God and the neighbor, for even as love is planted in man's heart together with faith, it is also its necessary and natural manifestation. Faith is embodied by love; love is faith in action (Gal. 5:6). Thus even in the Old Testament all the various demands of the law are summarized in the one great commandment, Deut. 6:4, 5, and similarly in the New Testament, Matt. 22:36ff. Paul considers love as the soul of all brotherly conduct in the Christian community, while John sums up all the various activities of the Christian both in his relation to God and to the brethren in that one word "love," and Luther in his explanation of the Ten Commandments repeats again and again, "We should fear and love God." Nevertheless it will be advisable instead of merely referring thus to the sum total of all Christian conduct to discuss at least the more important individual manifestations of faith, and with it of love and hope, or in other words, of the Christian life; always bearing in mind, however, that they constitute an organic unity, that they are the fruit of faith, growing forth, as it were, from one common root and ceasing to have any value in the sight of God when this is no longer the case.

CHAPTER XXVII

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN RELATION TO GOD

By faith the Christian is assured of three facts in his relation to God: God is the source of his life, including his spiritual life, God is its supporting power, and God is also its ultimate goal in which alone he hopes to find its final consummation.

From the first of these, the certainty that God is the source of his entire life and being, will grow the virtues of humility and thankfulness. Humility (*ταπεινοφροσύνη*, *Demut*) toward God (James 4:10; I Pet. 5:6) denotes that attitude of mind in which we think little of ourselves and desire to be all that we are only by God. It is not an utter rejection and abandonment of self, but it is the consciousness of being something solely by the grace of God (I Cor. 15:10). Such humility is not without readiness to serve God, but, like Christ, it seeks its greatness in "making itself of no reputation" (Phil. 2:5, 6ff.; cf. Matt. 20:26ff.). While by faith the Christian has become lord of all things, yet by love and for God's sake he would gladly be the servant of all. This, together with patience in the presence of vexation and disregard of ourselves, and forbearance with the faults

and shortcomings of others, is the true test of humility. Its death is spiritual pride. Hence the daily prayer of the Christian:

Make me only ever purer
In Thy sight, O Lord;
For my humble self-effacement
Daily grace afford.

Humility toward God will invariably be accompanied by true thankfulness. In the Old Testament, Israel had its thankofferings, the psalms abound in notes of praise and thanksgiving, Jehovah "inhabits the praises of Israel" (Ps. 22:3). In the New Testament Jesus sets a beautiful example of giving thanks for everything (John 6:11, 23; 11:41; Matt. 26:26, 11:25); the apostles follow his example and admonish their congregations to do likewise (Phil. 4:6; Col. 3:17). The ancient church assigned to thanksgiving a special place in its services, the gift of the Lord's Supper received the name εὐχαριστία. Our Confessions speak of the entire Christian service as a *sacrificium eucharisticum* and of good works as an *actio gratiarum* (Mueller's edition, pp. 120:68; 253:25), while in the Heidelberg Catechism the entire third section dealing with the new life of the Christian bears the heading, "Of Thankfulness." All this shows clearly enough how universally this virtue is regarded as an indispensable feature in the development of the Christian life. True thankfulness consists in continued thinking of the many evidences of God's love which we experience, and finds its expression both in words

and deeds. There is indeed a difference between praise and thanksgiving, for we thank God when we speak to Him only of his benefits to us, while in praising Him we also acknowledge them before others; but here we take them together. Thanking God is man's answer to the evidences of God's love for him. God's love binds Him to us, and our gratitude in turn binds us to Him. The deeper our penetration into the grace of our Creator and Redeemer, the purer and richer, the more sincere and enduring will be our thanksgiving (cf. Ps. 103). Humility and thankfulness belong together; without humility toward God there can be no thankfulness, and without thankfulness humility would be but an empty pretense.

By faith the Christian knows that God is the ever-present supporting power of his life, hence his faith will also produce the fruits of obedience toward God and joy in Him. The New Testament presents the entire life of sanctification under the viewpoint of gratitude toward God and obedience to God (for example, Rom. 6:12, with which passage I Sam. 15:22 should be compared). Our Confessions do the same when, as in Article 6 of the Augsburg Confession, the totality of good works produced by faith is designated as "New Obedience." Diligence in good works and obedience toward God may be said to be the final purpose of our redemption through Christ and our regeneration through the Holy Ghost (cf. Ezek. 36:27; Tit. 2:14; 3:8; Eph. 2:10; James 2:14-26). It is the

fruit of faith for "faith is a living, active, dynamic thing that does not stop to ask whether there be good works to be done but is ever busy doing them" (Luther). Obedience consists of the voluntary subordination of our own will under the will of God as it is revealed in the Scriptures. It is a necessary feature of the Christian life that the Christian be transformed by the renewing of his mind, that is, in his thoughts and judgments, by the Spirit of God, so that in all things he will make not his old will but the will of God the rule and guide of his life (Rom. 12:1, 2), and this not because he feels that he must, but because he freely chooses to do so (Ps. 40:8; 110:3). This voluntary obedience to the will of God is something which the world cannot understand, but for the true Christian it is altogether self-evident and an infallible mark of his spiritual life (Matt. 7:21ff.; Rom. 13:5; I Pet. 2:13). It was especially Luther who emphasized the voluntary character of this obedience and said that without requiring a formal command it must be present as naturally as the light of the sun and the growth of the tree (compare above p. 40). Our modern age must be reminded again and again that this voluntary, spontaneous obedience to God is infinitely more valuable than obedience to self-made pledges and good resolutions.

Since the Christian knows that every moment of his life he is being supported and embraced by the strong arm of his heavenly Father, his life will also

reveal something of the joy that comes from the assurance of this fact. Joy, delight in the Lord and his Word and will, is something that was already experienced by the saints of the Old Covenant (for example, Ps. 73:25f.; Micah 7:18; Isa. 40:9ff.; Ps. 37:4; 84:3), and in Psalm 119 its sweetness is sung in incomparably rich variations. In the New Testament Christ promises it as a gift of God (John 16:22, 24), the disciples experience it even in the midst of their trials (II Cor. 6:10) and expect to find it in their hearers (Phil 4:4). This joy can never be found in the sinner's heart until he has become conscious of his communion with God through the forgiveness of sin; its very essence is the lively consciousness of that peace with God. Hence, where there is no assurance of salvation there can be no joy in the Lord. Luther, the herald of that assurance, would have the entire Christian life attuned to the lay, "Dear Christians, let us all rejoice," and yet he knew that the joy we have here on earth is but a foretaste of the joy in heaven. This joy must not necessarily assume any of those violent, boisterous forms found in some "revival songs;" rather it will in most cases remain largely a secret hidden away in the Christian's heart. It will usually be felt more keenly in the advanced stages of the Christian life than near its beginning, until at the twilight hour of such a life it grows into a peace serene, unruffled by the cares of earth, a real anticipation of the joy above.

For the Christian by faith also knows that God is the ultimate aim and goal of his life, in whom that life will reach its final consummation. This conviction will produce in him both a feeling of longing for God and of patient waiting for his salvation. This longing for God was especially characteristic of the saints of the Old Testament, which was the time of prophecy and promise (cf. Ps. 25 and 42; Isa. 63). The New Testament is indeed the time of fulfillment in which salvation has been fully prepared, but it is not yet the time of completion. Hence the joy and thankfulness of the Christian over his present possession will necessarily be coupled with a longing for the full and complete revelation of the future. Thus in the case of Paul (5:8), of Peter (I Pt. 1:4; 5:4; 2:11), of John (Rev. 22:20). The Church of Rome has forgotten much of this longing hope in her efforts to establish a kingdom of this world, whereas the Reformers and their spiritual descendants are filled with yearnings for that precious final Day. Even among some Protestants today this longing for the heavenly mansions and the perfect fruition of God is gradually giving place to idle fancies of a kingdom of universal peace on earth as the final stage of cultural evolution. But one who views his own life in the light of eternal truth, and the history of the nations in the light of divine prophecy, will not be carried away by such phantastic dreams; he will keep alive in his heart that longing for deliverance and become

inwardly separated more and more from this world; by prayers and meditation he will penetrate ever more deeply into God's Word where he can find Him whose face he longs to see; and instead of yielding to speculative emotionalism he will soberly and conscientiously perform his present duties in order to be found faithful at the Lord's return.

This longing for the final consummation, if it be of the right kind, will always be coupled with *patience*, that is, not the dull, passive endurance of unavoidable evils but the active and willing submission (*ὑπομονή*) under the guiding and directing hand of the heavenly Father, in full confidence that in his own good time the final redemption will come without fail (Ps. 62:1; Isa. 30:15). The Christian casts all his cares upon the Lord, knowing that "all things must work together for good to them that love God" (Rom. 8:28). He rejoices and triumphs in advance (Rom. 8:31), in the assurance that the final outcome simply cannot be doubtful. This accounts for the serenity and equanimity of the Christian's mind, as it is so beautifully expressed in II Cor. 6:9f., and for his endurance in tribulations (James 1:3; II Cor. 4:16ff.). The Christian is a man who knows how to wait, though he must daily "study how to be quiet" (I Thess. 4:11) and actively cultivate this virtue. But where the heart is thus complacent and serene in the Lord, there is also courage and strength to perform the tasks of the present moment.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN RELATION TO THE WORLD

The Christian has a dual nature, spiritual and physical. As a spiritual being he has a direct relation to God, as a physical being he is a part of this created world in which he lives and occupies a definite place. This dual relationship determines his obligation toward the world, for it makes it necessary for him to assume a definite mental attitude and follow a corresponding line of conduct toward it. In his disposition and conduct toward the world at the same time his disposition and conduct toward God will become actively evident, for the world was placed before the Christian, and he into the world, for this very purpose that in his relation to it he should at the same time demonstrate and prove his relation to God. Now the world comes under consideration here under a threefold point of view: first, as created by God and continually being preserved and governed by Him; secondly, as an ungodly and anti-godly world under the curse of sin; and finally as a world which is to become God's world again and which therefore still has a future.

This world is God's world. He has created it, and He still preserves it. The Christian knows this by

faith. His attitude toward the world therefore must be one of humble and thankful appreciation of its gifts and ordinances. In all the good things of this world he sees the gifts of God, which he thankfully accepts; and in those institutions and ordinances which were either directly established in creation or which are the natural outgrowth of it and hence are not sinful, he finds an expression of God's will and therefore will not lightly set them aside or disregard them. It was Luther again, who emphasized this thought anew after the papacy with its fostering of monasticism as the only holy estate and with its arbitrary assumption of civil powers even to the extent of deposing sovereigns and absolving their subjects from lawful obedience, had completely forgotten it. Compare pp. 43ff.

Moreover, insofar as the Christian can still find in the world a reflection of the glory of its Creator, he also enjoys the world. He avoids both extremes: stoic contempt of the world, which would be contempt of God's work, and epicurean indulgence in the pleasures of the world without thought of God or the future. With the psalmist he fully realizes the vanity and decay of all earthly things, (Ps. 103:15f.; Eccl. 1:2), but with him he also knows something of the delight of the child of God in the things of God's creation and of the joy of life (Ps. 104 and 19; Eccl. 11:9). But his joy in the world is in reality a joy in the Lord (Phil. 3:1), of whose goodness the earth is full (Ps. 33:5). Again it was Luther who in this

respect was the best interpreter of Jesus (John 2:1-11) and Paul (I Tim. 4:1; I Cor. 3:22, 23), and in spite of the temporary blight of Pietism with its world-negation the Lutheran church to this very day has preserved that joyful spirit which finds a wholesome and legitimate delight in a world that shows forth in a thousand different ways the glory of its Creator.*

Since the crown of God's creation is man, it is both natural and important that the Christian develop the proper attitude toward his fellowman. His faith here will be manifested in love, which indeed has already been planted in him with his faith; love for all men and especially love for the brethren. The former makes no distinctions between individuals, it does not stop with nationality or any external differences, but it recognizes in every member of the human race a being like himself created by God and still bearing a remnant of God's image. This love will be extended particularly to those who are in need, the poor, the sick, the widows and orphans; and, following the example of the heavenly Father, who loved us even

*Lutheran hymnology is particularly rich in hymns that express this spirit. Take for example Paul Gerhardt's delightful "Sommerlied," of which we quote the first stanza in English translation from the American Lutheran Hymnal, No. 645:

"Go forth, my heart, and seek delight,
While summer reigns so fair and bright,
View God's abundance daily;
The beauty of these gardens see,
Behold how they for me and thee
Have decked themselves so gaily."

while we were still his enemies, of Christ on the cross, and of Stephen the first martyr, it will reach its perfection and crowning glory in love for the enemy (Matt. 5:44ff.; Rom. 12:20f.). Deeds of kindness and philanthropic enterprises indeed are not unknown to the world, but the Christian's love for his fellowman is distinguished by the fact that it is a love for God's sake, that it is a holy love which does not hesitate to reprove the sinner, and a saving love which is concerned about his soul's salvation.

The brotherly love between Christians is primarily the result of a common faith in a common Savior. In his brother in the faith the Christian sees something of a reflection of the image of God that has been restored in him. This love was made by our Lord the fundamental law of the new dispensation (John 13:34), Paul has described it in all its peculiar beauty in I Cor. 13, and John requires in particular that it shall be demonstrated in works of love even to the extent of giving up one's life for the brother (I John 3:18; 3:16). The profound impression which was made upon the Gentiles by the early Christians as they practiced this brotherly love is wellknown. True brotherly love is characterized by a tender regard for the weaker brother. It would rather abstain from the use of something otherwise permitted than by the use of it to give offense to such a brother and cause him to stumble (I Cor. 8:9). Genuine brotherly love must be achieved ever again by constant battle with innate

selfishness; besides, the brethren whom we are to love sometimes have but little that is really attractive to us, which is all the more reason for us to love God in them. The test of this love is in the fact that it hates the sin but loves the sinner. Luther says, "So much should I hate my neighbor that I cannot bear him; so much should I love him that I run after him like a shepherd who seeks his lost sheep." Such a thing is possible for brotherly love only when it is a manifestation of God's love, when it is truly born of faith.

But this world, in which the Christian lives, has become an ungodly and anti-godly world, contaminated with sin and subject to death. This, too, the Christian knows by faith, in fact, he knows that it was only by the grace of the Savior that he has escaped a similar curse and death. The more he realizes this grace that has saved him, the more will he want to be separated from this world that "lieth in wickedness." He cannot help but disavow it, and world-denial will thus become one of the indispensable features in the development of the Christian life (I John 2:15; II Pet. 1:4; Tit. 2:12). Indirectly this implies a condemnation of the world and its ways, though not an external withdrawal from it. The latter will ever remain impossible, as the futile attempts of misguided ascetics plainly show; in fact, it is unnecessary (I Cor. 5:10) and wrong, for the Christian has work to do in the world. Inwardly, however, the Christian will separate

himself more and more from worldly works and ways in order to live unto God and to magnify his glory in the world. Such world-denial is painful, for it means in many cases the giving up of things that have become very dear to him, and it may call forth the contempt and hatred of the world (John 15:18). But the Christian must not be discouraged thereby, willingly he must sever one tie after another in order to belong ever more completely to his Lord. The enmity of the world he will bear quietly and patiently in view of the bliss which he enjoys even now in communion with his God and of the greater glory which shall be revealed in him. Thus he takes upon himself the cross of Christ and bears it after Him (Matt. 10:38; cf. Hebr. 12). And if by reason of these experiences there is something of a depression and dejection about his life in this world, this does not seem strange to him, for he carefully guards against the error of the Corinthians who believed that they were called to be rulers even here on earth, and he rather assures himself that he must expect to share some of the experiences which Paul relates in I Cor. 4:9-13. In all these things there will appear in his own life an afterglow of the life of Christ. His joy in the Lord and the certainty of his salvation will always reassure him.

Finally, the Christian also knows by faith that, after all, this world still has a future in which "the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of

our Lord and of his Christ" (Rev. 11:15; 12:10). This faith inspires him with hope for this world, to be sure, not in the sense of an evolutionistic theory of progressive development and world-improvement, but in the sense that the Lord by his Word and Spirit will yet rescue many a sinner from this ungodly world and bring him into the communion of saints, even though it be as a brand plucked out of the fire; and that finally He will throw all irrational creation into the crucible of divine judgment in order to bring it forth again, refined and purified, as a new heaven and a new earth, where the wicked shall be forever excluded and the righteous shall dwell in blissful contemplation and enjoyment of the glory of God.

Such hope also makes the Christian eager for service in the world. It makes him contend earnestly in word and deed against all ungodliness in the world; he strives to exert an influence for good wherever he can; he puts forth every effort to seek and to save the lost; he works and prays and gives for the extension of the kingdom of God on earth; and he also willingly and faithfully performs his civic duties in order thus to reach as far as possible all sorts and conditions of men and bring them under the saving influence of the Spirit of Christ. This zeal is ever combined with ὑπομονή, a patient endurance that makes him persist in his efforts even when for a long time his labors of love seem fruitless. In all this the thought of a universal Christianization of the world

is foreign to him, for he knows that it will always be only a minority that accepts salvation (Isaiah: **שׂאֵר (יְשׁוּב)**), and even that minority will not be saved at one time (James 5:7, 8; Mark 4:26ff.), still less in a period set by man. And even when the Christian is not permitted to see any fruit of his labor whatever he still holds fast his conviction that the Lord will make good his promise, and that where the Word of God has become a "savor of death unto death" the world must at least eventually acknowledge the justice of God's judgments.

Inasmuch as undoubtedly there are some activities, institutions and relationships in the world that are ungodly and others that are godly, it becomes the duty of the Christian to decide what they are in any given case and to govern himself accordingly. To this end he has need of wisdom, which will teach him to use the world without abusing it, without being drawn away from God and giving encouragement to the evil that is in the world. It requires a mature Christian spirit to be able always to draw the proper lines, and only a heart that has come to rest completely in God can find the way.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE LIFE OF JESUS AS AN EXAMPLE FOR THE PROPER DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

For the development of the Christian life as a whole the life of Jesus constitutes the finest example, and the proper development of that life may be said to be but the imprint of the likeness of Christ in man, a transfiguration into his image (II Cor. 3:18), a putting on of Christ and his virtues (Rom. 13:14).

His life was a life of love for his heavenly Father: as in essence so in love the two were one (John 17:20ff.). This love He showed by his humility, in which He lived his life upon earth in submission to the Father, did only what He saw the Father do, and taught only what the Father taught Him (John 5:19; 8:28), and by his thankfulness to the Father, which He expressed on so many occasions (cf. especially Matt. 11:25ff. and John 11:41). One of the outstanding characteristics of his life was his constant obedience to the Father. Obediently He came down from heaven and waited for the time when He should begin his public ministry. His meat was to do the will of Him that sent Him (John 4:34). Obediently

He went to his passion, and there again He learned obedience (Hebr. 5:8). He was obedient unto the death of the cross (Phil. 2:8), so that Paul could summarize his entire life in the one word "obedience" (Rom. 5:19). But in his communion with God He also found perfect bliss and joy. Even in his sufferings this joy could be dimmed only momentarily, while on the very way to his death He spoke of his joy in God and prayed the Father for such perfect joy for his disciples (John 17:13). In praise and prayer this joy frequently broke forth (Matt. 11:25ff.). And how did He not long for God! His entire passion was to Him but a going or returning to the Father (read especially John 17:5). And yet this yearning was united with an incomparable serenity that calmly, confidently awaited the Father's hour. He knew that God's time was the right time. Assured of the final outcome He faced his enemies with quiet courage, silently committing everything to Him that judgeth righteously. Confident of victory in his dying hour He commanded his soul into the Father's hands.

But He also had the right attitude toward the world, in which He demonstrated his attitude toward God his Father. He recognized the providence of God in human ordinances and institutions. He was as far removed from epicurean indulgence as from stoic contempt of the world. Read his parables and see what joy He found in nature and in all created things. Above all He loved his fellowmen: perfect

love for the neighbor and for the brethren was first revealed by Him. It was the very soul of all his activity. His own people naturally came first; but that the Gentiles were not excluded He proved by word and deed, in fact one of his last words was the great commission to preach the Gospel to all nations. All works of charity find in Him their perfect pattern. He was the friend of the poor, the children, the sick, the sinner, of every man. The culminating point of this love was reached in his love for his enemies, which He both preached and practiced. And yet withal there was in Him a burning zeal against everything sinful and diabolical in the world, by reason of which He repelled all sin and combatted it as only the Holy One could (cf. Matt. 4:1 with 16:23). But He also had within Him the hope and the conviction that many would still be rescued from this wicked world, and so He labored with an earnestness that never relaxed and with a patience that endured to the end. Again and again He stayed the arm of God's judgment and pleaded for another year of grace. And because He knew at all times how to distinguish the godly from the ungodly element, He also had the true wisdom which knew how to meet every situation without the least entanglement with sin for his own person.

While it would be a mistake to seek in the life of Christ an exact pattern for every situation and an answer to every question that may confront the

Christian, still in the fundamental principles derived from the life of Christ the Christian will always have a safe directive for his Christian ethical conduct, and his life will attain the proper development if he will earnestly search the mind of Christ and in all things strive to become a true disciple of Him who said, "Follow Me!"

CHAPTER XXX

CROSS AND AFFLICTION AS AN AID IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

As the preservation of the Christian life is aided by asceticism, so its development is assisted by cross-bearing and affliction. The former is self-imposed, the latter is imposed by God. The way of the Christian is described by Paul as a way through much tribulation (Acts 14:22), and this is the keynote that is heard throughout the entire New Testament down to Rev. 7:14 and 21:4. Compare II Cor. 6:4ff.; Matt. 10:38; and especially I Peter and Hebrews, which were written to Christians who were "under the cross." Since Christ trod the road of the cross himself, it is an axiom of the Christian life that "No Christian without cross can be."

While usually the term "cross" is understood as designating such afflictions only as may come upon a Christian because he is a Christian, we take it here in the widest sense as comprehending evils of every kind. Moreover, we are not considering afflictions now as welcome occasions for Satan to bring his powers of seduction into play in order to cause the Christian to fall into sin, for that would require a repetition of our

discussion of the preservation of Christian life. In our present chapter we consider afflictions as a means in the hand of the heavenly Father for the spiritual training of the Christian, for the imprinting of the likeness of Christ in him, for the development of those rich potential resources that lie as yet undiscovered in his faith. Neither do we speak here of the sufferings that may befall the ungodly, which in some way must always be considered as an evidence of God's punitive justice, but only of the afflictions of the Christian, which must be carefully distinguished from the former and are intended either as opportunities for witness-bearing, or as tests and trials of faith, or as fatherly chastisements, but never as evidences of divine wrath. That the first two of these three are not to be taken as proofs of God's wrath is plainly evident; but even the chastisements dare never be so considered, for painful as they may be and deep as they may cut into the "flesh," it is always a loving hand that wields the rod (Heb. 12:6-11) and the purpose can be none other than fatherly training. The heavenly husbandman may prune the vines, even though they bleed under the knife, but He does it only in order to make them bear more fruit (John 15:2). Through suffering the Captain of our salvation was made perfect (Hebr. 2:10), and the same is true of us though in a different sense. James expressly calls the afflictions which the Christian endures a means of testing our faith (*δοκιμιον τῆς πίστεως*, ch. 1:3), and Paul in Rom. 5:3ff. shows

us a golden stairway of precious experiences by which God would lead us through trials and tribulations to ever greater heights of moral attainment. Every man's work must be "tried by fire" (I Cor. 3:13-15), and the test is not complete until the dross is all removed and the pure metal in the crucible reflects the image of the refiner.

This goal can only be reached when the Christian's attitude toward the cross is what God wants it to be. The Christian must not deliberately seek the cross, as some did during the first centuries of the Christian era; but neither must he attempt to escape it when it comes, nor take offense at it as though "some strange thing happened to him" (I Pet. 4:12), for "even hereunto were ye called" (I Pet. 2:21). When the Lord sends a cross the Christian should take it, even as Christ did. Then, after it has come, the true Christian attitude is not one of dull resignation, but humble submission under the will of God, which should become ever more full and complete. Well may the Christian groan under his burden, he may lose the equilibrium of his soul for a time and even pray for the removal of the cross—all this has been hallowed by the Savior's experience in Gethsemane—but he must eventually win through to a sincere "Not my will, but Thine be done!" That is true passive obedience. The Christian must let his afflictions serve him as a means of breaking his self-will, of leading him to thorough repentance and self-humiliation. But

he must also cultivate that sacred carelessness which is fully confident that God in his own good time will find a way out. For this he waits patiently, meanwhile exercising his trust in God and his meekness toward others. God's grace is sufficient for him, for it is a pledge of ultimate deliverance. And as he gains an ever wider perspective of God's ways (Ps. 73) and an ever greater assurance of his blessed purposes, he may even come to experience a quiet joy over the privilege of suffering and thus become ever more like Christ (Col. 1:24; James 1:2). Thus he ascends the scale from compulsion to willingness, to endurance, to appreciation. In most cases, to be sure, the Christian will hardly advance beyond the second stage, and only rarely will he reach the heights where he really considers suffering a privilege. That is an ideal attitude which must not be expected as an abiding one in every case.

Such an attitude and conduct the Christian can achieve only if he bears in mind at all times the consolation which God offers to those who bear the cross. There is comfort in the thought that it is God who fills my cup of woe. There is comfort also in the prospect of eternity, with the glories of which the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared (Rom. 8:18; II Cor. 4:17f.; I Pet. 5:10). Though these sufferings now appear interminable, when placed side by side with those never-ending glories they last but a moment (Isa. 54:7). It was

not an empty phrase when Jesus said seven times, "A little while" (John 16:16ff.). There is further comfort in the thought that God never lays upon us a burden too heavy for us to bear (I Cor. 10:13). As the physician carefully measures the dose before administering it, so God counts the drops in our cup of suffering. With the temptation He also prepares a way of escape. And where no escape seems possible He causes our strength to grow with the weight of the burden (I Pet. 5:10). He still has angels whom He will send to strengthen us. Finally, our afflictions are to be considered as a proof that God has not forgotten us, but rather that we are an object of his tenderest solicitude (Hebr. 12:8, 9). And though He appears to be angry with us, his heart is moved with compassion and He actually must restrain himself not to succor us before the time.

If the Christian keeps his attention steadily fixed upon such consolation he will find it possible to achieve the right attitude in his afflictions. The gradually maturing fruits of his suffering then will be a richer development of his spiritual life, a realization of spiritual strength and power afforded by his faith such as he had never known before, a moral perfection (James 1:4) so far as this is possible to reach in this earthly life (Phil. 3:12, 15), growth into mature manhood and the full measure of development found in Christ (Eph. 4:13), ethical endurance and finally the crown of life (James 1:12).

CHAPTER XXXI

THE EARTHLY CALLING AS THE SPHERE IN WHICH THE PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE ARE TO TAKE PLACE

For the preservation and development of his spiritual life the Scripture directs the Christian neither into a convent nor into the desert, but to his earthly calling. Every creature of God, hence also every calling in this world that has come into existence by divine providence, is good and may become a means for the manifestation of the Christian's relation to God, sanctified by the Word of God and prayer (I Tim. 4:5). Nothing that was created by God is in itself to be considered unclean (Acts 10:28), hence also no human relationship of this earthly creature-life; it is all capable of sanctification (I Cor. 7:14) and can and should be a means for the glorification of God. And because every earthly relationship of this creature-life, unless sinful in itself, is compatible with Christianity, it is the duty of everyone to demonstrate his Christianity in such relationships (I Cor. 7:20ff.). Thus we find that when the church was planted by the apostles, Greeks remained Greeks, and Jews, Jews; and without losing any of their racial peculiarities but

only eliminating whatever sinful elements there were, they lived as Christians. This, too, was the teaching of John the Baptist (Luke 3:12ff.) and of Paul (Eph. 5:22ff.; 6:1ff.; Col. 3:18ff.). Even the slave Onesimus was sent back by Paul to his master. Originally the church honored every calling as a part of the divine order and opposed only such occupations as were not only permeated with sin but actually born of it. But only too soon, especially with the rise of asceticism, a misconception of the divinely ordered relationships in the world including the earthly calling began to prevail, until eventually there was left but one really "holy" order, that of the priests and monks. Compare pp. 42-45.

It is one of the outstanding merits of the Lutheran Reformation that it restored the true appreciation of God's created world in general and with it of the earthly calling as a divine arrangement, in which the Christian is to live and prove his Christian life. Luther said, "We must understand that our earthly life, station and being is comprehended in the Word of God and sanctified by it, that it is a true service of God, in which God is well pleased; and that it is unnecessary for one who would truly serve God to undertake something exceptional in his earthly life, as the monks did. Let him abide in his calling and do what his government, his office and position require of him. That is serving God aright." With this thought in mind he appended the Table of Duties to his Small Catechism

and gave it the sub-title, "Certain passages of Scripture for various holy orders and estates, whereby these are severally to be admonished of their office and duty." The Augsburg Confession also has numerous references to this view of the earthly calling; see Articles 16, 20, 21, 26, 27. Accordingly the Lutheran ideal of the ethical life consists in the demonstration of the Christian faith by a faithful discharge of the duties of that calling into which God has placed us. There have been those in the Lutheran Church as well as in other groups, newly converted as a rule, who were inclined to consider their earthly calling as inferior to the various forms of direct religious activity, such as the Christian ministry, and who thrust themselves forward into the latter—and there still are such today. But such an attitude marks a departure from the Biblical and Lutheran ideal, according to which the vocation in which we have been called and led to Christ is the calling in which we are to preserve and develop the spiritual life we have received. If then under the providence of God and in obedience to his guidance this calling is relinquished in favor of a "spiritual" vocation, let no-one think that such a change is an advance to a higher and more God-pleasing position. The profession of the ministry, although of greatest importance, is no higher in itself than any other honorable earthly calling.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE INNER LAWS WHICH GOVERN THE PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

This entire preservation and development of the Christian's spiritual life does not take place, and must not take place, as though there were a law driving the Christian to it like a taskmaster, fearing which and under the pressure and compulsion of which he made his half-hearted attempts to do that which the law required. For aside from the fact that the law can cause a preservation and development of Christian life as little as it can produce that life, the very nature of the Christian life is such that it can develop and thrive only in an atmosphere of freedom. Christian life and freedom are correlatives. The Christian is free from the law, not only from the Jewish law in its entirety (cf. Galatians) but from every kind of law (Rom. 8:2; especially I Tim. 1:9). The law does not coerce him. He who had been an ἔννομος had by sin become an ἄνομος and therefore in the judgment of God a ὑπόνομος, but now since his regeneration and conversion he is again an ἔννομος, that is, he is internally in harmony with the invariable will of God laid down in the law. He respects the authority of the law, but not because

he fears its punishments or is driven by external force to keep it, but because being freed from the law, from its curse (Gal. 3:13) and its coercion (I Tim. 1:9), in his new liberty he ever again freely chooses to do God's will (Rom. 8:4). The Christian still knows of a *necessitas* in his moral life, but it is a *necessitas ordinis*, a *necessitas mandati vel voluntatis Christi*, not a *necessitas coactionis*, compare Form. Concord, Article IV, 14-20. He recognizes a *debitum*, an obligation, a duty (ὀφείλομεν, I John 4:11), even a divine commandment (John 13:34,) a commandment, however, demanding nothing else but what the inner urge of the new man in him constrains him to do. In fact, the impulses of his regenerated heart could never be satisfied without such voluntary submission under the will of God (James 1:25). For this reason the same apostle Paul who so strongly emphasizes the Christian's freedom from every kind of law can nevertheless assert (Rom. 3:31) that justification without the deeds of the law and by faith alone does not overthrow the law but rather establishes it and makes it the true basis for a moral world-order, even as Christ who freed us from the law said that He came not to destroy the law and the prophets but to fulfill them.

To be sure, the Christian is free from the law only insofar as he has really become a new creature. Insofar as he still has the Old Adam in him he is still under the authority, pressure and coercion of the law. However, with reference to the Old Adam there is now this

difference that since the Christian's conversion and the consequent restoration of the harmony of his will with the divine will the pressure of the law upon the Old Adam is no longer merely a pressure from without but is transmitted through the will of the new man; while the resistance of the Old Adam is not merely a resistance against the law but also against the regenerated will of the Christian himself. But even the Christian as such, the new man, still has need of the law. He is still in a process of growth and becoming, and his willingness to do God's will by no means implies that he also has a full and complete knowledge of the works and ways that truly please God. He therefore needs the law as a norm and guide in the way he wants to go. Thus the law is to him actually a blessing for which he is duly thankful (Ps. 19: 8ff.; 119:103ff.). It is to him what guideposts and road-signs are to the traveller. Herein lies the unity of the law and Christian liberty: the Christian in the exercise of his free self-determination finds in the divine law a precious gift, a rock and support to which he may hold, a safe and sure guide whom he may confidently follow. Thus the Christian life, though a life of freedom, yet determined by the law, is still a truly unified life.

As is wellknown, our dogmaticians distinguished a threefold use of the law, the *usus politicus*, the *usus paedagogicus seu elenchticus*, and the *usus didacticus*. Quite correctly they said that the first was for the

unregenerated, the second for those to be regenerated and converted, the third for those who were regenerated and converted. But both Luther and the Formula of Concord point out that the *usus elenchticus* and even the *usus politicus* still have a great importance even for the regenerated Christian. Insofar as he still has the flesh in him the law will continue to reveal his sin and the wrath of God over it, in order thus to lead him ever again to seek Christ and his forgiveness; and there are times in the life of the Christian when his spirituality is at such a low ebb that it will no longer be his love for God that keeps him from sin but rather the thought of the law and the consuming fire of the wrath of God, or when at least the thought of the majesty of the law and the Lawgiver, always to be respected, will act as a powerful aid for him in resisting temptations. From this angle we can also understand what the Scripture has to say concerning the fear of punishment and the reward of good works (Rom. 8:15; I John 4:18; I Pet. 1:17; Hebr. 12:28; Phil. 2:12, and Luke 6:23; Matt. 6:1, 2).

Now we can also understand in what sense vows and pledges may be approved for the Christian, that is, vows which are voluntarily made with a view to the promotion of the ethical life, and which constitute a limitation of his Christian liberty which the Christian takes upon himself. There are in general two kinds of occasions for such vows. It may be that the Christian finds himself in great need or difficulty, and

as he prays for deliverance he is mindful of the fact that he so easily forgets about such deliverance or neglects to render the proper thankoffering; therefore he fixes the contemplated thankoffering in his mind in the form of a vow and says, If the Lord will help me out of this great trouble I will give Him this definite gift as a sacrifice of love. Or it may be that in contemplating the use of certain material things for his pleasure and enjoyment, things which are not in themselves sinful and which therefore are permitted him, the Christian comes to the conclusion that the use of such things does constitute a special danger to his spiritual life, and therefore he vows or pledges himself to abstain from them.

In the Old Testament vows are frequently mentioned, though nowhere commanded. In the New Testament we have only two examples (Acts 18:18; 21:23ff.), a fact which already suggests that vows are more in keeping with the spirit of legal pedagogy in the Old Testament than with that of the full possession of salvation in Christ in the New. At any rate, the making of vows or pledges can never be considered as an evidence of higher Christian perfection, they are in fact a testimony of a sense of weakness on the part of him who makes them, and to ascribe any sort of merit to them is a great mistake. Ascetic exercises as well as vows are only a means to the end of that self-control which is necessary for ethical development. No matter how useful vows and pledges may be in

individual cases, it is of infinitely greater importance always to be concerned about the daily renewal of one's spiritual strength in contrition and faith.

As law and liberty find their unity in the Christian life, that life is also at the same time the fulfillment of a duty (I John 3:16; 4:11; Rom. 8:12) and the attainment of a blessing (Matt. 5:2ff.; Rom. 8:6, 14; James 1:25). Both aspects appear even at the beginning of the Christian life, but they become more obvious as this life progresses. In the beginning it is more the attainment of a blessing, of a great good and precious treasure, in later life often more the fulfillment of a duty. The sense of joyful elevation and victory which so often accompanies conversion does not continue indefinitely; yet the movement toward God must be constantly renewed even though the joyous feeling of attaining the good diminishes. It is then that the Christian reminds himself of that which God has done for him and of his obligation even on that account to renew the covenant of grace so far as he is concerned. Especially at times when the Christian life is at a low ebb the sense of duty must supplement the attraction of the blessing. And the farther out toward the periphery the Christian life extends, the more frequently will this be necessary, so that there are in fact certain activities which appear to him solely as duty (for instance, the payment of taxes). But just as law and liberty become a unity in the Christian life, so the contradiction between the attainment of a blessing and

the performance of a duty does not destroy the harmony of that life; for even the appropriation of the Highest Good, whose enjoyment the Christian most ardently desires, is again only the fulfillment of a duty, the duty of belonging to God with heart and soul, with all that he is and has, and the fulfillment of this duty in turn will ever again result in the appropriation and enjoyment of God as the Highest Good (James 1:25). Objectively considered, therefore, there can be no tension between these two aspects of the Christian life, and where subjectively it is the case it is due to the presence and influence of the old man in us.

Now, where man is no longer under the coercion of the law but freely and voluntarily decides for that which the law demands, and where the development of the spiritual life takes place rather because it is a good to be attained than a duty to be fulfilled, there we may speak of "virtue" (ἀρετή, II Pet. 1:5) as being present in the fullest sense of the term. For the virtuous man gives proof of his "virtue" (ἀρετή from ἀνὴρ, *virtus* from *vir*; hence virtue originally means manliness, manly courage, efficiency) precisely in this that he always willingly and readily performs his duty. Virtue in the full sense of the word is something, therefore, that is not to be found in the "child" in Christ, in one who has only just been converted, no matter how freely the gifts of the Spirit may have been poured out upon him, but in the man in Christ, the mature Christian; and the individual virtues, such as

meekness, mercy, chastity, etc., are not owned by those who in every case must laboriously wrest them as it were from their Old Adam, but by those who as a result of long experience can manifest such dispositions with a certain ease, having reached mature manhood in Christ (Eph. 4:13, 14). This does not mean that the virtuous man can be spared all further struggles. That is impossible because virtue is never efficient in respect to all the various forms and situations of the Christian life, and because it is never complete in this life but must prove its worth in every new temptation.

There is indeed here upon earth a relative moral perfection (James 1:4), such as St. Paul has in mind in Eph. 4:13, 14 and II Tim. 3:17; but there is here no absolute perfection which would make any further striving in sanctification unnecessary (Phil. 3:12-14). No matter how faithful the Christian may be in the preservation and development of his new life, and thankful as he is for that which he has already been permitted to attain, he will still sigh and pray ever so often, *Kyrie eleison*. The mature Christian knows that only eternity will bring the consummation, absolute perfection. Hopefully and longingly he looks forward to that goal.

a certain order established by God. You must submit to that order.
consider your station--"

~~marriage~~ does not establish marriage; it forbids the breaking of marriage

B. THE PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE VARIOUS SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

CHAPTER XXXIII

INTRODUCTION. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Christian Social Ethics must be built up on Christian Individual Ethics. As society is made up of individuals, so the life of society is largely determined by the individuals composing it. In every social organism and relationship, such as the family, the church, the state, the relation of friendship, of employment and labor, of art and culture, the individual Christian personality therefore is of paramount importance. It would be impossible to have a Christian society without Christian individuals. In fact, it is largely within the sphere of these various social relationships that the individual Christian develops his own personal Christian life and character.

Nevertheless, Christianity is a religion not only of individuals as such, but of individuals joined together in community life. The very terms "church," "kingdom of God," etc., imply this. It would be a grave mistake, therefore, to interpret Christianity as a

merely individualistic form of religion. In the best sense of both terms, Christianity combines Individualism and Socialism. Thus, for example, Christianity teaches that marriage is of value and importance not only for the two individuals contracting it but also for the family that grows out of marriage, for the community in which the home is established, for the church and the nation. It was the fundamental error of ancient and medieval asceticism to ignore this fact. It is only in the various social relationships that a beginning of the realization of the "kingdom of God" upon earth can be made; it is only in these relationships that the basic motive of all Christian conduct, grateful love for God, can find a broad and comprehensive field of action (cf. I. John 1:7; 3:18). Even the future life to which the believing Christian looks forward is not a Nirvana but a life of intense social activity in the community of God's people perfected in glory.

The importance of a correct understanding and evaluation of Christian Social Ethics will become evident from the following considerations. According to the Sermon of the mount, Christians are to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world; and yet St. John writes, "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world" (I John 2:15). An overemphasis on the latter precept may easily lead to a timid retreat from contact with the world in its various social organisms because the Christian exaggerates its power,

fears its allurements, and would at all costs avoid its corrupting influence. Thus the light will be hid under a bushel, the salt will lose its savor. On the other hand, it is possible to overemphasize the former precept, assume an optimistic attitude which expects too much, plunge headlong into all sorts of activities to bring about a "reform" of society and attempt to build the kingdom of God on earth with carnal instead of spiritual weapons. The former may be characterized as the "other-worldly" view, held by medieval monasticism, pietism, puritanism, and some small radical sects; the latter is the "this-worldly" attitude of the broad stream of present day Protestantism, especially its liberal modernistic wing. Only when the Christian knows how to avoid both extremes, clearly understanding both the opportunities and the limitations of his social life, will he be able to find a satisfactory answer to the many questions and problems that confront him in his various contacts from day to day.

Social life is a life of historic continuity. No generation begins it anew; it merely continues the process. This continuation however is not a mechanical one, it is that of a living organism. In analyzing the flow of this stream of social life, we can easily distinguish two factors: the older generation and the younger or rising generation. It is the function of the older generation to transmit to the younger the rich heritage of the past and thus to preserve the fruits of the intellectual labors of humanity and to safeguard

the continuity of its progress. This tradition will be accepted by the younger generation primarily on the authority of the older, and it will be seen therefore that authority is an important principle of progress in social life. Without it there is constant danger that the fruits of humanity's labor be dissipated and thus the progress of civilization itself be jeopardized.

But the younger generation does not merely accept that which is handed down to it from the past; it also appropriates it, penetrates it with its own spirit, and enriches and increases the heritage for future generations. In times of transition to new historic periods and under the influence of strong, creative personalities, there will occur a pronounced antithesis of the new against the old in this process, and thus great social reform movements, revolutions, etc., are initiated. But the usual form of historical progress is this that the heritage of the past is preserved by a consistent application of its principles and yet with gradual modifications in keeping with new conditions. We may call that viewpoint which makes prosperity and progress depend predominantly upon the continuation of the heritage the "conservative," while the "liberal" view expects progress and fortune rather from the free initiative of individuals unhampered by the shackles of the past. In either case, though less in the former and much more in the latter, there will take place a critical dissolution of certain elements in the tradition and a new combination of others. But let everyone first be

thoroughly permeated with the objective heritage before his subjective mind undertakes to reshape the world. A criticism which does not understand that which is criticized is purely negative and therefore unproductive, and thoughts and actions which are merely the products of subjective minds are enthusiastic, impractical and utopian.

The Christian view of the various forms of social organization always considers whether they are in accordance with nature and history, for both in the book of nature and in the records of history the Christian reads a revelation of the providential will of his heavenly Father. But above all, the Christian tests every kind of social theory and social institution by the infallible touchstone of the Word of God as recorded in Holy Scripture. A state, for example, in which the authority of government has been usurped by the church, or a church which is under the dictatorial power of the state; a family in which the parents do not control the children but the children the parents; a society in which the inherent worth of the human personality is ruthlessly disregarded or in which the established customs and usages and institutions which are the mainsprings of its historic life are scoffed at and destroyed—all these are contrary to nature and history and contradict the will of God. Such perversions destroy their own organisms and consequently make them unfit to serve as supports of historic continuity and thus also as forms of Christian life. But

inasmuch as Christianity for the purpose of penetrating the human race with its saving truths and ethical principles has need of the various social organizations as nurseries of historic life, it will as a rule soon discover such caricatures destructive of social life and vigorously oppose them. In this way many unchristian and harmful elements have been all but eliminated from civilized social life, such as slavery, polygamy, barbarian punishments, outlawry of the poor, etc. The Christian in his estimate of any form of social organization is guided by these two considerations: First, are the natural and historic relations of the organization of such a character as to make possible a really vital progress in accordance with the plans and purposes of divine Providence? And secondly, are its governing precepts and principles inherently compatible with the service of God or conducive to the service of sin? For if the vitality of the organization is assured and its principles are not inherently the instruments of sin, the ideal of Christian morality can enter into it and become operative through it. Only then can such an organization become the bearer of the highest type of Christian culture and serve as a positive field of activity for the Christian in the preservation and development of his spiritual life.

In this section we shall consider the preservation and development of the Christian life in the four social relationships, the family, the church, the state, and the purely human relationships.

...lation in the family & repression.
...to have duty and right to discipline children (educate)
...ly unit & a divine order
...ing a contract (?) dissolved by will.

...ble moral standard.
...dissolved freely.

1. THE FAMILY

CHAPTER XXXIV

MARRIAGE

Marriage is that divine institution which consists of the legal and voluntary union of two persons of opposite sex for an exclusive, continuous, and lifelong communion of all interests in the physical, intellectual, and spiritual spheres.

Marriage is more than a civil contract, a purely human agreement between two parties. It is a divine institution, in fact the oldest in existence, dating back to the days before the fall (Gen. 1 and 2). Based on the natural differences between male and female, it was established by the Creator as a relationship in which both man and woman are normally to attain their fullest development, achieve their greatest happiness, and accomplish their God-given purposes in life. Since marriage is a part of God's original plan of creation it follows that normally it is the privilege as well as the duty of every human being to enter this estate. It is a privilege, for there are particular blessings connected with it which cannot be attained in any

... of sex.
... man see his loss. The loss of God. 2. Show him God's redemption. 3. Teach a Bible

other way; and it is a duty which the Christian owes to humanity—for the continuation of the human race according to the will of the Creator is conditioned upon it, to the kingdom of God—for according to God's will he is to establish a place for that kingdom in his home, to himself—because he ought to make use of this God-given opportunity for the higher development both of his natural and his spiritual life.

Since marriage is a divinely established institution and both sexes have been created for it by God, it follows that celibacy cannot be considered as affording a higher moral perfection. Marriage is the rule established by God in creation; an exception to this rule may be made only when divine Providence clearly indicates it. Under certain conditions, physical, social, or even professional, it may become the duty of the Christian either to remain single throughout his life or at least to postpone marriage until God changes the conditions; while it may also happen that celibacy is actually forced upon the Christian by circumstances beyond his control (Matt. 19:10-12; I Cor. 7). To remain single simply for the sake of convenience or because one shuns the responsibilities and burdens of married life is wrong and injurious to human personality; while on the other hand one who does so in obedience to the will of Providence will be compensated in other ways for the loss of those blessings attainable only in matrimony (Matt. 19:29). In the case of those rare individuals who are of "angel-like nature"

just body, but all the ego, the whole personality.
... , overbalanced. The personality is changed for the worst.
... in sex.
... - sexual union, natural desire of two persons.
... people than exclusively with one another, only.
... of sexuality. a complete union of the sex in

you don't hide names.

etic in marriage.

that joy and desire and duty
at segregation 3 races, but duty for union.

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(Martensen), to whom the joys of married and family life offer no inducements and who have the gift of continence (I Cor. 7), their own conscience must be their guide. At any rate, such natures cannot be produced by artificial training, whence also the apostle Paul speaks of those who forbid to marry as teaching a "doctrine of devils" (I Tim. 4:3).

The object of marriage is the exclusive, continuous, and life-long community of all interests in the physical, intellectual, and spiritual spheres. That the union of man and wife extends over all the various interests of life is evident from the very nature of the union and is implied in the words, "the twain shall be one flesh" (Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:4). For while these words first of all describe the union as an intimate physical life-unity, we certainly will not be straining the sense of Scripture if in view of the close connection between the physical, intellectual and spiritual in this earthly life we extend their meaning in the sense indicated. The physical union of two individuals affects all the various relations and conditions of their lives. With the help of other passages of Scripture we may specify three objects of marriages in particular: mutual aid, sex communion, and procreation.

That mutual aid is the primary purpose of marriage is indicated in Gen. 2:18 and Eph. 5:29. It is to be rendered in every possible way, not only so far as the physical necessities of life are concerned, but especially also in the spiritual sphere.

a command, but a promise
in relation to the bond

ing - a deeper, more lasting acquaintance - [YANDA - know lovingly
and knowledge - a personal knowledge (experience). 2. mutual knowledge - personal relationship of
knowledge of an inner secret.
union & maleness/femaleness Marriage 265

Sex communion is the chief distinguishing characteristic—but not the chief purpose—of marriage. "The twain shall be one flesh." Cf. I Cor. 7:3, 4. It involves much more than mere physical union; it is a highly personal relationship. Anything less than that is bestial.

Procreation cannot be considered as an indispensable feature of a true marriage, for in that case childless marriages would not be true marriages. Normally, of course, it is one of the objects of marriage (Gen. 1:28) and in fact it is limited to that relationship by the divine will. But God has reserved for himself the decision whether or not He will grant this happy fruition of the marital union (Ps. 127:3).

In the light of Eph. 5:32 we may add the remark that the Christian marriage is a type of the mystical union between Christ and the church (cf. also Hosea 2:19, 20; Ps. 45; the Song of Solomon).

From the nature and object of marriage it follows that the normal form of marriage is monogamy. This was no doubt the intention of the divine Founder (Gen. 1:27) and the teaching of Christ (Matt. 19:4-6; cf. Eph. 5:31). Polygamy therefore must be considered as a heathen corruption of the original institution, which though tolerated by God in the Old Testament never brought any blessing upon those who practiced it but on the contrary was often followed by disastrous consequences. However, it is only simultaneous, not successive, polygamy that is contrary to the divine institution of marriage; for after all, marriage is for

1. The leader, the protection of the child-bearing.

2. sexual attraction (a promise of sexual satisfaction)

3. erotic love (the happiness one feels in the presence of a loved one)

4. personal merit and worth (exchange idea, working together, "you're valuable to me.")

5. drops

this earthly life only and the objects of marriage can well continue to be realized in successive unions (Matt. 22:30; Rom. 7:2, 3; I Cor. 7:9; I Tim. 5:14).

If marriage is to be a legal and voluntary union, the question, What constitutes a valid marriage contract? must be answered. When God instituted marriage, He himself brought the first husband and wife together and they voluntarily accepted each other as such. In one form or another, throughout the Scriptures, the voluntary consent of the man and the woman is always implied in a God-pleasing marriage, as in fact it is inevitably included in the divine idea of human personality. "Consensus facit matrimonium" therefore states the minimum requirement, the absolute *sine qua non* of a valid marriage contract. But as soon as the human race began to grow and a human society came into being, marriage became a social institution, and society began to prescribe certain formalities which must be met before a union was recognized as legitimate and legal. These formalities varied in different periods of the Old and the New Testament and in different races, Jewish and Gentile, Greek and Roman; but so far as the Scripture record shows they were uniformly recognized by God as valid. We may say, then, that while marriage is a divine institution the form in which a marriage is contracted is determined by the society in which the marriage takes place; and while it is true that "consensus facit matrimonium," that

consent must have the approval of the social organism in which it occurs before the marriage is valid.

In our modern American society, we distinguish between betrothal and marriage, the promise given at the time of engagement being considered as meaning that the parties agree at some future time to enter the marriage estate. Among the Jews at the time of Christ the betrothal was in fact the first part of the marriage ceremony, to be followed later by a public celebration or "wedding." Accordingly the betrothed were spoken of as "husband" and "wife" even before the marriage was actually consummated (cf. Matt. 1:18-20). A similar custom prevailed among the ancient Germanic peoples, continuing down to the time of Luther, which explains Luther's interpretation of betrothal as equivalent to marriage. Needless to say, even with our distinction between the two, a Christian will consider an engagement or betrothal as a solemn and sacred pledge which like any other promise made by him must not be lightly broken.

The Roman Catholic church has pronounced marriage a sacrament through which a special divine grace is bestowed, and therefore it claims that only a priest can solemnize a true marriage. Lutheranism, however, holds that marriage is a part of the natural world order divinely established in creation and governed by God's providence. Now since in an organized state God exercises his government through the lawfully constituted governmental authorities

(Rom. 13:1), the state has the right to make laws concerning marriage, to define what constitutes a valid marriage, to prescribe certain formalities to be observed, and through its lawfully constituted representatives to solemnize marriages. Such marriages our church recognizes as fully valid provided they do not violate principles clearly revealed in God's Word. Needless to say, the Christian, who does whatever he does in the name of the Lord Jesus, will not be content with the mere approval of the state when he is about to take this step of most far-reaching importance in his life, but he will eagerly seek the blessing of God in a distinctly Christian marriage ceremony. Fortunately, in our country the function of the state and the church may be combined in one act; the minister acts as a servant of the state and the church at one and the same time, and thus the marriage is validated before the law and sanctified by the Word of God and prayer (I Tim. 4:5). For a Christian under these favorable conditions not to have a distinctly Christian wedding ceremony would be tantamount to contempt of God's blessing.

If marriage is for life, the only legitimate dissolution of the marriage bond is through death. The indissolubility of marriage is evident from its very nature, the union of two beings in "one flesh." It is also clearly indicated in Scripture, for example, Matt. 5:32; 19:6. Hence only death can bring about a dissolution that is not sinful; in every other case either the one or the other party, or both, are guilty. That death

actually does sever the marriage bond and release the survivor is evident from such passages as Matt. 22:30 and I Cor. 7:39. This implies the moral right of the survivor to a second marriage.

However, the Scripture recognizes the fact that such severe offenses against this divine institution may be committed by one spouse while the other is still living as to relieve the innocent party of any further obligations under the marriage vow. According to Matt. 5:32 and 19:9, adultery on the part of one spouse is such a serious offense against the very essence of marriage as to make the guilty party unworthy of a continuation of the relationship and to entitle the innocent party to demand a formal dissolution of it in the courts of the land, although repentance on the part of the offender or other considerations may induce the innocent party to forego that right.

That I Cor. 7:15 recognizes a second cause for divorce, viz., malicious desertion, is the opinion of the majority of Protestant theologians.*

The offense in willful desertion consists in depriving the innocent party of those things which are the distinctive features of the marriage relationship. The deserter has actually broken the marriage, and the divorce is merely an official recognition of this fact.

*Luther in commenting on this passage says, "Here the apostle absolves the Christian spouse and sets her free, when her unchristian spouse will not permit her to live as a Christian, and he gives her the right and privilege to marry another spouse" (Erl. ed. 51:20, quoted in Zahn's Comm. on I Cor., 3rd ed. p. 271).

The difference between Matt. 5:32 and I Cor. 7:15 may be briefly stated thus: In the former passage the Lord answers the question, When has a man (or woman) the right to ask for a dissolution of the marriage bond? In the latter the apostle answers the question, What is to be done when the marriage bond has actually been dissolved? In the former case the guilty party makes the *discontinuation* possible, in the latter the continuation *impossible*.

The question has been raised, Are not *saevitiae* (extreme cruelty) and *insidiae* (plotting against the life of the other party), as well as the refusal of the *debitum conjugale*, actually tantamount to desertion and therefore valid grounds for divorce? Martensen and some other Lutheran divines think so. But while we recognize that it may sometimes be difficult to draw the lines of distinction, as a rule we would advise adhering strictly to the Word of God and in doubtful cases rather suggest a legal separation from bed and board without formal divorce, urging the innocent party to bear his misfortune with Christian patience and fortitude.

In regard to divorce the state and the church assume different positions, based upon the different relation of each to marriage itself. Hence, the divorce laws of the state may conflict with the principles of the church. According to the words of Christ (Matt. 19:8), "Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives." He put the

blame for the lax divorce laws of Old Testament times not on Moses but on the hard-hearted Jews. There were in Israel (the Hebrew state) even in the days of Moses, such hard-hearted men, unbelievers, in whose case in order to avoid still greater evils, adultery, murder, etc., he permitted the existing custom of obtaining a divorce for some uncleanness to continue, seeking, however to discourage and curb this wicked, pernicious practice as much as possible under existing circumstances. "From these words of Christ we learn several lessons of importance. The state may grant a divorce not permitted according to God's will. While in the kingdom of God marriage is indissoluble except by death (fornication and malicious desertion ought not to occur among Christians), in the state, because of the hard-heartedness of natural man, God suffers divorce to be issued even in such cases where He has not dissolved the marriage. These divorces, however, though acknowledged by other states, are null and void before the forum of the church, which is ruled not by civic but by divine law. Since the underlying cause for obtaining a divorce against God's will is the hardness of the heart, no Christian will seek to obtain such a divorce . . . Civic authorities and all good citizens should bend every effort toward curbing the divorce evil by adopting marriage and divorce laws as strict as possible under existing conditions . . ." (Theo. Laetsch in "Divorce and Malicious Desertion," *Conc. Theol. Monthly*, December, 1932).

CHAPTER XXXV

PREREQUISITES OF A CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE

Since marriage is a divine institution, it is only natural that the Christian will try to ascertain, when he contemplates entering into this estate, whether he is acting in accordance with the divine will and can expect the divine blessing to rest upon the proposed union. This divine will is indicated in the nature and purpose of marriage as shown in the Scripture. Accordingly, the first prerequisite of a Christian marriage is fitness to attain the objectives of marriage. This at once excludes those afflicted with an inheritable or transmissible disease, the mentally unbalanced, those already married or illegally divorced, as well as normally also those who are incurably and permanently impotent. Good physical and mental health on the part of both husband and wife are important conditions for the attainment of the objects of matrimony as outlined above, whereas the "marriage" of one who in the sight of God is not free to marry is in fact nothing short of adultery.

Closely connected with the question of physical fitness is the question of the interpretation of the marriage restrictions recorded in Leviticus 18 and 20. The strict interpretation holds that these laws are still in force in every detail, even to the extent of marrying a deceased wife's sister or a deceased husband's

brother. While we believe that the wording of Lev. 18:18 does not forbid the marriage of a wife's sister *after* the wife's death (cf. also the levirate marriage), the ethical principle is plainly set forth in these laws that marriage with a near blood relative is to be avoided. This principle is corroborated by the well-known observation that such marriages frequently result in physical and intellectual deterioration of the descending generations. State laws have taken cognizance of this fact and forbid marriages within certain degrees of consanguinity. Thus in the United States, marriage between those nearer of kin than first cousin is everywhere forbidden; in some states first cousins are permitted to marry but in over one third of the states they are not. Marriage between step-parent and step-child is generally prohibited. Indeed, the Creator himself has established a safeguard against such incestuous unions in the *horror naturalis* (cf. I Cor. 5:1).

A second very important prerequisite is the presence of true conjugal love, which must be carefully distinguished from mere sex attraction though it also includes it, from mere "puppy love" which sometimes seizes immature youths in the early period of adolescence before their personalities are fully developed, and from mere romantic admiration of beauty, strength, intelligence, etc., which will rapidly fade away when it is discovered that the imaginary idol of gold after all has feet of clay. Conjugal or sexual

love may be defined as the mutual attraction of the entire personality, by reason of which each finds in the other the indispensable helpmeet and complement for a full and complete life. It is evident that such love is not blind, but rather should be kept always under the control of reason. It may vary in intensity with the age, temperament, and other peculiarities of the individual, but it must never be lacking entirely if the marriage is to be a God-pleasing and happy one. Hence, "marriages of reason" or "convenience" without the presence of conjugal love, being based purely on selfish motives, are immoral. Finally it may be said that true sexual love is always coupled with sincere respect for and admiration of the person loved.

In view of the close and intimate relationship established between husband and wife, compatibility of personality is a further important prerequisite. We are not thinking here of physical compatibility, the importance of which is often exaggerated by materialistic sociologists, while the lack of it is one of those popular grounds for divorce which the Church can never recognize as valid in the sight of God. With competent medical advice most physical hindrances to a happy married life can be overcome by normally healthy individuals, and in any event Christians can and must at all times keep their physical impulses and desires under the control of the spirit (Eph. 5:25; Col. 3:18, 19; Tit. 2:4; Rom. 12:10; I Cor. 13:7; I Pet. 3:7). Compatibility of personalities involves

rather the possibility of harmonious living together of two persons in continuous intimate association on the basis of complete agreement in their outlook upon life and in those fundamental convictions which determine their philosophy of life. This is hardly possible where there is a very great difference in education, refinement and general culture; where there is a radical difference of race; and especially where there is no agreement in religious convictions. With reference to the latter, the Germans have a significant saying: *Zwei Glauben auf einem Kissen, da ist der Teufel dazwischen*.* Mixed marriages, especially between Christians and non-Christians, or Catholics and Protestants, seriously endanger the peace of the home that is to be established. Practical differences are bound to arise in connection with the discharge of Christian duties, such as church attendance and support, communion, the baptism and religious training of the children, etc. Even marriages between members of different Protestant denominations often do not prove entirely happy and should be discouraged.†

*"Two faiths on one pillow have the devil between them."

†A statistical survey made a few years ago showed that when both parents belong to the same church, 78% of the children go to church; when the parents belong to different Protestant denominations, 55%; when only one parent belongs to a church, 50%; and when one parent is Protestant, the other Catholic, 38%.—It is also interesting to know that while in general one marriage of every six in the United States ends in divorce, recent studies of marriages of couples who met while attending coeducational institutions indicate that not more than one in 75 results in failure.

Inasmuch as the burden of maintaining the home that is to be established will fall upon the shoulders of the husband, no young man should offer himself in marriage to a young woman unless he has reasonable prospects of being able to carry that burden. Economic stability, however, includes more than just that. It also means that the young man has found his definite place in life, has adopted a definite calling or vocation, and is now a definite and useful unit of the society in which he lives. Marriage means more than merely the uniting of two persons for life; it means the beginning of a new family, the addition of a new social unit to the community, of a new family altar to the church. Not until the young man is able to assume the responsibilities of being the head of a house and the representative of the family group should he bind a young woman to himself for life.

Finally, inasmuch as the new home to be established will be closely connected with the old home of both husband and wife and because of the filial respect which even adult sons and daughters owe their parents (Lev. 19:3; Deut. 27:16; Prov. 23:22; Mal. 1:6), it is important that the blessing of the old homes go with them to the new. Christian young people will therefore seek the consent of their parents to their proposed union. This is a duty implied in the Fourth Commandment, and a further reason lies in the fact that by marriage a new member is to be taken into the family of each of the contracting parties. Those who

marry contrary to the wishes of their parents must have valid moral reasons; and even so, as Martensen observes (*Social Ethics*, p. 20), "there will be in one way or another a bitter flavor, an element of unhappiness in the midst of happiness, of discord in the midst of harmony."

if we can do in suppressing birth? (birth control, planned parenthood.)
could not think of sociological, physiological, but think in terms of theological.

some say complete abstinence
some say contraceptives.
Rhythm method is birth control.
to in to want to prevent conception?

CHAPTER XXXVI

CHRISTIAN FAMILY LIFE

The importance of the family is apparent from the fact that historically and objectively it is the primary social group and the wellspring of all civic and national life. "This world is ever beginning anew, and as it were over again, in the family" (Martensen). Human beings normally pass their infancy, childhood, and much of their youth under its sheltering care. Here they receive their first impressions from their environment; here they gather their first experiences in social conduct; here the foundations for their future philosophy of life are laid. In the family circle the traditions of the past become the building stones of the future; in the constantly occurring readjustments of family life individualism and socialism find a happy union; and the intimate contact and close interaction between the various members of the family present an infinite variety of ethical tests and problems and afford invaluable opportunities for the building of Christian character. Whenever we investigate the moral conditions of a people or an age, we naturally give attention first of all to the home life of that people

or age. If the family life is corrupted, we know that the nation is on the road to destruction; and whenever we wish to raise the moral standards of a people, we naturally begin with the home. Similarly, when religion has lost its hold upon a people, when men and women care nothing any longer for God and his Word, for church and worship, we naturally look into the home life of that people and call for a reconstruction of the family altar. The family is the basis of society.

The relation of husband and wife is determined on the one hand by the natural differences of sex, and on the other by the equality of the persons in Christ. It is regulated by such Scripture passages as Eph. 5:21-33; Col. 3:18, 19; I Tim. 2:8-15; Tit. 2:4-6; I Pet. 3:1-7. Accordingly each ought to honor and respect the other; each ought to serve the other in love; each ought to have regard for the faults and weaknesses of the other. And yet by divine arrangement the husband is the head of the family, on whom rests the final responsibility for the wellbeing and government of the entire household, even as the Lord is the head of the church. As such he is to be acknowledged and respected by the wife and by all other members of the family. Where this relationship is properly understood, there is no danger of the husband becoming a tyrant, nor of the wife being reduced to the status of a mere housekeeper or slave; on the contrary, it will prove to be an ideal

relationship conducive to the highest happiness of all concerned.

For in a Christian family husband and wife are united in true conjugal love, which acts as a powerful equalizing force. True love is never selfish; it establishes a real community of give and take between those who love. The perfect marital union includes a sharing of everything, and not the least of the soul-life of each partner with the other. Where each considers the other as a precious gift of God to be accepted and appreciated as God gave it and to be enjoyed and developed with loving tenderness and care, there the poetry and loveliness of a happy married life will continue long after the romanticism of youthful courtship has been displaced by the realities of life.

There, too, the perils that threaten the unity and harmony of the home can more successfully be overcome. Sorrows and disappointments will serve only to bind husband and wife more closely together; the daily routine with its petty annoyances will be transformed into a service of love; even the flaws and defects in the loved one, which will inevitably be discovered in due time, will not be permitted to destroy the Christian's appreciation of God's gift. For the Christian husband and wife love each other not merely with a natural but with a sanctified, spiritual love; a love that is a reflection of the love of Christ for the church (Eph. 5:25); a love that is faithful to its object despite its weaknesses

and defects; a love that "beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things" (I Cor. 13:7). Thus husband and wife ever increasingly become true helpmeets to each other, hand in hand they walk together over the pathway of life, through good and evil days, happily united "till death them doth part."

The family circle, which at first consists only of husband and wife, grows larger with the coming of children, and the love which the parents have for each other finds a new and wonderful expansion in parental love. Christian parents consider children as a gift of God (Ps. 127:3) and appreciate them as such. But like every other gift of God so this choicest of all gifts also carries with it a corresponding responsibility. The duty of parents is, not only to provide for the physical well-being of their children (I Tim. 5:8), but to bring them up to become physically, intellectually, and spiritually self-dependent personalities (Eph. 6:4; Col. 3:21; Prov. 22:15). This involves that the child be brought to Christian Baptism as early as possible; that the spiritual life which has there been implanted in the child be developed by Christian training in the home, the church, the Christian day school and Sunday school; that the child learn early to give expression to this spiritual life in prayer, in Christian conduct, and in conflict with evil both within and without; that at the proper age it be thoroughly instructed in the saving

truths of the Christian faith and the duties and privileges of active church-membership and then admitted to such membership in a Christian congregation; and that even after that event the parents continue to watch and pray for the spiritual welfare of their child. It also involves that Christian parents give their children as good an education for this earthly life as they can, and that they train them to become useful citizens of the state as well as of the kingdom of God.

The duties of children toward their parents correspond to those of the parents toward their children. In reverence and confidence they look up to their parents, whose authority is for them a reflection of the divine authority (cf. the Fourth Commandment). This reverent confidence is shown in willing obedience and sincere gratitude. And the sense of gratitude and respect remains even after the duty of absolute obedience has been superseded in adult life by personal responsibility; and when the possibility for its actual manifestation has passed away there still remains a grateful memory.

In a Christian family, brothers and sisters have many opportunities for the exercise of Christian virtues and the development of Christian character. Their natural affection for each other will grow into a free and voluntary one and become purified and glorified as they come to realize a new and stronger bond of union between them in their common love for the

Savior and their common pilgrimage toward the heavenly home. Their relation to each other in principle is one of equality, though differences in age and ability may modify this relation somewhat. Each is expected by his own individuality to contribute something to the peaceful harmony of Christian family life. Where true brotherly love and confidence has been cultivated among the children of a home in the days of their childhood and youth, the memory of those happy days will continue to be a powerful bond of union between them long after they have left the parental roof to take their God-given place in a busy world.

Domestic servants have a somewhat different relation to their masters than ordinary laborers have to their employers in our modern form of social organization. They become, for the time of their service, members of the home. This implies certain moral obligations for both masters and servants. Masters should consider servants not as mere laborers but as members of the household and take an interest in their physical and spiritual well-being. Servants should not merely do so much work for so much pay, but feel a real responsibility for the welfare and good reputation of the home, and enter wholeheartedly into its spirit. In this way the underlying principles of the many Scripture passages dealing with the relation of masters and slaves are applicable to our modern age. It is to be regretted

that the former intimate and personal relationship between masters and servants in the home has under the more complex forms of modern society so largely given place to a mere labor contract, a view which undoubtedly is responsible for much of the present day "servant problem." The Scripture ideal is perhaps most nearly approached today on the farm, where the personal relationship is generally much more in evidence than in the city home.

The family is expanded by the marriage of some of its members. Thus is formed what some sociologists call the "great family" or clan. From a Christian point of view, we have no right to ignore the larger circle of natural relationship; in fact, it offers additional opportunities and obligations for moral action. The sense of relationship should be preserved and friendly intercourse should be cultivated; yet never at the expense of the distinctive character of our own home. The dangers to be avoided are the development of a spirit of clannishness and a cultivation of selfish interests of the group instead of the larger interests of the community, the church, and society at large.

Under the highly complex forms of our modern civilization, the institution of the family must constantly contend with forces that tend to disrupt a harmoniously successful family life and bring about the disintegration of the family. We are not thinking here of the godless attempt of the Russian Communists

to abolish the family altogether, but of those conditions in our American economic and social life which seriously endanger the Christian ideal of family life. Such hostile economic factors are, the financial instability of the family dependent upon the wage-earning capacity of its head; inadequate housing; the rising standards of living with their tendency to seek an increase of the family income by increasing the number of wage earners in the family; living in rented houses or apartments instead of actual homes, with the consequent failure of the family really to strike roots anywhere; variety of employment of the various wage earners of the family necessitating varying hours of absence from the home and making a real family life difficult if not impossible. To these economic causes of family disintegration may be added a number of purely social factors, such as the increasing habit of seeking entertainment outside the home; membership in clubs, lodges, etc., requiring frequent absence from the family circle; excessive ambition for social recognition and preferment often leading to neglect of the purely domestic duties, etc. The disastrous effects of these disintegrating factors may be observed in many a home, which for the various members of the family has become little more than a boarding and lodging house, where each individual has his own interests, his own occupation, amusement, and circle of friends, but is only mildly interested in the immediate members of

his own family, and where the younger generation is only too eager to leave the parental roof at the earliest possible moment.

To counteract such influences, nothing is more effective than the assiduous cultivation of a Christian family spirit. This is that invisible bond of union which ties the various members of the family together into a distinct group. It is a definite feeling of belonging together, of having mutual aims and interests, of reverence for family history, traditions, customs. It rests upon the divine authority of the parents and the reverent obedience and submission of the children and servants. For the cultivation of this Christian family spirit the establishment of a family altar is absolutely essential, where—preferably under the leadership of the housefather as the “house-priest” — all members of the household gather together at stated times before the throne of Grace, unite their hearts and voices in praise and thanksgiving, in prayer and intercession for each other, and cultivate the consciousness of the presence of the unseen Friend in every need. Another important aid is the Christian training of the young in the home, both by precept and example—and the latter is ten times as important as the former. Christian habits, such as morning and evening prayers, table prayers, regular attendance at church and Sunday school, the practice of Christian charity, all can best be inculcated, not by mere words but by the example of

the parents. Mutual love and confidence between parents and children, brothers and sisters, will naturally develop where each shows due respect for the other's personality and a sincere interest in his tasks and problems. The observance of family festivals, such as birthdays, Christmas, Thanksgiving Day, and other anniversaries will help much to establish fond memories of the home long after its sheltering walls have been left behind by the younger generation. The keeping of family records and the maintenance of family traditions and customs will stimulate interest in the past and inspire worthy ambitions for the future.

2. THE CHURCH

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE SCRIPTURE AS THE NORM OF CHURCHLY LIFE

The church is essentially invisible; it is the communion of saints. But since the saints or believers cannot preserve their fellowship with Christ except by the faithful use of the audible and visible means of grace and are moved by an inner necessity and by the express command of their Lord to confess their faith before men and to labor for the preservation and extension of the kingdom of God on earth through those means which the Lord has given them, the term "church" is also applied to the visible body of those using the means of grace and being so engaged. In this sense it is used here. Churchly life and activity is determined by three essential factors: the Scripture as the God-given norm of all churchly life; the administration of the means of grace for the nurture of that life; and the external appearance and organization of the church as the form in which that life and activity takes place.

The recognition of the normative authority of divine revelation has been an outstanding feature of

churchly life ever since a communion of saints or believers existed on earth. Even before there was a written record of that revelation, the patriarchs of the Old Testament showed their reverence for it in many ways, such as the consecration of holy places where they had received it, the building of altars and the conducting of public services (cf. Gen. 12:8; 13:4, 18; 21:33; 26:25; 28:16-22; 32:30; 33:20; 35:1-15; etc.), and the observance of the rite of circumcision as a token of God's covenant with them; and after the divine revelation was recorded in written form in the Torah, all religious life of the Israelites was determined by it and reverence for the Law of Jehovah was the very heart and soul of Old Testament piety (cf. Ps. 1). In the New Testament, Jesus showed in countless ways his reverence for the Scripture. He quoted from it as from the authoritative Word of God; He declared that "the Scripture cannot be broken" (John 10:35); He used it as a text for his sermons; He instructed his disciples in the meaning of it; He prayed it. The apostles followed his example, and thus by a very natural process the Sacred Scriptures of the Old Testament came to be accepted as the authoritative Word of God in the New, augmented gradually by the writings of apostles and evangelists, whose divine authority was attested by the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* in the hearts of believers.

The Roman Catholic Church, despite its many high-sounding declarations of loyalty and reverence for

the Word of God, has in effect set aside its authority by placing churchly tradition on a level with the Bible and making the pope the final arbiter of its interpretation. The Lutheran Reformation definitely established the principle that "the Prophetic and Apostolic Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the pure, clear fountains of Israel are the only true standard whereby to judge all teachers and doctrines" (Form. Concord, Jacobs' Ed., p. 535, 3), and therefore also all churchly life, and it was ready to sacrifice even the external unity of the church rather than to submit to any other authority (cf. Augsburg Confession, Article 28: 77, 78). Calvinism adopted the same principle, but with this distinction that it finds in the Scripture first of all a revelation of the will of the divine Majesty and thus tends to use it as a legal code for the regulation of all private and churchly life, while Lutheranism sees in it primarily a record of the heavenly Father's revelation of his gracious plan of salvation with a tender invitation to serve Him freely in grateful love.

Fidelity to the Scripture, therefore, is the church's first duty. This was the outstanding characteristic of the apostolic church in Jerusalem (Acts 2:42); this was what St. Paul praised in the church at Ephesus (Eph. 1:1) and at Colosse (Col. 1:2); this is what Christ requires of his disciples (John 8:31, 32) and what St. Peter urges above everything else (II Pet. 1:19). Since the Scripture is to be our supreme norm and guide in all matters of faith and life, it is the

duty of the church to make all her teaching conform to the Word of God and to oppose every doctrine that departs from the Word. It is also her duty to see to it that her practice conforms to the principles of God's Word, although in practical matters Lutheranism avoids all Calvinistic legalism and in the enjoyment of her evangelical liberty requires only that there be no conflict with God's Word.

The confessions are the church's response to the Word of God. They state what the church believes to be the teaching of God's Word, or her interpretation of the Scripture. It is only natural that the church should thus formulate her beliefs in confessions, in fact, the Word of God plainly invites her to do so (cf. Rom. 10:8-10). Being only the church's interpretation of God's Word, they add nothing to the Christian's belief; they only express what he does believe (*non imprimunt credenda, sed exprimunt credita*). But being officially adopted by the church as her statement of faith, they are secondary norms of her churchly life (*normae normatae*), for fidelity to the confessions means for all those who have subscribed them fidelity to the Scripture. The fact that in her confessions the church has laid down her interpretation of the Scripture does not preclude progress in the church, but all such progress must be within the line of the confessions, not contrary to them.

The attitude of the church as a body toward the Scripture and the confessions is reflected in the indi-

vidual church member. Since the Bible is the Word of God whereby the believer was brought to faith, and the Word of his heavenly Father in which He speaks to him as his child, and since in the Bible he finds the divine record of the divinely wrought origin and institution of the church and the revelation of all that God has done and still continues to do for his salvation, the Christian will love and honor that Word. This love is not a love for the mere externals (language, history, poetry, etc.) but for its divine contents. Since the Scripture is to the Christian a most sacred treasure he will always approach it and handle it with reverence, he will hear, read, and learn it diligently, and he will jealously guard it against profanation, corruption and abuse. Similarly, the Christian will also love and honor the confessions of his church, not merely as interesting historical documents testifying of the conflicts and victories of the church, but as living witnesses of the church's faith in the Word of God and as bonds of union that unite him with all his brethren in the same faith. Accordingly, the Christian will let all his churchly life and activity be governed by the Word of God in accordance with the church's confessions.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MEANS OF GRACE

Next to the Scripture as the divine norm of all churchly life, and subject to its direction, the administration of the means of grace is an important factor determining churchly conduct. They are the means through which spiritual life is generated and maintained in this sinful world, the channels through which the streams of heavenly grace flow out upon earth. Their administration has been entrusted to the church by the Lord himself, who will hold it responsible for the discharge of this its foremost duty (Matt. 28:18-20; Mark 16:15, 16; Luke 24:46-48; John 20:21-23; Luke 22:19b; I Cor. 11:24, 25; I Cor. 4:1).

The administration of the means of grace takes place primarily in the public service, in the sacramental elements of which God comes to man with all his spiritual gifts and blessings through the channels which He himself has appointed; and in the sacrificial parts of which man comes to God in the various activities that are called forth and stimulated by the means of grace. The general object of the Christian church service is edification (*Erbauung*), that is, building up the Christian faith and life (cf. Jude, v. 20-21), both

of the individual Christian and of the congregation as such. All the various parts and functions in the service must be conducive to that end in one way or another, and it is the pride of the Lutheran church that in her liturgical order of service she has a ritual that is excellently adapted to that purpose, avoiding on the one hand the superfluous and largely unintelligible ballast of Romanism and on the other the coldness and barrenness of Calvinism.

It is one of the many merits of Luther that he restored the sermon to its proper place in the church service. He insisted that no service is complete without the proclamation of the Word. *Verbo victus est mundus, verbo servata est ecclesia, etiam verbo reparabitur*, he said. In a Lutheran sermon we hear not merely a word about our Lord but a word from our Lord (II Cor. 5:20; Matt. 18:20; Luke 21:15), expounded and applied as the varying needs of the congregation may require. At the same time a Lutheran sermon is also a testimony of the faith that is in the congregation, a confession of our convictions grounded in the Word of God. In both respects the sermon is an effective instrument in the hands of the Holy Spirit for the edification of the church.

While in the sermon the subjective element of the preacher's personality, the depth and clarity of his religious convictions and experiences, his natural ability as a speaker and shepherd of his flock, and other factors, enter largely into the question of its effect,

the Scripture lessons and the sacraments are entirely objective and depend only upon the spiritual condition of the recipient for their results. In the Scripture lessons we hear the *ipsissima verba Dei*; in the sacraments God uses the lowly objective earthly elements, water in Holy Baptism and bread and wine in the Lord's Supper, as the vehicles through which He makes his own personal contact with the individual. Yet it would be utterly false to conclude that on that account the sermon can be dispensed with or relegated to a place of secondary or minor importance, as is commonly done in the Roman Catholic church; for without it the faith of the church-member will soon lose its real strength and appropriating power, it will lack in vitality and growth, and a feeling of false security coupled with mere externalism and bodily service will set in that is utterly detrimental to true spirituality.

In the Lutheran conception of a church service, an important part is always assigned to music, which Luther called "one of the fairest and most glorious gifts of God," and to which next to theology he assigned the highest place of honor. It serves both to prepare the heart of the worshipper for the reception of God's gifts in the means of grace and to express his reaction as he receives them. Thus good church music, both vocal and instrumental, does much to supply the highly important emotional element in worship. From this point of view the importance of good congregational singing both as an expression of

faith and a means of edification is readily apparent. Church choirs are not essential to a Lutheran service; where they do exist they should be considered as part of the worshipping congregation, not as a sort of secondary clergy.

The administration of the means of grace was instituted by the Lord not only for the edification of the church as such but also for its extension in the work of missions. His command was, to "preach the Gospel to every creature" (Mark 16:15). Accordingly the church sends out its missionaries everywhere, among the scattered brethren in the faith, the unchurched and underprivileged in the homeland, as well as to the heathen in foreign lands. Her aim in doing so is not to spread the blessings of civilization, nor even primarily to relieve physical need and suffering, least of all to go forth leaving all "sectarian baggage," yes, even all distinctive fundamental concepts of historical Christianity behind to join with adherents of other faiths in a common quest for the "ultimate goal, unity in the completest truth," as the recent book, *Rethinking Missions*, proposes—but to preach the Gospel of Christ as revealed in the Scripture and interpreted in the confessions of the sending church, and thus to win souls for Christ and extend his kingdom on earth. Anything short of that would not only be flagrant disobedience to the will of her divine Master but also a breaking of faith with those supporters of the mission cause at home whose only motive in contributing for

this work is the love of Christ and the desire to bring his salvation to sinful men.

Beside the organized congregation which meets in the house of God for public worship there are other, smaller groups and social relationships, within which the means of grace, particularly the Word of God, find a place. Such are the Sunday school and the catechetical class, the various societies and organizations within the congregation, and the Christian home. In a wider sense, we might also include here those business and social relationships in which an opportunity presents itself for endeavoring to win a soul for Christ; in fact, the consecrated Christian will not simply wait for such opportunities but will actually seek them.

The attitude of the individual church member toward the means of grace is one of sincere affection and appreciation. His love for them will show itself first of all in sincere and conscientious use of them as they are administered in the church. He will be regular and diligent in attending divine services. He will enter wholeheartedly in the rendering of the liturgy, the singing of the hymns, the offering of the prayers. He will listen devoutly and attentively to the reading of the Scripture lessons and the preaching of the sermon. He will appear frequently at the Lord's Table. He will take a conservative position toward the forms of administration of the means of grace, knowing that therein is expressed a goodly portion of the historic life of the church. He will readily overlook defects

and weaknesses in those who are charged with their public administration, since their value lies not in their subjective administration but in their objective content. He will also join heartily with others in the study of God's Word in the Sunday school, in young people's meetings, and other organizations.

But knowing that the means of grace are the divinely given means by which he himself was brought to faith and by which his own spiritual life has been preserved and developed, the Christian churchmember will also be ready to do all he can to communicate them to others and to extend their influence. In his own family he will insist upon diligent and regular use of them. He will establish a family altar. He will provide for the Christian training of his children. He will insist that a Christian spirit prevail in his home. His family will be regular in their church attendance and frequent guests at the Lord's Table. But he will not limit his activity to his own home. The entire field of missions, inner, home, and foreign, will enlist his interest and support, and wherever an opportunity presents itself he will engage in personal work to win a soul for Christ.

A special topic that on account of its far-reaching importance in present-day life merits discussion at this point, is the relation of the church to the great social problems of the day, such as the labor problem, the question of public morals, civic betterment, public charities, etc. Here, in the first place, the fundamental

principle must never be lost sight of, that the one great business of the church that was committed to her by her Master, is the administration of the means of grace for the saving of souls and the building of his kingdom. To this she must give attention first, last, and all the time. But this personal gospel which the church preaches will also become a social gospel as the saving faith that is kindled by it in the hearts of believers exerts its regenerating influence upon their lives. The true Christian is the best citizen, the most honest workman, the fairest employer, the most conscientious office-holder, the man of highest ideals and cleanest morals. Thus in the same measure as the church is true to her calling to "preach the gospel to every creature" she also helps directly to solve the social problems of the day.

But she also does this indirectly in another way. As the light of the world and the salt of the earth, Christians are bound to make their enlightening and preserving influence felt in the various spheres of social life and activity of which they are a part. Not as church members, then, least of all as representatives of any particular church, but rather as Christian citizens of their community and country, they will take a lively interest in all efforts for the general improvement of social conditions. It is at this point where the church and the state, each with its own sphere of activity and its own distinctive duties and prerogatives, meet on common ground; and the Christian must be careful at

all times both to safeguard the principles of complete separation of the two and yet to do his full duty as a part of each, always remembering that the state rules by law and justice and with the power of outward compulsion, while the church extends its influence by the Gospel of love and mercy through personal persuasion.

Critics of the church who grow impatient at the slow progress which the church makes by following this program, might be reminded of the extensive inner mission work done by the church both through formal organizations and societies and informally through individual pastors, churchmembers and groups. This is social service in the highest and best sense, following closely in the footsteps of the Master. They might be reminded, too, of the rather obvious fact that churchmembers are the most stable, reliable and law-abiding elements of society; that in the recent economic depression the percentage of churchmembers dependent on public charity was much smaller than that of people not connected with the church; that by doing careful work in the religious education of the youth the church is actually keeping hundreds and thousands of youths out of jail; that the percentage of divorces among churchmembers is far below that of non-churchmembers; that eminent jurists, such as Judge Kavanaugh of Chicago, Judge Fawcett of New York, and Judge Mahaffey of Columbus, Ohio, have emphatically stated that the most effective means of preventing

juvenile delinquency is religious training in the home and the church—in other words precisely the method which the church is advocating and following. They might also be reminded of the sad fact that much of the good work the church is doing is undermined and frustrated by forces outside the control of the church, such as the atheistic character of much of our higher education, the materialistic philosophy of life that pervades so much of our modern literature, the commercializing of modern amusements, and the maudlin sentimentality of the American mind that prevents the enactment and enforcement of appropriate laws.

Nevertheless, we admit that there is room for criticism of the church, not of the principles for which she stands but of her application of those principles. The Christian training of children in the home is not what it should be; our Sunday school teaching in most instances is sadly inadequate; our young people's organizations are not what they might be; much of our preaching fails for one reason or another to reach the hearts of our people; and our churchmembers generally are either too indifferent or too timid to make their Christian influence felt effectively in their communities. It is also true that much more could and should be done by our churches in cultivating and demonstrating the spirit of true Christian charity among their own membership as well as among the needy and destitute in their communities; that the

fundamental Christian social principles of righteousness, of the intrinsic worth of every human personality, of unselfish and inclusive Christian service, of patient forgiveness and ready self-sacrifice should be much more widely applied by our Christian business men, employers and employees, industrialists, and professional men. And finally it is also true that the church in times of widespread public social evils and scandals should speak out much more emphatically than it does, throwing the searchlight of God's Word upon these evils and thus stimulating the social conscience. But all these criticisms the church can meet through a more effective administration and application of the divinely given means of grace.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE CONGREGATION

In its external appearance, the primary form of organization assumed by the church is that of the local congregation. This is not a mere human association but an organization divinely willed and sanctioned, for in the New Testament it is everywhere presupposed for the work which Christ has given the church to do (cf. Hebr. 10:23-25; Matt. 18:15-20; Acts 20:28; etc.), and it is the necessary outgrowth of the divinely planted spiritual life in the individual believer who must manifest his faith in confessing the truth and administering the means of grace. Hence we find that associations of believers, or congregations, have existed in the church from the earliest beginnings.

A Christian congregation exists when in any given community a number of believers have united for worship and for doing the work which Christ has given them as members of the church to do. Now since it is the divine will that such congregations be organized and the divinely ordained office of the ministry be established for the public administration of the means of grace, it follows that it is the duty of Christians everywhere to unite with such congregations where they already exist or to found them where they do not exist. However, since one of the primary

reasons for organizing local churches is the common confession of the common faith, it follows that the Christian can unite only with such a church already existing, or assist in the organization of only such a new church, as will enable him actually to confess the faith that is in him without violence to his conscience. For a Lutheran this implies that the congregation in its constitution and practice stand foursquare upon the Word of God and Lutheran confessions.

The work which the church, and therefore each individual congregation, has to do consists in bringing the salvation of Christ to men through the administration of the means of grace. Their public administration belongs to the Christian ministry. It therefore becomes the duty of a Christian congregation (and hence of every member thereof) to see to it that the office of the ministry be established and a call extended; to accept the ministrations of its own pastor; and to see that the minister actually performs the duties of his office in accordance with the Word of God and the confessions of the church. Every churchmember is responsible for the acts of his minister. On the other hand, the universal priesthood of believers (I Pet. 2:9) includes not only the privilege and duty of direct approach to God but also of spiritual ministration to the neighbor. All such activity, however, must be in harmony with the spirit of the church and her confessions, and it must never aim to displace the regular functions of the public ministry.

Incidental to the administration of the means of grace and in support of it, there is much other work that has to be done by the Christian congregation. Here the apostolic injunction must be observed, "Let all things be done decently and in order" (I Cor. 14:40). For the transaction of its business the congregation holds regular business meetings. These every voting member is in duty bound to attend, for here the church deliberates upon plans and methods for carrying out the work which the Lord has given her to do. In regard to the work itself there can be no question; but in reference to the manner of doing it there is room for Christian liberty and wisdom. The subjects brought before such a meeting are not all of the same kind and are not all decided in the same way. Matters pertaining directly to faith, and duties clearly enjoined by divine law, are decided by God's Word, and the object of the deliberations can only be to ascertain just what is the word and will of God in such a case. But matters which lie in the domain of Christian liberty and depend for decision only on human judgment are decided after due deliberation by the vote of the majority; and it is the duty of every churchmember to accept this decision and to enter wholeheartedly into the execution of it even if in his own judgment the course intended is not the wisest one to pursue.

For the execution of the plans agreed upon the congregation may elect or appoint certain agencies,

either individuals or committees. It is disorderly for any individual or group to assume arbitrarily any portion of the work of the congregation which they are not called upon to do. On the other hand, every member must be ready and willing to serve his brethren with those gifts and abilities which God has given him, when the church calls upon him to do so. To be elected as a member of the church council, or to be appointed as a member of a special committee in the church is an honor and confers a responsibility which the Christian must not consider lightly nor arbitrarily refuse to accept. Whether at any time a congregation should commit some special phase of its work to a smaller organization within its own body, such as the women's society or the brotherhood, is a question which must be decided by the congregation itself. All societies in the congregation are under its control and responsible to it.

Since funds are required to carry on the work of the church it becomes the duty of churchmembers to support their church to the extent of their ability. But all contributions must be made voluntarily as the fruit of faith. The church has no right to resort to legalistic measures compelling the members to pay a specified amount or to money-making schemes which tend to kill the spirit of Christian liberality and love for the church.

A special topic that merits discussion in this connection is the question of women's rights in the

church. Influenced no doubt by the modern emancipation of woman in politics, in business, in the learned professions, some congregations and in fact some entire church bodies have granted to their women much more extensive rights than they formerly enjoyed. Some have even gone so far as to admit them to ordination to the public ministry, others are allowing them to hold any office in the church except that of pastor, still others have given them the right to vote in all congregational meetings but bar them from holding office; and there is still much debate going on concerning the entire question. Lutheranism, taking its stand on I Cor. 14:34, 35 and I Tim. 2:12-14, holds that while so far as the essential treasures of the Gospel are concerned there is no difference between men and women (cf. John 1:12; Acts 10:34; Gal. 3:26-28), nevertheless there is a clearly defined and divinely fixed relationship between them which the church must not set aside. That relationship is indicated by the apostle Paul when he says that women "are commanded to be under obedience," (I Cor. 14:34) and "I suffer not a woman to . . . usurp authority over the man" (I Tim. 2:12). And in the former passage he refers to the Torah for proof when he says, "as also saith the law." The reference is to Gen. 3:16: "And he shall rule over thee." In the Timothy passage he evidently has the same thought in mind, but he also points to the fact that the subordination of woman goes back even to creation (v. 13, 14). This relation-

ship of woman over against man (notice that Paul in the Timothy passage uses the terms *γυνή* and *άνήρ* without qualification) is not to be understood as a part of the Jewish ceremonial law, which Paul would be the last to attempt to force upon a Gentile Christian church, but it is a position and relation established at the very beginning of the human race and universal in its application. Once this basic principle is clearly understood, the application Paul makes to church assemblies is clear: "Let your women keep silence in the churches . . . I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man." Whatever privileges we accord to women in our church practice dare not contravene this principle.

Consequently, Lutheranism generally does not admit women to the ministry nor permit them to hold any elective or appointive office in the church where they would exercise authority over men; and it is difficult to see that even the granting of voice and vote in all congregational meetings can do anything but place them on a level with men in all such meetings and thus gravely interfere with their divinely ordered subjection and obedience.

But the matter of voice and vote and of holding office in the church is to be carefully distinguished from the natural rights of women in the church. Thus in questions of doctrine and conscience sex cannot count in any way, and the women concerned must be heard. Again, in undertaking any important work

ordinary wisdom will suggest that those women whose support is to be enlisted be consulted. Even in minor matters such as providing some service, or in details where women may well have proper wishes of their own, common sense will meet any reasonable wishes on their part. All such things are done quite properly in Lutheran congregations without going the length of granting them voice and vote in all congregational meetings, and without in any way violating the principle of subjection and obedience for women as divinely ordained in Holy Writ.

If someone would rejoin that women do teach in Sunday school and mission bands, and exercise authority in women's organizations of various kinds, well and good. All that the Scripture principle set forth above forbids is that she occupy any position in the church where she would exercise authority over man. Neither is there any intention whatsoever to belittle the services which godly women are rendering the kingdom of God in many capacities. On the contrary, we believe that where women closely follow Scripture precepts and Scripture examples in their church work, they are a source of inestimable blessing to the church and the kingdom of God.

The following passages will throw further light on the question of the relation of men and women, both in the church and in general: Eph. 5:22-23; Col. 3:18, 19; I Tim. 2:9-11; I Pet. 3:1-7.

CHAPTER XL

GENERAL CHURCH BODIES AND DENOMINATIONS

Not all the work which Christ has assigned to his church on earth can be done by the individual congregation. The Gospel is to be preached not only in the community where the congregation is located but in all the world; educational institutions must be established and maintained for the preparation of men for the ministry and the general Christian training of the youth of the church; Christian charity must be practiced, the old and feeble, the sick and the orphans must be provided for; Christian literature must be printed and disseminated for the edification of the church. All this work can be done only in very rare and exceptional cases by individual congregations standing alone. It can be done only by co-operating with a larger number of the brethren, by a union of individual congregations in larger organizations. Hence there is a relative necessity of general church bodies and denominations.

Such bodies are not directly of divine origin. They do not as such constitute the Holy Christian Church or a part thereof. Each individual congregation has all the powers which Christ has given to his Church

on earth, and nothing is added thereto by uniting with a larger organization. All larger bodies are merely human organizations formed for the sake of expediency in carrying on the larger work of the church, and it cannot be made a matter of conscience for an individual congregation to unite with such a larger body. It is a matter of Christian liberty and judgment; though under present conditions it would be difficult to see how the work of the church could be carried on successfully in any other manner.

As voluntary human associations these bodies derive their just powers from the units that form the organization. They cannot deprive a congregation of its inherent rights and powers; on the contrary, they have only such powers and prerogatives as may be conferred upon them by the congregations composing them. This renders it necessary that as such bodies are formed a constitution be drawn up, on the basis of which the congregations unite for the purpose of doing the Lord's work and safeguarding the rights of the individual units composing the larger body. In a Lutheran church body it is self-evident that the Word of God will be accepted as the supreme norm of faith and life, and that the Lutheran Confessions are acknowledged as the true and adequate declaration of the church's faith according to the Scripture. These are basic principles, therefore, that are laid down in the constitution as unalterable, and no congregation will be received or retained as a member that does

not accept them. In addition, the constitution also outlines the work which the body proposes to do and provides in a general way for the proper methods and means of doing that work. In this way only can harmonious and successful co-operation between the various individual congregations be attained.

Since the purpose of a general organization may be said to be the spreading of the Christian faith and the building of the kingdom of God in accordance with the principles and practices recognized by the congregations composing it as derived from the Word of God, it is evident that a Christian can hold membership only in such a body with whose principles and practices he finds himself in complete agreement. Any other union would be hypocrisy and fraud. It should also be self-evident that so long as he is a member he will loyally co-operate with his brethren in that body. He will consistently endeavor to put its principles into practice in his own individual life, in his relation to his own congregation, and in any part of the larger work of the body to which he belongs and in which it asks him to serve. Individual pastors and congregations will constantly remind themselves that they are in fact jointly responsible with all other members for the success of all common enterprises, and they will put forth every effort to discharge their share of that joint responsibility. They will also be careful not to disrupt the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace (Eph. 4:3) by selfish individualism,

but will rather endeavor to give expression to that unity in every way, even in such adiaphoristic matters as the order of service, the use of the church hymnal, Sunday school literature, periodicals, etc. Only by such loyal, whole-hearted co-operation of all can the ends for which the church body is organized be accomplished.

Since general church bodies are organized for the common confession of a common faith and the united pursuit of Christian work on the basis of such confession, the relation of church bodies to each other, and of their individual congregations and members to each other, will be determined by the extent to which they agree in doctrine and practice. It should be remembered that the external union of all Christians in the world in one organization is not required in the Word of God, nor is it essential to the true unity of the church (cf. Augsburg Confession, Article 7). Even the external union of such church bodies as are in full agreement with each other is only a matter of expediency, not a matter of conscience. But it should also be remembered that divisions in the church that are caused by differences in doctrine and practice are always the result of sin, the sin of disbelief in the truth of the Word of God or the sin of disobedience to the revealed will of God. Whether those who bring about such divisions and those who maintain them are conscious of such sin or not, does not affect the facts in the case. Obviously, then, it becomes an

important duty of every church body to make sure that its position in doctrine and practice really is in accordance with the Word of God, for the responsibility for such divisions rests not upon those who conscientiously abide in the truth of God's Word but upon those who depart from it (John 8:31, 32). Then, applying the same test to the position of other bodies, if it finds itself in full agreement with such bodies it will gladly extend the hand of Christian fellowship and co-operation in the building of the kingdom of God; but if it finds itself in serious disagreement it can only withhold such fellowship until the causes of the disagreement have been removed. Fidelity to the truth of God's Word and genuine Christian love for those who are in error permit of no other course of action. Neither must we permit ourselves to be misled by the specious argument that in our own church body there are some whose teaching and practice is not in full accord with the official position as declared in our constitution; for church bodies and denominations are to be judged not by their individual members but by the principles laid down in their official documents and by their official acts. Erring brethren in our own midst we labor patiently to convince of their errors until they will either see their errors and renounce them, or persisting stubbornly in their errors, they are removed from our membership. But error officially countenanced or even taught by an entire church body precludes the possibility of fellowship.

Among the Lutheran bodies in America it has become an established practice to acknowledge agreement in doctrine and practice by an official declaration of pulpit and altar fellowship, meaning that each of the church bodies concerned agrees to admit the pastors of the other bodies to its own pulpits and the communicants of the other bodies to its own altars. Since the erection of church fellowship is a prerogative of the respective church bodies as such and not of the individual pastors and congregations constituting them, individuals should not ignore the official relationship of their own church body to other bodies and proceed as though such fellowship had been established where this is not the case. Instead of thus giving offense to their own brethren they should rather use every legitimate means to remove those hindrances which stand in the way of church fellowship and to induce their church body to establish it.

In his conduct toward those with whom he can have no church fellowship the Christian must avoid two extremes, fanaticism and unionism. On the one hand, he will remember that other church bodies and denominations, as long as they still have and administer the means of grace, are to be recognized as Christian, though they may be erring, churches, and that their rights as Christian churches must be respected. This will lead him to avoid all unfair proselyting as well as all harsh and hasty judging of individuals and will cause him to rejoice at every opportunity to confess

the truth over against their error and to labor with patience and love to win them for the truth. On the other hand, he will not be blind to their errors but will consistently avoid any conduct that would make the differences appear as of no particular importance, bearing in mind that there can be no real union without true unity of faith and confession.

CHAPTER XLI

SUNDAYS AND FESTIVALS

The question of the observance of Sundays and festivals is answered by the Lutheran Christian in a different manner than by the Reformed Christian, although in the Reformation period itself there was no essential difference between Luther and Calvin in regard to the Sunday question (cf. Chapter XV, pp. 117ff.). The view still largely held by conservative Reformed groups today goes back to the Westminster Confession (1647), which in Chapter XXI declares most emphatically that God "in his Word, by a positive, moral, and perpetual commandment, binding all men in all ages, hath particularly appointed one day in seven for a Sabbath, to be kept holy unto Him: which . . . from the resurrection of Christ was changed unto the first day of the week, which in the Scripture is called the Lord's Day, and it is to be continued to the end of the world as the Christian Sabbath" (cf. also the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Questions 57-62). The way for this rigorously legalistic view had been previously prepared by John Knox in English and Scottish Presbyterianism, and by the Puritans in the Church of England. Through the Puritan migra-

tion to Virginia and New England and the Presbyterian immigration in the middle colonies, it was brought to America, where during the colonial and early national periods it blossomed out in the most extreme and minute legal restrictions and regulations of Sunday observance* with heavy fines and penalties imposed upon the offenders.

While in modern times the earlier rigor of our Sunday Blue Laws has been considerably modified, we still have forty-four states in the Union that have laws safeguarding the Christian Sunday on their statute books, and the Puritan conception of Sunday still enters largely into the attitude of the average American toward that day. The legalistic interpretation and application of the Third Commandment in many American denominations is evident in the widespread substitution of the word Sabbath for Sunday, Sabbath school for Sunday school, etc.

* Robert V. Foster in his historical sketch of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church (*American Church History Series*, vol. I, p. 270 f.), speaking of the founders of that denomination, says: "All the ministers of the new Presbytery had a thorough Presbyterian training and Cumberland Presbyterians still regard it as worthy of record that in profound respect for the Sabbath they were scarcely behind the Puritans themselves. The customs of their families in this respect were regulated strictly by the Jewish law. No wood was gathered or carried, much less cut, on the Sabbath. No visiting, no pleasure-riding, no cooking, no strolling through the woods, no whistling, no traveling, except to church, no conversation or reading, except on religious subjects, was tolerated. If a child committed an offense worthy of the rod, the penalty was delayed till Monday morning."

The Lutheran Christian knows that Sunday did not originate from a shifting of the Old Testament Sabbath to the first day of the week. Following the example of Luther, and in harmony with the Augsburg Confession, Article 28, he takes his stand with Christ and Paul rather than with those who would perpetuate the legalism of the Old Testament in the church. To him it is very evident from the teachings of the New Testament that there is no divine command obligating him to observe a certain day of the week. This is clear from the general relation of the Old Testament to the New. The former was a time of preparation, of spiritual childhood, of legal restraint and external forms; the latter is the time of fulfillment, of spiritual manhood, of liberty. When the body appears, the shadows that were cast before are of no further importance (Col. 2:17). Christ himself also plainly teaches this, for if according to his words to the Samaritan woman (John 4:21-24) the worship of the New Testament is not to be confined to any certain *place*, we are justified in concluding that neither is it to be confined to any certain *time* or *day*. Both would be in conflict with the essence of New Testament worship, which is to be "in spirit and in truth." For this reason Paul was particularly concerned with counteracting the Judaizing influences in his congregations in this respect (Gal. 4:1-11; Col. 2:16f.). Gratitude to Christ, who has freed us from the Old Testament ceremonial laws, ought to move us to insist on safe-

guarding our freedom and refusing to put our necks again under a yoke of slavery (Gal. 5:1). In the exercise of this liberty the Christian may act according to Rom. 14:5, 6; he may choose certain meats as well as certain days, though never under any compulsion of law but solely for the sake of giving glory to God.

Why, then, have Sundays at all? The necessity of Sunday observance may be considered under two aspects, the natural and the religious. It is assumed by many students of sociology that a law of nature requires that in order to do his best work man should rest one day out of seven, and in fact many Bible students maintain that this was intended by the Creator (cf. Gen. 2:1-3; Mark 2:27). Life needs its rhythms of occupation and relaxation. Mind and body need rest. At any rate, it appears that practically all civilized countries today recognize the fact that for the well-being of the individual, the family, and the state it is desirable that a day of rest be observed each week. For the sake of uniformity and good order it becomes necessary that the government appoint such a day and safeguard its subjects in the observance of it.

However, the Christian needs such a day for another purpose: the edification of his spiritual life by the use of the means of grace publicly administered. As a member of a Christian congregation he must see to it that both a place and a time be provided for the assembly of Christians for divine worship. It was

only natural, as we have seen, that the church at the very beginning should select that day which reminded her of the resurrection of her Lord, and that gradually the idea of rest was combined with it in order to afford to all a better opportunity for taking part in the worship. For similar reasons other days were fixed by the church, such as Christmas, Easter, Pentecost, etc., in order to "have a fixed time in common to consider the great deeds of God and render Him due praise for the same."

In this spirit the Christian observes Sundays and festivals agreed upon by the church. He welcomes such days when, freed from the cares and toils of everyday life, he can devote himself unhindered to spiritual communion with his heavenly Father. He gladly makes use of every opportunity for such communion, in public worship, in the Sunday school, in private devotions. He voluntarily abstains from all work that is not necessary on such days, allowing as little as possible to interfere with their solemn purposes. He likewise avoids all amusements and entertainments which will tend to diminish rather than increase his spiritual life. But he does not hesitate to do such work as may be required by urgent necessity or by Christian brotherly love (James 1:27; Matt. 12:11, 12).

3. THE STATE

CHAPTER XLII

ESSENCE AND PURPOSE OF THE STATE. THE GOVERNMENT

The state is not a product of nature like the family or the clan, although especially the latter with its patriarchal or matriarchal authority does present a certain similarity to primitive state organization. The origin of the concept of the state is lost in antiquity; but wherever states actually exist they are the result of historical action, usually of violent action. The natural basis on which a state rests includes such factors as a common language, a common location, common views, customs and usages, common interests, and usually, though not necessarily, a common racial ancestry. Whenever a body of people thus united by natural bonds is organized under some system of government it becomes a state. Accordingly, in every state we always have the juxtaposition of government and governed, of authority and submission. The authority may have come to those who constitute the government by consent of the governed, by inheritance, or by usurpation; in any case they can exercise it only so long as they are able to enforce their will. Again, the submission of the governed may be a voluntary one, resulting either from mutual agreement or per-

sonal loyalty to the rulers, or it may be an involuntary one obtained by those in authority only because they are in possession of sufficient power to enforce their decrees.

States which are organized on the principle that "Might makes Right" do not reflect the divine idea of a state. Even the consent of the governed, though an essential principle of a modern state according to our American conception of it, does not constitute its divine authority. The primary purpose of the state is, to safeguard the inherent, inalienable God-given rights of its citizens and arrange for their orderly enjoyment of those rights. As an individual human personality, every citizen has the right to exist, to be free, and to hold property. As a member of a family he has those rights which are divinely established in the relation of husband and wife, and parents and children. As a religious being he has the right to his own convictions and beliefs, and to the practice of those beliefs both individually and collectively with others of the same convictions. These rights the state does not create, for they already exist independently of the state; but it must give them official recognition, guarantee them and make possible their orderly enjoyment and exercise. Thus the state is preeminently an institution of justice. "It lives and is to act to uphold justice in the largest and fullest sense. This is its moral basis that gives it worth and purpose in social life" (Haas, *Freedom and Christian Conduct*, p. 287).

In addition to this primary purpose for which the state exists, we may mention some secondary functions, which come within the province of the state in the exercise of its primary function. Since in a large social organism it is manifestly impossible for individuals to live unto themselves alone without due regard for and co-operation with their fellow-citizens, it becomes the duty of the state to encourage, co-ordinate and promote the development of its natural and intellectual resources, its industry and commerce, to establish and maintain friendly relationships with other nations, and thus to advance the general cause of civilization.

The state is not a divine institution in the same sense as the family and the church. The only exception is the Old Testament theocracy, which was called into being by God for a very specific purpose. It is therefore a matter of complete indifference to the Scripture whether a government assumes the form of an absolute or constitutional monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy. The form of government is human; the most we can say of it is that it comes into being under divine providence, and that God can and does make use of all the various forms of government to accomplish his purposes in the world. But while the form is human, the idea and principle of government is undoubtedly divine (Rom. 13:1; I Pet. 2:13); that is to say, it is a part of the divinely established world order that governments shall exist and exercise authority. In this

sense it can be said just as truly of the president of a republic who is elected for a term of years, as of a monarch who inherits his throne and occupies it for life, that he holds his place "by the grace of God." Even a tyrannical government, with whose establishment the citizens have had nothing whatever to do, must be recognized as the "minister of God" (Rom. 13:4 was written under Nero's reign!). Indeed the Christian patriot may have much to grieve about under such a government, but he will bear it in patience, at the same time using all lawful means to bring about an improvement of conditions.

In the light of these principles we must endeavor to find the answer to that vexing question of the moral right of revolution. A revolution involves a fundamental change in political organization, generally including the overthrow or renunciation of one government and the substitution of another by the governed. The question is, Does a Christian ever have the moral right and duty to take part in such a movement? The question cannot be answered by direct quotations from Scripture. It is true that the New Testament plainly teaches the duty of submission, even to tyrannical and despotic governments. Christ did not encourage the revolutionary Zealot party of his day, but advised them to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" (Matt. 22:21). He did not oppose power to power, nor permit his disciples to use the sword in his defense (Matt. 26:52). Paul urged the Christians at Rome

to be subject to the government "for conscience' sake" and to render it all just dues (Rom. 13:1-7); and Peter, though he calls his readers a "chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation," still requires them to submit themselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, mentioning especially the king and the governors, under whose rule the Christians even at that time were suffering many wrongs (I Pet. 2:9, 13, 14). But it would seem quite impossible on the basis of these injunctions to individuals to formulate a general principle of citizenship with reference to revolution, particularly since a revolution against the Roman empire could not possibly have come within the scope of such injunctions except in the case of the Zealot party of the Jews; and in their case everybody but themselves realized the utter futility of the attempt. If the divine character of government lies in the fact that the state is an institution of justice, and if obedience to government rests upon the fact that it is a "minister of God for good" and "a revenger upon him that doeth evil" (Rom. 13:4), then certainly where a government constantly violates every principle of right, constantly becomes guilty of flagrant injustice, and in fact becomes a minister of Satan for evil, it becomes the duty of every Christian to join with his fellow-citizens in bringing about much needed reforms first by peaceable efforts, and, failing in such efforts, to overthrow the tyranny that is no longer entitled to the name of government.

"For if we say that a revolution is in no case justifiable, . . . then we say that prevailing injustice and infringements of law, nay, sins which cry to Heaven, must always take their course unchecked, and meet with no further opposition than protests, to which no attention is paid; that a nation must receive injuries, nay, insults to hearth and home, with passive obedience; that even though country and kingdom should be ruined, the national spirit, the mother-tongue, the popular life should be stifled and die, the once existing historical right must never be sacrificed to the ideal right; that a nation must in quietistic and fatalistic waiting for the help of Heaven let itself be torn by the most ruthless ill-treatment, without venturing, in dependence upon the help of Heaven, to use its own strength. Then the question presses itself upon us, whether the appeal to God's command, to the duty of submission to authority, is here really in place? whether a nation is not really absolved from the duty of obedience when rulers, by continued deeds of violence, *annul themselves as rulers*, themselves abolish the state of law, and by making mere force prevail over law, introduce the rude state of nature, that is, just the state of things in which we are directed to self-help" (Martensen, *Social Ethics*, p. 222).

If thus the right of revolution in fact rests upon the right of self-preservation, it is evident that only in the most extreme cases is it justified. It is also clear that it must be exceedingly difficult for a Christian to

decide just when this extremity actually exists, and to keep his conscience entirely inviolate. "The curse of every revolution is, that not one is the work of justice alone, but is at the same time, and none the less, the work also of excited passions, which had long brooded in obscurity, and now when opportunity rises, burst forth into flames, whose extent and effects no one can calculate and control" (Martensen, *op. cit.*, p 224). The question when, in case of a change of government by violent means, the divine authority of the old ends and that of the new begins, cannot be answered *a priori*, but in general this is the case whenever the new government actually has the power in its hands, that is, when it has established and successfully maintains the administration of law and justice.

Since the state is an institution of justice, it becomes the primary duty of the government to uphold the right and to curb the wrong, as defined by the laws of the state. When individuals choose to oppose their own will to the will of the state, it is the duty of the government to apprehend such individuals, establish their guilt by fair and impartial trial, and to inflict the proper punishment. The punishment of criminals is not to be considered as an act of revenge on the part of the community for the wrong committed, but as a solemn act on the part of the government to uphold the majesty of the law. It rests on the eternal and unchangeable idea of justice and right, the inviolability of the moral law. So considered, it also

becomes a means of self-defense and self-preservation for the state, since by its very definition the state can continue to exist only as long as it continues to be an institution of justice. In a secondary sense, punishment will also serve to intimidate actual and potential criminals and thus act as a deterrent and a pedagogical agent. But the primary object is to vindicate the right, to balance the scales of justice, and to express the moral indignation of the community.

The greater the ethical advance of a state, the more just and equitable will be its penal code. The punishment inflicted must not be mere compensation for the crime committed ("an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"), it must not be barbarous and inhumane. Even after his conviction, the criminal has a right to be treated as a human being, and while the primary purpose of punishment is not pedagogical, nevertheless it is the duty of the state to make it possible for him after he has been discharged to live a self-respecting and useful life in society. Provision must also be made for the exercise of clemency in special cases, just so the ends of justice will not be defeated. But above all, the high moral sense of a nation and its government will be evident in the swift, sure, and determined action of all concerned to bring the offender against the laws of the state to trial, to determine the degree of his guilt, and to impose the proper punishment. It is especially in this respect that conscientious Christian citizens can do much by upholding the hands of their

government in public opinion. In a democracy, law enforcement will never be any better than public opinion demands.

Gen 9:6 The much debated question whether or not in extreme cases the death penalty may be justified, is answered for the Christian by plain statements of Scripture. Gen. 9:6: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," was spoken by God immediately after the Flood, before the Mosaic law was given, hence expresses the principle of general validity for the human race that a murderer forfeits his life because he has deprived one who bears the image of God of his most precious earthly treasure. The same divine principle is enunciated by Christ, Matt. 26:52: "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." And St. Paul adds the important fact that the right to inflict the death penalty ordinarily rests with the lawfully constituted government, when he says, Rom. 13:4, that the government "beareth not the sword in vain" but is the "minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil;" for the "sword" is not merely the symbol of authority in general but also the instrument of execution to be used in executing the divine wrath upon him who by his deed deserves to be put to death. Objections to the death penalty, except those arising in false sentimentality which need not concern us here, are easily met. When it is claimed that by cutting off a man's life we also cut off his chances to reform, the answer is that

the primary purpose of punishment is not reform but justice; and besides, it is probable that more murderers have been brought to repentance when facing certain death than while enduring a long imprisonment. When it is argued that life imprisonment is really a more severe punishment than execution, the fact is overlooked that very few criminals actually consider it so, and that in very many cases "life" imprisonment really does not mean imprisonment for the rest of the murderer's actual life. And then the question arises, how shall such a murderer be restrained from committing another murder, and what penalty shall be imposed upon him when he does commit it? Moreover, we do not ask for a more severe punishment than a murderer deserves.

In all cases involving the administration of justice the individual citizen must bear in mind that this is a matter placed by God in the hands of the government, hence he must not take the law into his own hands. Mob violence, lynching, private feuds, blood-vengeance, etc., are not only an offense against the laws of a civilized state and an outrage of the rights of its citizens, but they are also a sin against the will of God who has endowed the regularly constituted government with divine authority to administer justice. Only in case of extreme necessity, where the protection of the government cannot be invoked, has the individual the right to act in self-defense or in defense of others (cf. Luke 12:39).

falling away.

should not wait for Christianity; for Christianity is not honored by heathen. What we should do is a pious government.

CHAPTER XLIII

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No man can live unto himself alone; and no state can exist entirely unto itself. States and nations have always had some sort of contact with other nations, either friendly or hostile; but the recent remarkable developments in the field of transportation and communication have brought all nations of the world into direct relations with each other and thus have given a strong impetus to the development of international ethics and laws.

The believing student of the Word of God can hardly escape the conclusion that the division and subdivision of the human race in nations and peoples was quite within the original purpose of God. "The Most High divided to the nations their inheritance; He separated the sons of Adam" (Deut. 32:8). The confusion of tongues (Gen. 11), when considered in the light of this fact, appears both as a divine punishment for man's disobedience to the will of God and a most effective means to promote the formation of separate nations. In the rise and fall of the nations as well as in the fascinating story of their fortunes and misfortunes, the believing Christian sees the evidences of

divine providence and government just as truly as in his own individual life (Ps. 22:28; Job. 12:23). He knows by faith, though not always by observation, that the destinies of the nations are held in the Lord's hand, that He sets their bounds beyond which they cannot pass, that He blesses the nation that walks in his ways and punishes the one that forsakes his commandments, and that while in his wisdom He permits many things to occur that are not in accordance with his will, He can and does overrule evil for good and so accomplish his purpose.

It is evident that the Lord who "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth" (Acts 17:26) wants these nations to dwell together in their common habitation in peace and concord. Since "the Most High has divided to the nations their inheritance," no individual nation, no matter how great and powerful it may be, has a right to encroach upon the inheritance of another nation and by the use of brute force to appropriate that which does not lawfully belong to it. Under this principle, all the great world-empires of history, built up as they were by the ruthless conquest of the weak by the strong, stand condemned. Expansion of territory, colonization in distant parts of the world, may become necessary when a country can no longer adequately support its increasing population; but such expansion must go forward not through wars of aggression and conquest but by peaceful means and

always with due consideration of the rights of those who inhabit the territory to be annexed. Stronger and more advanced nations owe the weaker and backward peoples in various parts of the world their protection against aggressors and their assistance in establishing a stable and efficient government and developing their natural resources for the benefit of all humanity. How to accomplish all this without exploitation and injustice constitutes one of the most difficult problems of broad, unselfish and far-sighted statesmanship. The problem will not be solved unless the spirit and principles of Christianity become much more effective in international relationships than they are at present, and in the light of Biblical prophecy this is hardly to be expected.

altered(!)

One of the results of the World War has been the effort to draw the various nations of the world more closely together in renewed attempts to solve great international problems such as the elimination of slavery, the regulation of traffic in narcotics, the promotion of international trade and commerce, the stabilization of exchange, the reduction of armaments, and the prevention of war. In view the tremendous practical difficulties standing in the way it would seem unjust to belittle the scanty results thus far attained; but the chief hindrances are not those of an objective, practical nature but those arising from the selfishness and greed of the nations concerned and the fear that some other nation might gain an undue advantage. We have but

little hope for any far-reaching success of world conferences, world alliances and leagues of nations, unless the nations of the world learn to recognize much more clearly and effectively than they do now that "the kingdom is the Lord's, and He is the Governor among the nations" (Ps. 22:23).

Meanwhile the friendly relations between individual nations can be promoted by personal contacts between individual members and by co-operation in the advancement of science, art, and literature. It is only by such personal contacts that racial and national prejudices can be overcome, and the pursuit of common aims for the betterment of humanity will establish common bonds of friendship and interest that will make for a larger and freer life of all mankind.

Since states are fundamentally institutions of justice established for the purpose of maintaining and enforcing the right, it is evident that international relationships should also be governed by right and justice. The extent to which individual states have agreed upon the common rights of all nations is recorded in what is known as international law. Its weakness lies in the fact that there exists no generally recognized international or supernational authority to enforce it. Its validity rests therefore solely on the willingness of the nations to let their conduct be governed by it, and to arbitrate any differences that may arise. Even the establishment of an international court for the adjustment of disputes between nations

has proved to be an experiment only partially successful, because the court has no power to enforce its decisions. In view of these facts the right and duty of a nation to resort to war as a final means of defending itself against an aggressor cannot be denied.

We are well aware of all the bitter things that can be said against war, and we frankly admit that we agree with most of them. War "is a perversion of the moral order. Murder is legitimized through it, and the taking of life becomes a business. Lying and deception are the approved attitudes. Hate sweeps over peoples, revenge is developed, and the bitterness of war is handed on as a memory from generation to generation. Every war sows the seed of future war. . . . Science, that ought to be used for the help of mankind, becomes the servant of destruction. Thousands of minds think and plan how they can invent more terrible and more destructive agencies of war. Cruelty is developed and man sinks back to the primal, barbaric instincts. Impurity gains a larger hold. The moral restraints are removed. The press, the platform and even the pulpit are commandeered to increase the sentiment of hate. To keep up the morale of war everything is set aside but those emotions and acts that will win the war. Surely there is no part of war that does not degrade and enslave man" (Haas, *Freedom and Christian Conduct*, pp. 305f).

We also frankly admit that most of the arguments advanced by the ardent defenders of war as an inter-

national institution for settling disputes leave us quite unconvinced. It simply is not true that God never permits any side but the right to win. He can and does overrule evil for good, including the evil of war; but nowhere in his Word has He promised that He will in every case give victory to the side that stands for the right. On the contrary, history shows that in innumerable instances the victory has gone to the side that was strongest in military power and resources, a fact which would suggest as the logical deduction from this argument the thesis that "Might makes Right." That war develops certain manly qualities and virtues may be true; but courage, self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, patriotism, and other virtues can also be developed in time of peace and by constructive, not destructive, efforts. And when it is claimed that the outbreak of war is usually accompanied by a widespread and intense religious and moral awakening, we can point to the fact that not only do such artificially stimulated movements as a rule soon die down, but that the religious and moral after-effects especially of long drawn-out wars have as a rule been disastrous.

On the other hand, we can find but little encouragement in the utopian dreams of those well-meaning reformers who would make this a "warless" world by simply having all nations scrap their armaments and agree among themselves never to resort to war for any reason whatsoever. As long as human nature remains what it is, as long as individuals and nations

allow themselves to be governed in their actions largely by such sinful motives as selfishness, pride, jealousy, hatred and greed, so long it will remain the duty of every government that is conscious of its solemn obligation to safeguard and protect the rights of its citizens and the welfare of its country, to maintain armed forces that will at least be sufficient to perform that duty. Recent events in various parts of the world have shown the utter inefficiency of peace-pacts, arbitration treaties, international courts and League-of-Nation commissions, when there is no international power to enforce international law against a recalcitrant nation.

In America. War is an evil, but there are times when it may become a necessary evil. As in the case of every evil, so in war the responsibility for it rests upon the nation that provokes it, not upon the nation that suffers it. Because of the many horrors that follow in its wake and the far-reaching consequences which no man can foresee, no conscientious government will resort to war until every other means of settling the dispute or warding off the danger has been exhausted, and then only when the violations of justice are so great as to affect the very existence of the state and the supreme and most important possessions of its people, that is, when it is a war *pro aris et focis*. *for altars and firesides*

What, then, should be the attitude of the church toward war? Certainly it cannot be that ultra-pacifistic attitude which is the fashion of the day in those very

church bodies which during the World War fairly tried to outdo each other in the most rabid war propaganda. They have lapsed from one extreme into the other. We respect the conscientious objector who honestly believes that war, no matter for what cause it is carried on, is wrong; but we do not share his convictions. We believe that the government is the "minister of God," that it "beareth not the sword in vain;" that it is a "revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil" (Rom. 13:4), no matter whether the evildoer is a criminal within the state or an aggressor and invader from without. And therefore we declare in Article 16 of the Augsburg Confession that "it is right for Christians to . . . engage in just wars, to serve as soldiers . . ." For if it be the duty of the government to resort to force, if necessary, to protect the state, then it is clearly the duty of Christian citizens to serve in the armed forces of their state when called upon to do so by their government.

But what if the government should draw the sword in a wrong cause? Is it still the duty of the Christian to answer its call to arms? The answer is not as simple as it seems. Who shall determine whether the cause for which a country goes to war is a just or an unjust one? Certainly it would seem that the highest officials of the government, who have all the information at their disposal and who presumably are fully conscious of the grave responsibility they assume, are better fitted to determine whether or not

there is a just cause for war than the private citizen who is not in a position to analyze and judge intelligently all the intricacies of modern international relationships. Ordinarily, therefore, the Christian may with a good conscience serve in the armed forces of a government of which he believes that it has been placed in power by divine providence. If that government makes a mistake, it is not his fault. However, if he is fully convinced that the cause for which his government and country have gone to war is an unjust one, he must obey his conscience, refuse to serve, and take the consequences.

But the church can do more than merely to enlighten the conscience of her members on the troublesome question of war. Keeping strictly within her sphere, avoiding all meddling with political affairs which are matters of the state, she can and should labor earnestly and unceasingly toward the ideal of a warless world, though always fully conscious of the fact that this ideal can never be attained this side of heaven (Matt. 24: 6ff.). She must put forth every effort that the nation within which she exists become more and more permeated with the principles of social life laid down in the Word of God, the principles of righteousness, of justice, of tolerance and forbearance, of mutual helpfulness and co-operation. She must do this, not by futile efforts to control legislation or to direct the administration of government, but by laboring patiently and persistently to increase the number of

those within the nation whose hearts have been regenerated by the Spirit of God and whose lives are directed by that Spirit. She must do it, not by invading political assemblies and public rostrums, but by preaching emphatically and convincingly from her pulpits the whole Gospel of Christ and by guidance and instruction of those whom she can persuade to submit to her teaching. She must do it also by reaching out a helpful hand across international boundaries in works of Christian charity, in Christian missions, in Christian world-service; for nothing is more effective in removing suspicions and breaking down prejudices between nations than disinterested, sympathetic, Christian service. Thus by building and extending the kingdom of God within the hearts of men the church can make a valuable and really constructive contribution to the establishment and maintenance of right international relationships.

a matter of X and Pilate; Church and State, for X is crucified, created
man. History and history of Salvation.
in the Prince of this world - against God and His Plan
Tactical life - a blending of Deity and demonic
- comes thru many channels, we love Satan more than God.
argument has power of the sword - the symbol is the sword and not the palm.
test good - punish evil - order and authority
necessity to obey government
a subject to government.
Prayer for government.

CHAPTER XLIV

old Petri: we ought to obey God rather than man.
State and Church
law that makes an Xian refuse to obey it is a sign that government has overstepped its bound
it doesn't give Xian's rights to force church against state.

One of the most far-reaching problems affecting
both the state and the church is the question of proper
correlation and coordination of the two to each other.
The state and the church occupy common ground,
they are constituted largely of the same people; and yet
they are two distinct organizations, each having its
own peculiar characteristics, powers, methods of oper-
ation, and aims. What, then, is the proper relation
of state and church?

In order to answer the question, it will be
necessary first to review briefly the sphere and the
purpose of each, according to the divine intention.

The state is an institution of God's providence, having
a government that is vested with divine authority to
perform its functions, chief of which is to safeguard
and protect the inherent personal, social, and religious
rights of its citizens and to promote their general well-
being. It deals only with the natural life of man, and
its jurisdiction extends over its citizens as human
beings only. For the maintenance of an orderly social
life it has the power to enforce external obedience
to its laws and to punish transgressors, but it has no

(342) Luther: There would be no more hope to have
thief.

in a person, divine image
cease that one who kills
he be punished.
in punishment - forbidding Judgment Day.
Bible demands cap. punishment.

olution. no to all revolution; yes to the establishment of government (preservation.)
te; passive resistance; comp de stat; public opposition... legal ways for better government; comp de
close to revolution.
olution as a dissolution of government by force; satanic, demonic, chaos, anarchy.

power to control convictions and conscience. The church, on the other hand, is an institution of divine grace, and its purpose is to bring the salvation of Christ to sinners through the administration of the means of grace. It has to do primarily with the spiritual life of man, and with his physical only insofar as it affects the spiritual. Its governing principle is not law but love; it operates not by force but by persuasion; it aims to secure not merely external compliance but inward convictions; its ends are not temporal well-being but eternal salvation.

It is obvious from these considerations that state and church are two entirely different bodies, each having an individuality of its own and distinct from that of the other. They are not to be considered as one entity with perhaps two different modes of operation or manifestation, but as two distinct organisms. They may occupy largely the same territory, and they may embrace largely the same individuals in their membership; but they are not in any way to be confused or confounded with each other. "What God has joined together let no man put asunder;" and conversely, what God has put asunder let no man join together. This distinction leads us at once to several important inferences. One of these is, that membership in the one does not necessarily include membership in the other. Another is, that opinions, doctrines and principles purely political should never exclude a man

the symptom of the fallen state of man
utilitarian passivism. - what the use of having it, were not going to gain anything
in the few politicians and industrialists.

344
Jude's command.

II, B, 3: Christian Life in the State

passivism
are right (!)
had him pass
not Jude's command
all
not X.

from churchmembership; and religious opinions and convictions as such should not exclude him from citizenship. Again, personal prestige, power, office, authority, ability, merit, dignity, etc., in one of these two organisms does not necessarily entitle an individual to leadership in the other; the President of the United States may be but an ordinary lay-member in the church, and the most illustrious archbishop or cardinal is on that account no more important as a citizen of the state than an ordinary layman.

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But the fact that the state and the church are two separate and distinct organisms does not imply that they should assume an attitude of complete indifference toward each other. On the contrary, a mutual friendly recognition and a readiness on the part of each (within the limitations of its own scope and sphere) to aid and serve the other is indispensable to the peace and prosperity of both. The state has need of the church for the very foundations on which a state must be built if it is to endure. Take away its religion, and a state will soon lapse into decay—that is the lesson which history teaches; and naturally so, for without the fear and awe of God as the supreme Lawgiver and Judge all respect for human laws and human authority is without a real motive. But it is the church that inculcates religious principles and motives in the citizens of the state, and thus it renders the state a distinct and necessary service. Furthermore, it is the church that

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teaches and inculcates the highest moral principles, love and respect for the good and the right, honesty and integrity, loyalty and patriotism, in fact, all the virtues that are of incalculable value to the state. "Whatever makes men good Christians, makes men good citizens," said Daniel Webster, and it is the good citizens that are the mainstay of a nation and its government.

But the church also has need of the state—not indeed as if it could not exist without it, for the history of the church proves conclusively that it can exist not only independently of but in spite of the state—but as a God-given means for its protection, peace, and benefit. Not only does the government of the state guarantee to all its citizens the right to worship God according to the dictates of their own conscience, but it also recognizes their right to join themselves together in congregations and larger bodies, to buy and sell property, to erect houses of worship, schools, and other institutions, and to carry on all such work as they may deem necessary in the promotion of their religion. In the enjoyment of all such rights the state safeguards and protects the church. In fact, says Dr. C. H. L. Schuette, "to describe the full worth and to speak the praises of the state, where at all it is what it is designed to be, and where it faithfully executes its high trust, is next to impossible. It is the divinely appointed guardian of our lives and the lives of all

who are dear to us; by the will of, and in subordination to, God it is the protector of our property, the preserver of general order, the keeper of the common peace, the avenger of our wrongs, the promoter of our prosperity—in every way our highest earthly benefactor, so that in the Scriptures even our 'rulers' are called 'gods.' Now what the state is to us and is to us individually, the same it is to the church—an invaluable and indispensable treasure" (*State, Church and School*, p. 183).

Since the state and the church are two entirely distinct bodies, each having a definitely circumscribed divine purpose and a divinely established mode of operation, it is evident that a conflict between state and church can arise only when they go beyond their own sphere and meddle with things that do not concern them. The sphere of the state is the natural life of man; it deals with him as a human being only; and its duty is so to order the social life of human individuals in the community of the state that each individual may enjoy to the fullest extent the inherent rights with which the Creator has endowed him, without at the same time interfering with the enjoyment of those rights on the part of others. The sphere of the church is the spiritual life of man; it deals with him as a sinner who needs the grace of God; and its chief duty is to administer the means of grace, by which sinners are made children of God and live as children of God.

In its own sphere each is supreme and must tolerate no interference from the other. The difficulties arise in those fields where the functions of state and church overlap to a certain extent. The practice of his religion according to the dictates of his own conscience is an inalienable right of every citizen and it is one of the functions of the church to guide and assist him in that practice. It is the duty of the state, on the other hand, to safeguard and protect him in that right, even though a person's religious performances should appear false and foolish in the extreme to most of his fellow-citizens. However, there is an exception. Whenever the religious practices of a person or a group of persons are such as to interfere seriously with the inherent rights of other citizens, or whenever they are incompatible with the true and legitimate idea and business of the state, the state has the right and duty to restrict such practices or even to prohibit them altogether. Again, it is the function of the state to make laws and ordinances for the orderly life of its citizens, to enforce such laws, to curb and prevent crime and disorderly conduct, and to administer the government honestly and effectively. But the state cannot, by such external means, produce true morality; which nevertheless is necessary both to the conception of good laws and for their wholehearted support and execution. It is the function of the church to cultivate this morality, and it does it through the regenerating power of the means

of grace, by which new motives are implanted in men. Accordingly, the church must not encroach upon the function of the state, the making and enforcing of laws; and the state must not attempt to displace the church by undertaking to do that which it has not the power to do. Thus in every case of conflict between state and church, let each remind itself of its own proper sphere, object, and means of operation, attend to that, and the conflict will be solved.

CHAPTER XLV

CHRISTIAN CITIZENSHIP

The Christian's life in this world is not lived in separate compartments, the spiritual and the temporal. It is one life, the life of a child of God, and in all the various situations and relationships in which the Christian finds himself he is motivated and governed by those principles which have been implanted in him in his regeneration and which are nurtured and developed by the means of grace. It is impossible, therefore, to separate his life as a Christian from his life as a citizen; in his relation to the state, the nation, and the government the Christian rather finds but an additional opportunity to manifest and exercise the Christian spirit that is in him.

The fundamental Christian virtue, love, in the Christian's life as a citizen takes the form of patriotism. This includes first of all the love of the country as such: "I love thy rocks and rills, Thy woods and templed hills." It includes also the love for the people of the country, its language, customs, literature and art. And it includes finally the love for the organized state, its government, its institutions, and its history. True patriotism is not unreasoning sentiment but intell-

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nationalism.

igent and thankful appreciation of the blessings of God that come to us as members of a nation and a people. The true patriot is not blind to his nation's faults; neither does he exaggerate her virtues to such an extent as not to be able to see any good in other nations. He is neither a chauvinist nor an internationalist. As a Christian he realizes that the body of humanity must be made up of many individual members, each of which has its own distinctive place and service, in the world-economy of God. Above all, he remembers that in Christ "there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free" (Col. 3:11), that ultimately his "fatherland" is in heaven (Hebr. 11:16), and that patriotism and loyalty to his own country must never overshadow his loyalty to the kingdom of God (Matt. 6:33).

Contrary to a popular misconception, patriotism is a virtue that should flourish not only in time of war but even in time of peace. In fact, much of what is called "patriotism" in war time is in reality nothing but war hysteria. The true patriot loves his country and is ready to serve it and if need be to sacrifice for it, not only in times of great national emergencies but under all conditions. One of the finest services a Christian citizen can render his country and his fellow-citizens is, to be faithful and diligent in his calling, for thus he not only provides the necessary daily bread for himself and his dependents, but at the same time

he also contributes something to the general well-being of his community, state, and nation. Only he must be careful not to permit himself to become so absorbed in his own work that he takes no interest in the work of others, particularly those in the same profession or occupation. He must be ready to share his experience and skill with others and thus to make his own contribution, however small it may be, to the general advancement of his country's culture.

In his relation to the government the Christian citizen is ever mindful of the fact that the relation of government and governed is divinely ordered, and therefore he is always ready to render unto all who are in authority their just dues, "tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor" (Rom. 13:7; cf. the Fourth Commandment). To those who are in public office he will show all proper respect, not because of their persons but because of their office. Such Christian respect is far removed from subservience or flattery; in fact, it does not exclude judicious and constructive criticism, for even those in the highest offices of government are only human and can make mistakes. But the Christian citizen, who honors his government, will never stoop to the tactics of the demagogue and the partisan politician by deliberately maligning and ridiculing those who bear the burdens of public office.

Obedience to law is a matter of course for the Christian citizen. He renders such obedience first of

all "for conscience' sake" (Rom. 13:5; I Pet. 2:13), then too because as a loyal and patriotic citizen he knows that the welfare of the state depends upon the sovereignty of the law, and he will want to throw the weight of his personal influence and example on the side of law observance. For that reason he will not withhold his obedience, even though some laws may not meet with his approval or even seem to be unjust. Only in one case will the Christian citizen refuse to obey a law of the state; that is, when it is directly contrary to the will of God (Acts 5:29). In all other cases he will obey the law so long as it is on the statute books; and in case he disapproves of it he will use all legitimate means to have it removed. Whether a Christian should ever join hands with others in an association to promote a better enforcement of existing laws, is a matter of personal judgment and depends largely upon the seriousness of a given situation. Certainly, from a Christian point of view nothing can be said against it, so long as the organization limits itself to legitimate means, does not presume to take the law into his own hands, and co-operates in an open and sympathetic way with the regularly constituted agencies of law enforcement. However, in all such cases let it be made perfectly clear that the Christian citizen takes part in such movements not as a representative of any church or denomination but as a conscientious citizen of the community. "As an organization, it is expedient that the church abstain

from official participation in movements of this kind. The church's function is to redeem, not to reform; to save, not to condemn. Nothing should be done to confuse this function with that of the state" (Fischer, *Social Problems*, p. 84).

Obedience to the law also includes the conscientious payment of taxes. The Christian citizen willingly pays "tribute to whom tribute is due" (Rom. 13:7; cf. Matt. 17:24-27). This is an obligation imposed upon him not only by the Word of God but also by natural necessity, for no government can perform the various functions for which it exists without funds. A sense of fairness and justice toward his fellow-citizens should make him willing to contribute his proportionate share toward the expenses of his government.

Christian citizenship, however, involves much more than merely an attitude of reverence for the government and obedience to its laws. In modern civilized states the people themselves have a share in the government of their country, and under a democratic form of government it is highly important that the right to vote be intelligently and conscientiously exercised. Through his vote the citizen can effectively express his intelligent, Christian convictions with reference to candidates for public office and measures that are to be decided. If he habitually neglects to cast his ballot, or does so haphazardly without having informed himself as fully as possible concerning candi-

dates, platforms and policies, or if he votes simply in a spirit of blind partisanship, he betrays a sacred trust imposed in him and violates his duty toward God and the state.

In a democracy such as ours, government at least in its larger aspects of state and nation is party government. The question to what extent a Christian should take part in party politics will depend very largely upon his political understanding and ability, as well as upon the duties and limitations of the calling. Certainly the fact that politics are notoriously "rotten," that graft and corruption is so frequently found in political offices high and low, is all the more reason why honest, conscientious Christian citizens should take a more active part in politics, even at the cost of personal discomfort and self-sacrifice. Here is an opportunity, and therefore also an obligation, for Christians who are the "salt of the earth" and the "light of the world" (Matt. 5:13, 14) to make the seasoning, preserving and illuminating influence of their Christian religion felt in no uncertain way.

Finally, it is one of the chief duties of every Christian citizen to pray for his government and country (I Tim. 2:1, 2).

4. THE PURELY HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS

CHAPTER XLVI

THE BROTHERHOOD OF MAN

In addition to being a member of the family, the church, and the state, the Christian is also a member of the human race in general, and in his association with his fellowmen as such he has many occasions for the preservation and development of his Christian life. As a member of the three social orders named, the Christian has certain definite obligations which rest upon the divine institution of these orders and upon the specific relationships of family ties, church-membership, and citizenship. As a member of the human race he shares in the common blessings and the common tasks which God the Creator and Preserver of mankind has bestowed upon all.

There is hardly a phrase in the English language that has suffered more abuse and concerning which there has been more vague, confused, and inaccurate thinking, than the one which has been selected as a heading for this chapter, and that usually in connection with its correlative, the "fatherhood of God." A

complete system of naturalistic religion has been built up around these two terms. Modernism finds in them the essence of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and the panacea of all the world's ills. Freemasonry would unite all creeds and religions on the common basis of this principle, and certain students of comparative religion predict that the common world religion of the future will be one which discards or ignores all present differences and teaches only the one doctrine of the "fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man."

It is a significant fact that throughout the Scriptures the name "Father" is never applied to God in his capacity as the Creator and Preserver of man, and that the individual members of the human race are never spoken of as "brethren" merely because they have all been created by God. Nevertheless, we may properly speak of a "brotherhood" of mankind, not only in the limited, special sense of a spiritual brotherhood which has been established by Jesus Christ and of which we become members by our common faith in Him, but also in the general and universal sense of a natural kinship resulting from our common descent from Adam, our first ancestor and "father." We are all "made of one blood" (Acts 17:26), we all have a common habitation, the earth (Ps. 115:16), and we all have a common task (Gen. 1:28, 29). We are indeed one family. This human family, under the providence of God, has spread over all the earth, it has

become divided and subdivided in many races and peoples and tongues, and even in individual nations its members have formed many social groups, castes, and classes; but they all have in common that human nature inherited from their first progenitor, and they all are equally the objects of God's love and of Christ's redemption (John 3:16).

The Christian's conduct toward all his brethren of mankind is governed by the fundamental motive of love. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 22:39). This love is more than the φιλανθρωπία of the ancients, which was really nothing more than a sense of justice and fairness regarding the claims of others to whatever they were entitled to receive. The Christian's love for the neighbor is ἀγάπη, deliberate, purposeful love, unselfishly seeking always the true welfare of the person loved and ready to make even the greatest sacrifices for him (cf. I Cor. 13). This love of the neighbor in the various situations and relationships of life will unfold itself in a great variety of social virtues, such as kindness, gentleness, meekness, forbearance, mercy, forgiveness, charity. Indeed, it is the only real solution of the many vexing social, economic, and racial problems of our day.

We may illustrate the point by a brief reference to one of these problems, which is becoming more and more troublesome in our day, the race problem. Despite the fact that the term "race" is really hard to

define, there has always been a certain race consciousness characteristic of the various branches of the human family. This consciousness, however, does not constitute a problem until it develops into race antagonism. To this development a variety of factors may contribute, such as color prejudice, race arrogance based on certain real or imaginary superior qualities of one race as compared with another, political domination of a weaker race by a stronger one, social and economic factors (cf. Fischer, *Social Problems*, pp. 151-165). Christian Ethics does not teach us to ignore the fact of race consciousness, based as it is on very real racial differences and distinctions. Neither does it attempt to answer every political, economic, or even social question connected with the problem. But it does take a most decided stand against race antagonism, on the ground that it is incompatible with the fundamental motive of the Christian's conduct toward his fellowman. The Christian, who truly loves his neighbor, can harbor no color prejudice, no race arrogance; he denounces all arbitrary domination and ruthless exploitation of a weaker race by a stronger one; he can tolerate no unfair treatment, no political, economic, or social injustice in the relations between the white and the colored races. The test of this motive of the Christian's life comes in his personal contact with those of other races. It is here that his transformation by the renewing of his mind (Rom. 12:2)

becomes apparent. He sees in every man, no matter how primitive, degraded, or uncultured he may be, a fellow-member of the human race, made after the similitude of God (James 3:9), an object of God's love and of the Savior's redemption, the possessor of an immortal soul that is worthy of being saved. He recognizes that every human being has certain inalienable rights that must always be respected. If he finds that he himself has enjoyed certain advantages that have raised him above the level of his less fortunate brother, he also is conscious of the responsibility that goes invariably with such blessings, and in a spirit of true Christian kindness and helpfulness he does what he can to bring the other up to his own level. The finest examples of such unselfish love and devotion are found in the history of Christian missions.*

* The Negro problem in the United States is becoming more acute from year to year, especially in the northern states. The first census after the Civil War, that of 1870, found 4,880,009 Negroes in the United States; by 1930 their number had grown to 11,891,143. Originally almost entirely confined to the southern states, the Negro in recent years has migrated in ever increasing numbers to the North, where social pressure is less severe and better economic advantages seem available. Thus, e. g., the Negro population of Ohio has increased 66% from 1920 to 1930, that of Columbus 47.8%, Cleveland 108.7%, Detroit 194%, and Milwaukee 236.5%, while the total Negro population in the United States increased only 12% during the same decade. (Figures taken from the *World Almanac* for 1933.)

The possibilities of the Negro race may be seen from the following figures taken from the Negro Year Book for 1925-26, showing economic, educational, and religious progress over a period of 60 years.

360 II, B, 4: *The Purely Human Relationships*

NEGRO PROGRESS 1866-1926

<i>Economic Progress</i>	1866	1926	Gain in 60 yrs.
Homes owned	12,000	700,000	688,000
Farms operated	20,000	1,000,000	980,000
Business conducted	2,100	70,000	67,900
Wealth accumulated.....	\$20,000,000	\$2,000,000,000	\$1,980,000,000
<i>Educational Progress</i>			
Per cent literate	10	90	80
Colleges,			
Normal Schools	15	500	485
Students in			
Public Schools	100,000	2,150,000	2,050,000
Teachers in all schools	600	48,000	47,400
Property for higher			
education	\$60,000	\$40,000,000	\$39,940,000
Annual expenditures			
for education	\$700,000	\$37,000,000	\$36,300,000
Raised by Negroes.....	\$80,000	\$3,000,000	\$2,920,000
<i>Religious Progress</i>			
Number of churches.....	700	47,000	46,300
Communicants	600,000	5,000,000	4,400,000
Sunday schools	1,000	46,000	45,000
Sunday school pupils...	50,000	3,000,000	2,950,000
Value church property	\$1,500,000	\$100,000,000	\$98,500,000

(Sherwood Eddy, *Religious and Social Justice*, p. 60).

CHAPTER XLVII

THE CHRISTIAN'S PERSONAL RELATION TO HIS FELLOWMEN

The indispensable basis of all moral intercourse between man and man is personal honor. In the sense in which we take it here, it consists in that recognition of personal worth which is accorded, or should be accorded, by society to the individual, on account of his personal qualities or his position, in particular, the recognition of those qualities which make one deserving of esteem, confidence, and respect. It is evident that ideally this external honor should accord with the internal, essential honor, that is, the honor which we have before God, and which is infinitely more important to the Christian than honor before men (cf. I Cor. 4:3, 4). The Christian, who appreciates the manifold gifts which God has given him and the position in the world in which God has placed him by his providence, and who knows that the omniscient Lord will graciously recognize and reward the faithfulness with which he makes use of the talents entrusted to him (Matt. 25:14-30), has in the consciousness of his moral worth before God ("by the grace of God I am what I am," I Cor. 15:10) a never-failing, reliable norm by which to measure the external honor which he is entitled to expect from others. Yet the latter is

also of considerable importance to him, for without it he cannot successfully fill his place in the world. For this reason Luther includes "honor" among the things meant by daily bread in the Fourth Petition, and the Scriptures repeatedly urge us to give honor to whom honor is due (Rom. 13:7; I Pet. 2:17). Especially those who are called to be leaders in the church must have a "good report" even with them which are without (I Tim. 3:7; Tit. 1:7, 8; Acts 16:2; 22:12).

There is, then, a legitimate desire for honor on the part of the Christian. This is far different from that false ambition which attaches more importance to what we seem to be than to what we really are. One who must have honor before men at any price will be tempted to adapt his actions to the prevailing views of his fellowmen instead of being governed in all things by the will of God. That this is a serious danger to his spiritual life is evident (cf. John 5:44). After all, honor before men is only a relative good, a fact which is further emphasized by the fickleness of popular opinion (cf. I Cor. 4:3; the story of Christ's passion). The true follower of Christ, therefore, will be ready to go with Him "through honor and dishonor, through evil report and good report" (II Cor. 6:8, 9), knowing that in his own good time the Lord will vindicate his honor.

This does not prevent the Christian, however, from making every lawful effort to safeguard and protect his honor, especially when the success of his

calling is at stake. For this he has the example of the apostle Paul (Acts 16:37; 22:25-28; II Cor. 11:21ff.), and even of the Savior himself (John 8:46, 50, 54, etc.). In such self-defense it may sometimes suffice simply to let one's actions speak for themselves (I Pet. 2:12); but if that is not enough to "put to silence the ignorance of foolish men," it may become necessary for the Christian to resort to every other lawful means to vindicate his honor. It goes without saying that the Christian will not spitefully "render evil for evil, or reviling for reviling" (I Pet. 3:9), and that his defense will rest upon the consciousness of his own internal moral worth as a child of God. An appeal to the courts should be made only as a last resort. What the Christian seeks is not revenge but protection in the successful pursuit of his calling.

In all his associations with others, the Christian will recognize in every fellow-man a moral personality which it is his duty to respect. This respect will find its expression in sincerity of word and conduct. Anything short of that is unworthy of a child of Him, who is a God of truth as well as of love. The devil is a murderer and a liar from the beginning (John 8:44); the lie, therefore, is devilish, the truth divine. The Christian, in whom the image of God has been restored, should demonstrate this fact by reflecting it in his daily life and conduct. Following the example of his Master, he will indeed at times take cognizance of his neighbor's weakness and speak to him in "par-

ables" or "proverbs" (cf. John 16:25), or withhold from him until a later date that which at present he "cannot bear" (cf. John 16:12), but always in a spirit of sincerity and love. It is significant that at the very beginning of the Christian church we have the account of a most severe judgment of God upon Ananias and Sapphira—there is to be no lying in the Christian church! The apostle Paul enumerates the "liars" together with the most wicked of sinners (cf. I Tim. 1:9, 10); and in Revelation 21:8 they are classed with the murderers, whoremongers, idolaters, etc., who "shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone."

The lie may be defined as any statement or action made with intent to deceive and in violation of an obligation to give the truth. In this sense it includes the lie proper whether by word or act, equivocation or the use of language with double meaning with intent to mislead or deceive, and mental reservation. Fiction, parables, fables, etc., are not properly lies since they do not involve intentional deception. The same may be said of jests and jokes, although the Christian will be careful always to preserve their harmless character and to avoid any violation of that respect which he owes his fellowman.

Since in all his associations with his neighbor the Christian is motivated by a spirit of sincerity and love, he will be careful always to speak the truth, but to sweeten the truth with love (Eph. 4:15, 29; Col.

3:9). There is a time to keep silence, and a time to speak (Eccl. 3:7). He will avoid the habit of making excuses, rather striving to avoid the necessity for them. He will be quick to apologize for a wrong committed against anyone, for if we know that we have done a wrong and let it stand as though it were right, we act a lie. And finally, he will avoid both excessive flattery and excessive censure of others, for both contain the elements of a lie (cf. J. Stump, *Bible Teachings*, pp. 208-213, a chapter well worth reading).

"Conventional lies" are untruths, both in word and conduct, which are demanded by social usage in our modern life. That in the development of conventional forms of social intercourse much of the divine virtue of sincerity has been lost, cannot be denied and is to be regretted. Where certain phrases, manners, and actions are generally accepted at their face value as mere evidences of politeness and so understood by all parties concerned, they can hardly be construed as lies in the sense of our definition, yet the Christian will be careful and conservative in their use, aiming in all things to cultivate true sincerity.

The question of "white lies," that is, lies spoken under stress of necessity, is one of the most difficult problems of Christian Ethics, as may be seen from the fact that such outstanding theologians and philosophers as Basilus the Great, Augustine, Calvin, Kant, Schleiermacher, condemn them categorically, while others equally great, such as Chrysostom, Jerome,

Luther, find excuses for them. Undoubtedly all will agree with Martensen, when he says, "A lie of exigency merely proceeding from egoism, from selfishness, from regard to personal convenience, is to be rejected" (*Individual Ethics*, p. 216). But when in a desperate situation a lie is resorted to in order to save a human life where no other means of doing so is available (cf. Exod. 1:15-21; cf. also Josh. 2:4, 5 with Hebr. 11:31 and Jas. 2:25), such an act, though not justifiable, would at least seem to be deserving of charitable judgment, for by far the greater share of the guilt will fall upon the one who brings about such a situation rather than upon the one who resorts to an untruth in order to prevent what, humanly speaking, seems a much greater crime. On the other hand, however, it must be admitted that in every such untruth there is something of sin, something that needs excuse and forgiveness; and surely it is the duty of every child of God, the God of truth and light, to strive constantly for the attainment of such wisdom, courage, faith and trust, that it will never become necessary for him to resort to such questionable means. This much is sure, that our Savior Jesus Christ, "who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth" (I Pet. 2:22), and who "was in all things tempted like as we are" (Hebr. 4:15), never felt constrained to resort to this doubtful expedient.

While Christianity strongly emphasizes *φιλανθρωπία* (love for all men) and *φιλαδελφία* (love for the

brethren), it also recognizes the fact that certain individuals by reason of similarity of dispositions and aspirations may feel specially attracted to each other and on the basis of such similarity form that most intimate and highly ethical relationship which we call friendship. Friendships usually arise from a more or less consciously felt need of attachment to another, in whom we seek a complement of our own personality and in whom we have implicit confidence. Some persons are so constituted that they make friends very easily, others are lone individuals who find it difficult to inspire or to bestow confidences. It lies within the very nature of youth that it is the time when the most intimate and lasting friendships are formed, but very beautiful examples of friendship may be found also in the more advanced stages of human life. Friendships are usually formed between members of the same sex, but pure and wholesome friendships between members of different sexes are not impossible. Those friendships are the most beautiful and also the most lasting, which are based upon complete mutual understanding and confidence; in which each is to the other both an ideal to be attained and a conscience to warn, direct, and judge. Hence in the highest sense only a true Christian can be an ideal friend.

ted hour. praise of accomplishment.

ment, demands, confess, protect honor.

tons can become demonic, satanic.

away with OATH - psychological. The world is not religious. Therefore The oath is no
good.

Comm. protects hidden-known relationship.

relation important in all areas. - integrity - internal truth.

a oath reminds them that they are standing before God.

h, a truth, the government that protects integrity

CHAPTER XLVIII

SOCIAL INTERCOURSE

Life in communities is in itself an invitation to social intercourse. To be sure, there will probably always be some few individuals toward whom we feel especially attracted and with whom relations of more or less intimate friendship will develop. Again, the various callings, occupations, and professions in life will naturally bring us into more intimate contacts and relations with those who follow similar pursuits. But aside from these more specialized relationships, community life brings with it a variety of contacts that the Christian may well cultivate and enjoy. For the ideal Christian life is not the life of a hermit, but a life in which we share with others the manifold gifts of God, and in that sharing find enjoyment. We cultivate sociability, not to gain or profit thereby, but for its own sake. And herein lies its ethical value, for in social intercourse a broadly human interest in our fellowman is developed and at the same time we are compelled to exercise that self-control which is essential to become a well-rounded Christian character.

Social intercourse offers the finest opportunities for the practice of the time-honored Christian virtue of hospitality, for which especially the Lutheran parson-

age in former times was justly famous. But whether it take the form of an elaborate formal dinner or a simple frugal meal that is shared with a hungry stranger, whether it be a carefully planned week-end house-party or merely an informal invitation to "stay over night," true Christian hospitality is impossible without that sincerity of heart which gives unselfishly without hoping for a return and finds delight in serving others (cf. Luke 6:32, 33; I Pet. 4:9).

Conversation as a feature of social intercourse is not debate, business conference, or scientific lecture, but the free and easy unfolding of natural endowment in intellect, imagination, and feeling, both in the form of serious talk and of jest, wit and humor, but always within the proper bounds so as not to offend against brotherly love. Since all social intercourse as such rests upon a purely human relationship, and is cultivated merely for mutual recreation and enjoyment, it is not necessary that the conversation, even among Christians, be always limited to some topic directly connected with religion, but it is necessary that the Christian at all times avoid such things as are incompatible with his Christian character. Never should the Christian permit his conversation to descend to the level of idle gossip, slander, frivolous jesting, or vile and filthy talk (Eph. 5:4; 4, 29; cf. Col. 4:6; Phil. 4:8; James 1:19; Matt. 12:36). "Useful Conversation"
"Anger, and
Bitter."

Inasmuch as social intercourse, as distinguished from professional or scientific intercourse, is for

purposes of recreation, diversion and enjoyment only, it may properly be considered as a form of play. For play, in its most general sense, is any activity which has these things for its purpose, as distinguished from work, which is a purposeful effort, physical or intellectual, directed toward a specific end. It is only natural, then, that the various pastimes and amusements which constitute a large part of social intercourse, should take the form of play in a more specific sense. Such play, whether gymnastic in the form of various sports or intellectual as a matching of wits and mental powers, is ethically justifiable insofar as it serves for the purpose of recreation or relaxation from work. When it goes beyond this it becomes dissipation, which is sinful. Games of chance are not sinful in themselves; they become sinful when they are used for the purpose of betting and gambling, for we are to make our living by productive work, not by outwitting our fellowman or obtaining his money without the return of an adequate equivalent (Acts 20:33, 35; Eph. 4:28; I Thess. 4:11, 12; II Thess. 3:10, 11; the Seventh Commandment). The fact that by overindulgence in such games the gambling instinct is easily developed, and the danger of giving offense to weaker brethren, make it advisable for the Christian as a rule to abstain from them. All pastimes and amusements come under the criterion of God's Word, Eccl. 11:9, "Know thou that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment."

Dancing as a modern and highly popular form of social amusement cannot be justified from examples in Scripture, and it is, to say the least, a questionable and often dangerous pastime, particularly in its modern forms which have a tendency to overemphasize the sexual attractions. D. M. Roan, a physician, says in his book, *Home, Church, and Sex*, "It stands to reason that contact as it is established while dancing by male and female facing each other in close approximation, the embrace, the necking, the wiggling of hips, the interposing of lower limbs so frequently seen, especially on the dance-floor in public dance halls, must for biological and physiological reasons stimulate the glandular secretions that control the sex urge" (p. 183). The fact that uncounted numbers of young people have fallen into a life of shame through dancing is a powerful indictment of this popular form of amusement (cf. Matt. 5:28; Jas. 1:15; the Sixth Commandment).

Social life requires a certain ornamentation. Just as each individual will present his best side, intellectually, to the other, so properly also externally. So long as such ornamentation does not violate the virtue of sincerity and purity, there is nothing unethical in it. Luxury is an application of the beautiful and agreeable beyond the limits of actual need; and it is only natural that special, festive occasions be distinguished by such super-abundance. It is justifiable, as distinguished from waste, by the ends which it serves and when it does not

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violate the fundamental prior obligation of Christian charity. So too, the question of truthfulness in personal dress and adornment must be decided on the fundamental principle of love, that is, whether the matter in question serves one's vanity and desire to attract attention, or is prompted by love which would spare others the offense of the ugly or disagreeable (I Cor. 16:14).

70
implying: dependent on Lady Luck, fate.
the Comm.
X and Y speaks as neighbors.

are responsible to God for what we do and what we have
it is protected by the 7th? Not my property, but the neighbors
X & Y protests my attitude, with heart against nei

*...a... of...
fruits of labor, to fight, battle for his lordship.*

CHAPTER XLIX

LABOR AND PROPERTY

When God created the first human beings, He gave them the earth as their dwelling place (Ps. 115:16), and every creature of the earth for their use and enjoyment. This dominant position in the world, however, man was not to hold without activity; even before the fall he was expected to work (Gen. 1:28, 29; 2:15; Ps. 8:6), and after the fall the rule obtains, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread" (Gen. 3:19). This divinely appointed appropriation and mastery of nature through human work is the basis of all human progress and civilization and of all cultural relationships of the various members of the human family with each other.

The conception of the dignity of labor is a distinctly Christian achievement. In the ancient world, labor, especially manual labor, was for slaves only; the free citizen devoted himself to intellectual pursuits and political activity. Even the Old Testament considers labor mainly as a burden and a wholesome discipline (Gen. 3:19; 5:29; Ps. 90:10; Eccl. 1:8, 13f.; 4:8; 6:7); at best, it recommends diligent work for prudential reasons and promises the reward of prosperity to those who do not shirk from daily toil (Prov. 12:24; 13:4; 31:13ff.; Ps. 128:2). The New Testament does not contradict these views, but it goes

beyond them, for it speaks of labor, not as a burden, nor simply as a discipline, nor even merely as a means of obtaining a livelihood, but as a really God-pleasing service, no matter how mean and lowly it may be, if only it is rendered in the fear and love of God (I Cor. 7: 20-22; Eph. 6:5-9; I Cor. 10:31; the parables of Jesus). In I Thess. 4:9-12 and II Thess. 3:6-13, the apostle Paul brings out several important thoughts concerning labor: It is the orderly manner of life for Christians, it is the only proper way to provide a living for themselves and those dependent upon them, and it is the means of enabling them to practice Christian charity (cf. Eph. 4:28). Summing up, we may say that the Christian conception of labor gives to it a peculiar dignity and worth, for honest labor affords the finest opportunity for the free development of a Christian personality, it makes possible the practical fulfillment of the second Great Commandment, and it constitutes a real bond of union between men and a means of co-operation in the great task assigned to humanity. Hence it is, too, that a Christian derives a real joy and satisfaction from his work, and a continued inspiration to perform his daily task with diligence and conscientious care. And having faithfully performed his allotted share of the common task, he joyfully and confidently looks forward to the "rest that remaineth to the people of God" (Hebr. 4:9).

Labor and property are correlative terms. While it is true that property may be rightfully acquired by

gift, by inheritance, or by original claim where public lands are still available, in most cases the property we own represents the fruit of some form of labor that goes beyond the barest and most immediate necessities of daily existence. Indeed, labor may be said to be the divinely ordained method of acquiring property (Gen. 1:28; Ps. 128:2; Prov. 13:4; II Thess. 3:10-12), and the accumulation of property is one of the blessings God bestows upon labor.

The unequal distribution of property or wealth among men is due in part to themselves, in part also to divine providence. Surely the lazy, the indolent, the shiftless, as well as those who are extravagant or careless in the management of their possessions must not expect to accumulate much of this world's goods, but they have no one to blame but themselves for their poverty. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that with equal effort and care, men will not become equally rich, not even those who apparently have the same opportunities and abilities. The Scripture teaches us that this *may* be due to divine providence, for God in his wisdom makes both poverty and riches to serve his purposes with the children of men (I Sam. 2:7; Matt. 26:11; Rom. 8:28). He that is poor without any fault of his own should therefore not look upon his poverty as an evidence of God's disfavor, while he that is rich should consider his riches as a sacred trust for the administration of which he will be held accountable.

For the correct understanding of the Christian view of property and wealth, it is important to remember that property, like all things material, belongs to the sphere of the purely natural, the things of this world. Accordingly, the making of laws and regulations concerning it, the definition of property rights, the setting up of economic systems, etc., all belong to the sphere of the state, not to the sphere of the church, which deals exclusively with spiritual things. Only insofar as the possession of material things may affect the spiritual life of man, and only to the extent to which material things are necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the kingdom of God on earth, does the New Testament teach a specific doctrine concerning property. This doctrine may be summed up in a series of ethical principles, by which the Christian should be guided in all questions pertaining to material wealth and property. They are the following:

1. Striving for material things must ever be subordinated to seeking the kingdom of God and his righteousness (Matt. 6:19f.). One who seeks first to satisfy the wants of the body acts like a heathen (Matt. 6:42) and becomes an idolater (v. 24). It is impossible to serve God and mammon.

2. Great wealth is in no wise worth striving for. It is dangerous to the soul, for it exposes to great and peculiar temptations, especially to false security and sinful pride (Matt. 19:22ff.; Luke 6:24; Mark 10:24; *and to make it*).

I Tim. 6:9, 17). It may easily hinder the seed of the divine Word from bearing fruit (Matt. 13:22).

3. All property, regardless of whether it has been obtained by gift, inheritance or by personal effort, is a sacred trust committed to the holder by God, who is the ultimate Owner of all. The holder is God's steward, who will be required to give an account of his stewardship (Luke 12:42; 16:1-13; I Pet. 4:10).

4. Accordingly the wealthy are required to use their riches in such a way as to "be rich in good works," in particular, to aid the needy (Luke 16:9; I Tim. 6:17-19; I John 3:17).

5. Every man should work in order to have the means to provide for his own (I Tim. 5:8), to support the work of the church (I Cor. 9:14; Gal 6:6; I Cor. 16:2), and to prove his brotherly love in Christian charity (Eph. 4:28; II Thess. 3:13).

6. The Christian is to be content with such things as he has and as he earns by his labors (I Tim. 6:8; Hebr. 13:5). The poor man who steals or is envious of the rich is just as bad as the rich man who hoards his wealth (I Cor. 6:10).

7. Every Christian must be ready at all times to give up all his possessions (I Cor. 7:30), whenever God demands it, especially when the possession of his heavenly treasures is endangered thereby, as in times of persecution (Matt. 19:29; 10:37). Cf. Meusel's *Handlexikon*, vol. II, p. 322.

In the performance of the common task to "subdue the earth" (Gen. 1:28), or, to speak in modern terms, in the active appropriation of nature to satisfy the wants of man, a large amount of co-operation is necessary. This leads to the setting up of a definite form of economic organization. Christianity favors neither the capitalistic, nor the socialistic, nor the communistic system. It does not attempt to prescribe something which is not a matter of faith but of the practical wisdom of those who are responsible for the material well-being of society. In keeping with the ethical principles outlined above, however, Christianity does oppose the moral wrongs that may develop under any economic system, such as the extreme, selfish individualism of the capitalistic organization, the class-hatred of socialism, and the complete suppression of the human personality in communism. Above all, Christianity opposes the tendency to complete secularization in all three of these systems as they are found today, which would rule God out entirely from this work-a-day world and enthrone either the human individual or human society as the master of its own fate. It is the duty of Christian citizens as "salt" and "light" to exert such influence everywhere that the economic organization deal fairly and justly with all, the rich as well as the poor, and in their own personal life and relationship with their fellowmen to exemplify the ethical principles concerning property and labor which their Christian religion inculcates.

of nations and none can be avoided
economic order develops social order.

not inclination 2. individual ability and aptitudes 3. guidance of parents etc.

by with real church work, not fear automation; must learn to offer.

CHAPTER I ORDER AND CALLINGS THE OCCUPATIONS

dominion over nature.

In the performance of the task assigned to the human race to "subdue the earth," human individuals follow a large variety of callings and occupations. The beginnings of this diversification may be seen in the first two sons of Adam (Gen. 4:2), but the idea itself no doubt is already implied in the "dominion" which man was to have over nature (Gen. 1:28). It was evidently originally intended by the Creator. The choice of a calling is a distinct prerogative of man as a free personality—animals have no calling.

All legitimate callings and occupations have a social value, for each contributes something to the common ends and aims and to the satisfaction of the common wants of humanity. Only by the association and co-operation of many is the individual enabled to pursue his calling, and only by such association and co-operation is the progress of the human race made possible. In this service which he thus renders to the community and to humanity the Christian finds the ethical value of his calling, for in the service he renders to his fellow-men he sees a service rendered to his God (I Pet. 4:10; Eph. 6:6; Col. 3:22, 23). The lack

of a regular calling or occupation, therefore, unless it is unavoidable as on account of sickness, age, unemployment, etc., is both unsocial and unethical and to be deprecated as a form of existence in which one does not contribute anything to society but only receives from it—a judgment which is corroborated by the observation that such individuals frequently become incapable and useless egotists (compare chapter XXXI.).

Everyone should choose a calling, even the independently rich. The rich man needs the discipline of a regular occupation to avoid becoming a "busybody" (II Thess. 3:11; cf. I Tim. 5:13) or an idler (Matt. 12:44). Everyone should serve his neighbor, everyone should share in the general task of humanity. The field of choice may be limited. It is true that a Christian society should recognize no "castes" and grant to everyone a free and full opportunity to follow his inclinations and make use of his talents. Yet the factors of birth, family, heredity, financial and other circumstances in practice do limit the choice, and the Christian should strive for contentment within these limitations (cf. I Cor. 7:20ff.; Gal. 3:28). There are certain providential leadings to be recognized, which as a rule are discernible in the special gifts and talents, and in special inclinations and aspirations. Finally, it is to be remembered that all legitimate callings are equally honorable before God, and that all differences are only relative (I Cor. 12:12ff.).

The various callings and occupations may be classified in two general groups, those having to do with the practical use and control of nature for the satisfaction of the economic wants of mankind, and those dealing with the ideal appropriation and enjoyment of nature in the science and arts.

Of the former the most ancient and universally honored is agriculture. It is preeminently the occupation of solid stability, the foundation of a nation's culture, without which no genuine prosperity and progress is possible. Herein lies its social value; its ethical importance is apparent from its characteristic virtues, faith and patience (Jas. 5:7).

While in the ancient world the agriculturist was always highly respected and the ancient Romans did not hesitate even to call their dictators from the plow, the trades and handicrafts were universally despised as occupations fit only for slaves and helots. The Israelites held a different view; here even the scholars as a rule were required to learn a trade. Paul was a tent-maker, and Jesus was known as the "carpenter's son" or the "carpenter." Christianity ennobled the trades and crafts; some of its first apostles were fishermen by trade, and its earliest converts in the heathen world were won among the slaves and the small tradesmen. During the Middle Ages the trade-guilds became the very backbone of Christian civilization, and in the Reformation period the homes of the artisans and craftsmen were the true nurseries of Christian piety.

Integrity of character and honest workmanship are the indispensable virtues of the artisan, and to be known as a "master" of his trade is still a high distinction.

Under the term commerce we may comprehend all those activities which serve the distribution of any kind of goods that supply human wants. In view of the highly complex forms of modern society those who engage in the various forms of commercial activity also render a useful and in fact indispensable service to their fellowmen and enjoy equal opportunities with the farmer and the artisan for the cultivation of Christian social virtues. The special temptations to fraud, usury, speculation, etc., must be overcome; strictest honesty and integrity in all business affairs will spring from a heart that is governed by the fear and love of God; and the very business of supplying human wants affords the Christian business man many opportunities for the practice of Christian charity, while the uncertainties of the future and the fluctuations of business conditions must remind him again and again to put his trust in Him alone who is above all changes and vicissitudes of this earthly life and who holds in his hand the destinies of the individual as well as of the nations.

One of the distinctive characteristics of our modern age is the remarkable development of large industrial concerns with an almost endless variety of highly specialized occupations. We are living in a machine age. We have learned how to harness the forces of nature and to press them into our service, and thus we

have taken a tremendous step forward toward the aim set for humanity when God said, "Subdue the earth." It cannot be denied that the development of the machine and its use in modern industry has brought uncounted blessings to man. But it has also brought new tasks, new difficulties, new problems, which must be solved ultimately in the spirit of Christ and the Gospel, if they are to be solved at all. All these tasks and problems can be summarized in the question, What is the right relationship between Capital and Labor?

The very use of these two abstract terms indicates the crux of the question. The development of the machine has brought about a radical change in the relationship between master and workman, between employer and employee. In the pre-machine age manufacture was usually carried on in small shops, generally connected directly with the home of the employer, who engaged only a small number of men to assist him in his work. These naturally entered into a very close personal relationship with the master, who was responsible not only for the technical training of his apprentices but also for their social and civic education and their personal wellbeing. Today we have production of goods on a gigantic scale in enormous factories, shops and plants, involving millions of dollars in capital investment. These investments are made by thousands of individuals who purchase the stocks and bonds of the corporations, and who as a rule have no other interest in the enterprise except a

reasonable financial return on their investment. The relation between these owners and the thousands of workers employed in the enterprise is naturally quite impersonal and the obligations of the former to the latter usually end with the paycheck. In other words, the highly personal relationship between the master and his workmen has now become a strictly impersonal one of capital and labor.

The effects of this change upon the workingman have been little short of disastrous. "Once under the system of slavery the master owned the worker; under serfdom he controlled him by owning the land upon which he subsisted as a dependent; under the present system the possessing class, by owning the factory, together with the natural resources, raw materials, credit, the land, and often the homes of the workers and their tools, has almost as effective control over the worker's means of livelihood as in the days of slavery or serfdom without any of the responsibility that went with the care of the slave or serf.—One of the worst results of our present system is the helpless dependence of the unskilled worker due to unemployment and insecurity of life. Indeed our system makes large-scale unemployment almost inevitable . . . A whole brood of other fears spring from the basic fear of unemployment. There is the fear of discharge and of unfair treatment because of his utter helplessness; the fear of tyrannical or capricious behavior of the employer or the boss; the fear of injustice; the fear

of injury or sickness; the fear of dependence with no voice in determining his wages, hours or conditions of work; the fear of reduction in standards of living and a score of other apprehensions that haunt the helpless poor" (Sherwood Eddy, *Religion and Social Justice*, p. 21f.).

But neither did those who represent the "capital" in these great industrial concerns escape the pernicious effects of the system. With hundreds, yes, thousands of men in their employ, necessarily separated from them by a long line of foremen, shop superintendents, department managers, and other officials, any personal contact with their workingmen is practically impossible. The stockholders clamor for dividends; the controlling motive of the whole enterprise is profit, the making of money. How great, how almost irresistible, then, becomes the temptation ruthlessly to disregard the health and well-being of the workers, to reduce the wage scale to the lowest possible minimum that will "buy" the necessary "labor" to man and operate the machines, to exact the largest possible amount of work from the workers by most ingenious "speeding-up" devices that keep them under a constant nervous tension and transform living personalities into mechanical automatons! We are well aware of the fact that among our great industrialists there have been and are today some individuals who are honestly determined to deal justly with their workers and to conduct their business in such a way as to be found

faithful stewards of God on the last day. But the very fact that such men stand out so prominently in their efforts to correct or counteract the evils of our industrial system indicates the seriousness of the situation. The present relation between capital and labor may be described as nothing short of a state of war, in which, as in all wars, every means whether fair or foul is employed to gain the victory.

It is not within the province of Christian Ethics to devise or endorse any particular economic or industrial system. The relation between employer and employee is a purely human relationship, which may conceivably be regulated by the state which is responsible for the safeguarding of the rights of its citizens and the promotion of their physical wellbeing, but in which the church, which is charged with the care and cure of souls, has no jurisdiction. But it is within the province of Christian Ethics to point out the fundamental principles on which all industrial relationships should rest according to the Word of God. The first of these principles is the inherent worth of human personality. Whether a man is rich or poor, a great industrialist or a humble workingman in his factory, he is a human being made after the image of God and endowed with inalienable rights, of which no social institution, no industrial organization, has a right to deprive him. Another principle is the universal obligation arising from the unity of the human race to be our "brother's keeper." We *are* responsible before

God for the welfare of our fellowmen, to the extent to which it is possible for us to promote that welfare. A third principle is the stewardship of all earthly goods, including wealth, power, time, ability, opportunity. Every man must some day give an account of his stewardship, including also the use he has made of his money, time, talents, and opportunities in the industrial relationships. A fourth is the undeniable principle of elementary justice that "the laborer is worthy of his hire," a hire not simply barely sufficient to assure his physical existence, but one that will enable him to establish and maintain a home, raise a family, and look forward to the evening of his life with equanimity and confidence; a hire, too, that is in some proportion to the economic value of his service to the community. And finally, the right of private property may be mentioned. Deny that right, and the human personality will be stunted, the responsibility for the neighbor's welfare could not be discharged, the duty of stewardship would become meaningless, and the laborer's reward an illusion.

But more than that. The very fact that the church is charged with the spiritual care of man should remind her of her duty to raise her voice in solemn warning against the peculiar dangers and temptations that arise from the present industrial system and to point out the "more excellent way" (I Cor. 12:31). Then, fully persuaded that the best way to improve social conditions is to improve the persons who make

the conditions, the church must never cease in her efforts to Christianize the wealthy capitalist and the powerful industrialist, as well as the lowly laborer and the humble workingman. She must guard against the appearance of being only a "rich man's church," in which the poor and lowly have no place; and she must likewise make it plain to all that earthly wealth and prominence do not in themselves make a man unfit for the kingdom of God. In view of the deplorable physical and spiritual conditions so widely prevalent among the working people in our great industrial cities, she must develop an aggressive missionary activity in such centers, to bring the Gospel of peace and love to those whose souls are starving for the bread of life and whose minds are poisoned with the bitterness of their economic struggle. She must regain the confidence of the working classes, not by setting herself up as a political champion of their rights against their oppressors, but by a consistent spiritual ministry of serving love. Meanwhile Christian citizens everywhere must take their civic duties very seriously by personally doing what they can to secure a greater measure of social and economic justice in accordance with the principles set forth above, and by supporting every measure taken by local, state and national governments to bring about such reforms as in the best judgment of economists and statesmen give promise of ameliorating the present industrial crisis.

When God said to the human race, "Subdue the earth," He intended not only that man should exercise control over nature for the practical purpose of sustaining this physical life, but also that he should penetrate ever more deeply into the understanding of its inner principles, its laws, its structure and its history, thus making possible its ever increasing appropriation for the various uses of man as well as its ever fuller enjoyment as God's gift to his highest creature. This intellectual penetration of nature on the part of man began even before the fall (Gen. 2:19, 20), and in the history of the human race it has resulted in the development of a variety of cultural occupations and professions which we may comprehend in the general categories of sciences and arts.

The scientific professions are those engaged either in the discovery and systematic coordination of new facts of human knowledge, as by research, exploration, or invention; or in the communication of such knowledge to others, as by teaching, writing, lecturing; or in the direct application of such knowledge in various ways for the benefit of humanity, as in the practice of medicine or law, in technology, and in a certain sense also in the ministry. Quite frequently these various pursuits overlap to some extent, for example, an explorer may also be a writer or lecturer; one engaged in scientific research may at the same time be a teacher; and a practicing physician may materially increase the sum total of medical knowledge by his research and

experimentations. The social as well as the ethical value of these professions is apparent without further argument. It is chiefly through the scientific professions that humanity has reached its present stage of civilization, and the services rendered by the various sciences in the extension of the kingdom of God on earth are incalculable.

It is worthy of notice that the New Testament does not pronounce any ethical judgment concerning scientific pursuits as such. When in I Corinthians 1 and 2 the apostle Paul sets up a sharply pointed antithesis between divine and human wisdom, or when he warns his readers in Colossians 2:8 not to let any man "spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit," or in I Corinthians 8:1 speaks of knowledge that "puffeth up," he has in mind, not science and knowledge as such, but the supercilious, conceited wisdom of this world that has nothing but contempt for the simple Gospel of Christ, as in Corinth, or the incipient dualistic-gnostic philosophy that enchanted the intellectuals at Colosse and threatened to deceive the very disciples of Christ. Against such wisdom the Apostle did well to warn his Christians, for that was the "science falsely so called which some professing have erred concerning the faith" (I Tim. 6:20); but certainly we are not justified in concluding that all science, all scientific pursuits stand condemned by such passages of the New Testament. On the other hand, when this same apostle Paul admonishes his Christians

not to be "children in understanding" (I Cor. 14:20), or when he prays that they "might be filled with the knowledge of His will in all wisdom and spiritual understanding . . . increasing in the knowledge of God" (Col. 1:9, 10), or when the apostle Peter urges his readers to "grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ" (II Pet. 3:18), we can say at least this that the intellectual penetration and appropriation of that which has become the content of our religious faith is not foreign to the spirit of Christianity but rather a natural activity of it, in which we should continue to advance until that great day when we shall "be like Him" and "shall see Him as He is" (I John 3:2), Him, that is, in whom "dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. 2:9) and "in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (v. 3). And if the deeper penetration into the mysteries of the spiritual world is a God-pleasing and desirable thing, then certainly a similar penetration by God's children into the mysteries of this creature-world, which after all is still God's world, must also be in accordance with the purposes of Him who has endowed us with the divine faculties of reason and understanding and has given us the earth for our possession.

There are some very real temptations to which the scientific professions are exposed and against which the scientist must be constantly on guard. One of these is, to forget the limitations of his chosen field

and to pretend a knowledge much wider than he really has. To be sure, in the last analysis all science is one, and the scholar cannot hope to master his own field without constantly reaching out into related subjects. But that genius is yet to be born who can truthfully say that he has mastered all knowledge; and he who pretends to a knowledge which he does not really command and speaks with bold assurance of things which after all he does not understand, is only a fool despite his scholarly erudition, a caricature of a true scholar.

Another temptation to be scrupulously avoided is the danger of confusing theories with facts, or to assume certain conclusions without having marshalled all the evidence necessary for such conclusions and then to give out as an "assured result of science" something which at best is only a more or less workable hypothesis. The true scientist, like the true Christian, must not "think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but think soberly" (Rom. 12:3).

But perhaps the greatest danger for the scientist, especially the student of natural science, is the difficulty so frequently experienced of harmonizing the conclusions of his science with the divine revelation in the Word of God. Let him beware of rashly concluding that unless he can make his science and his Scripture agree, one must necessarily be discarded; it may be that he "knows only in part" and therefore "prophecies only in part" (I Cor. 13:9). Let the scientist, who is

also a Christian, see to it first of all that he continue in the intimate personal relationship of a child with his heavenly Father and walk humbly before Him in reverent humility and loving obedience; then let him proceed confidently along the highway of science even though for the present he cannot see the converging of the two ways in the ultimate oneness of truth. And let him beware of that intellectual stupor and dumb devotion which gazes in mute adoration into the study of the scholar and the laboratory of the scientist, as though the last word ever to be spoken must necessarily come from there. That, too, is a form of deification of man, which is idolatry. Christians must learn to bear the incongruities between a smugly self-satisfied science and the divine revelation with equanimity and patience. *Verbum Dei manet in aeternum!*

The artistic professions, like the scientific, are highly cultural occupations. While the scientist is primarily concerned with the discovery, the proclamation, and the application of *truth*, and thus enriches the human race by extending its intellectual dominion over the world, the artist discovers for us the world of *the beautiful*, and by its sensuous presentations makes possible for us a larger emotional enjoyment of our heritage.

While art, like science, has its source in the inherent endowments of human nature bestowed upon it by the Creator, the history of mankind shows that the home of art is in religion. And naturally so, for there

is undoubtedly a close affinity between them. Every religion feels the necessity of giving expression to its abstract thoughts and ideals in sensuous form, and the dignity of religion requires that they be garbed in forms that are beautiful. What magnificent services does not art render to Christianity! It builds our cathedrals; it carves for us in stone the mighty heroes of the past; it spreads before our eyes on canvas or plaster the most inspiring scenes of our sacred lore; it stirs us to the very depths of our being with the mighty chords of the organ and with the word of sacred song. On the other hand, it was only through Christianity that the various arts have reached their highest stage of development, for Christianity has given to art both its most worthy subjects and its finest inspiration.

Yet we do not mean to say that all art, in order to be worthy of the name, must be directly connected with religion. There is beauty everywhere in God's creation, and it is the privilege of the artist to discover for us that beauty and to help us to its appreciation and enjoyment. But all art, in order to accomplish this purpose, must be ideally true and chaste, that is, it must present in chaste, pure form that higher ideal of truth which is really contained in the subject, freed from the accidental obscurities by which it is clouded in actual life. And from a Christian point of view, it must be added that all art should also be moral, that is, it should present that which alone has true and

absolute value in human life (cf. Martensen, *Social Ethics*, p. 251). True art never degrades, never stimulates the baser passions of our sinful human nature, but on the contrary it acts as a sort of emotional katharsis purging and purifying and ennobling the inner man.

It is by standards such as these that the Christian must judge all artistic professions as well as all artistic presentations and productions, especially in this day and age when so much of what is offered under the name of "art" is really nothing but trash unworthy of any serious consideration, and much is even worse. He will carefully guard his home and family against the pernicious, degrading influence of the modern type of "jazz" music, of literature that at best is shallow, enervating, and distorted in its view of life and at worst is downright pornographic in content, and of motion pictures and stage productions that come under the same condemnation; and he will actively encourage and support every constructive effort to cultivate a taste for true art both in his own home and in his community.

are seen in ground (4) heathen practice
: considered wrong biblically
2:1 Burning bodies
6:10
cremation was abolished by Christians -
Esau are the mark are taken for cremation -
makes a confession of faith; faith in it and the Resurrection

more fr. humanity
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short. - outlast

that the short coming of life.
Time not good human.
man moves the future and future for
by time, & day after day & year

PART III

THE CONSUMMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

CHAPTER LI

THE CONSUMMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AS IT IS PREPARED FOR BY A BLESSED DEATH

There is no absolute consummation of the Christian life here on earth, because here there is no complete sinlessness and no perfect holiness, notwithstanding all the claims of old and new perfectionists, Phil. 3:12-14; I Tim. 1:15. Much as the old man may lose of his power over the Christian in the struggle of sanctification, much as he may be forced to the periphery of the Christian life, he is still present to the very moment of death and in some manner continues to make his presence felt; so that particularly the mature Christian longs for the time when the old man shall be put off forever, Rom. 7:24.

To be sure, death in itself does not bring about the consummation, for physical death is a part of God's judgment of wrath, to which all men are subject since the fall of Adam (Rom. 5:12; 6:23). It is neither the natural termination of life, comparable to the falling and shrivelling of the ripened fruit of a tree or to the expiration of the flame of a lamp when the oil supply is exhausted, as the materialists opine. Nor is it a self-evident guarantee of entrance into a higher

form of existence, as the superficial thinkers so frequently imagine. Even the fact that the human life-spirit is a divine breath that came forth from the mouth of the Creator does not prove the continuation of human personality after death with absolute certainty, and least of all man's final consummation. For when it is frequently asserted that "the finite must ultimately pass over into the infinite, since without such consummation human life would be a struggle without a victory, a career without a goal," such arguments prove nothing because they prove too much. For certainly human life is not in every case a struggle nor a striving toward a goal. Such a hope can have a firm foundation only when that which is hoped for is already present in its beginnings here in this life before death.

On the contrary, death is something foreign to the nature of man as created by God. It is the intervention of a hostile power, an unnatural, violent experience that causes a rent in the entire being. It is only through sin that death has become in a certain sense the natural termination of life, but one that causes the living to shudder when he thinks of it. It is not idle talk when we speak of death as the king of terrors who brings all things under his gloomy sway and dissolves what seemed inseparably united. For that reason there is a certain fear of death permeating the entire natural world, especially the human race (Hebr. 2:15). In the case of the unbeliever, physical death is only a manifestation of that death which has

already been present within him for some time, it is the end of his time of grace, the entrance of the soul into the preliminary state of damnation or the "second death" (Rev. 2:11); all of which reveals the essential nature of death as the severance of the ties that unite man with Him who is the ultimate source of all life, that is, God.

It is only when one has come to faith in the Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, that he can look upon death in a different light. Indeed, even such a one is not by nature free from the fear of death. We read not only of King Hezekiah, who certainly had done that which was right and good in the sight of the Lord, that he chattered like a crane or a swallow and did mourn as a dove (Isa. 38:14) in his fear that he must die, but we know that even Jesus looked forward with dread to the baptism of his passion (Luke 12:50; Hebr. 5:7), and that in Gethsemane He quaked and trembled in his agony as He faced the certainty of his approaching death. For death was completely repugnant to his nature. To be sure, we have before us here an experience entirely unique, but nevertheless there was something that our Savior had in common with all men including us Christians. We need not try to deny this natural fear of death in us or to harden ourselves stoically against it, but we must overcome it even as Jesus overcame it, so that eventually we shall not be afraid but rather ready and willing to die.

Besides this natural fear of death the Christian on his deathbed may experience another kind of fear, the fear that his death will place him before the judgment seat of God and may lead him to damnation. At such a time the memory of long forgotten sins may be revived; the whole life of the past will be reviewed in a light which may reveal even that as sin which until now we had considered good; Satan may approach the child of God and reclaim him as his own in view of such revelations; the soul may become terrified even to the very verge of despair of its eternal salvation. Now is the time, if ever, when the Christian must cling to the Word of Jesus, the Word of his redemption from sin, death, and the devil; and he who now holds before that tortured soul the great and mighty words of the cleansing power of the blood of Christ and the protecting strength of the exalted Redeemer, will render such a person the greatest possible service. For it is precisely at such critical times as this that the great truth of justification by grace alone for the sake of Christ through faith will exert its full beneficent power.

The Christian who clings to that truth and embraces the Christ who is truly present in that Word, will also overcome this deadly fear. He will learn quietly to wait upon God from whom cometh his salvation; he will come to a new realization of his safety in the hands of Jesus from which no man is able or will dare to pluck him (John 10:28), and of the love of God from which nothing can separate him (Rom.

8:31-39). He is mindful of the covenant of grace which God established with him in Holy Baptism and which stands immovable (Isa. 54:10), and he may also find further assurance of his eternal salvation, and strength and nourishment for his soul on the walk through the valley of the shadow of death by partaking of the body and blood of his Savior in Holy Communion. The sting of death, that by which it wounds and injures us, according to I Cor. 15:56 is sin and the curse of the law that follows it; but since through Christ we have been redeemed from the curse of the law (Gal. 3:13) and by his blood our sins have been covered (I John 2:2), death has lost its sting for us. In this way that which for the unbeliever is a judgment over sin becomes for him who believes in Christ a bridge unto life, the entrance to his consummation; instead of a terrifying loss, death is to him rather an inestimable blessed gain (Phil. 1:21).

Now the art of faith in the face of death consists in these two things: to view the past only as covered up with Christ's blood and righteousness, and with reference to the future not to let the mind become centered on grave and decay but to have it wing its flight beyond death and grave to a blessed eternity where a new world opens to the view with all its glory. Thus did Jesus do on the eve of his passion, as his last discourses recorded by John plainly show. He did not center his mind upon his death as such, but he spoke of it as a going home to the Father and to the

glory awaiting Him there. And Paul during his very imprisonment in Rome became so thoroughly at home in the thought of his eternal dwelling place, his *πολίτευμα* in heaven (Phil. 3:20), his being present with the Lord (II Cor. 5:8), his life in never ending communion with Christ, that his soul was filled with longing to depart (*ἀναλῦσαι*), to cut the last cable that still holds the ship in port, to strike the tent and complete the last stretch of the homeward journey. He can hardly find words enough to express the thought that such a death would be far, far better (*πολλῷ μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον*) than to abide in the flesh (Phil. 1:23). It is this contemplation of heavenly glory that has given birth to those beautiful hymns of eternal life in our church. They are all written to the music of the final consummation. And the Scripture itself speaks not only of being gathered with the fathers (Gen. 35:20; 49:29; Deut. 32:50), of the righteous coming to their rest (Isa. 57:2; Rev. 14:13), of falling asleep (II Sam. 7:12; I Thess. 4:13; I Cor. 15:20), of striking the tent (Phil. 1:23), of being unclothed (II Cor. 5:4), but also of waiting for and hastening toward the Lord, of coming home from a strange land, of entering our eternal abode, where we shall be permitted to see our Lord as He is (Rom. 8:28; Tit. 2:13; II Pet. 3:13; Rom. 8:25; Gal 5:5; Hebr. 9:28; John 14:1-3), and of being glorified in his image, which after all is only the final consummation (Rom. 8:29; I John 3:2).

One who thus accustoms himself even in the face of death to live in the future consummation, will experience even here a more definite detachment from earthly things, a more incisive separation from sin; it may even be that something like a ray of blissful eternity will fall upon the final hours of his life, until in the actual moment of death God himself will make an end of the old and bring on the consummation with his mighty hand. This body of sin and death will sink into the grave, but the justified soul is carried into the realm of consummation.

CHAPTER LII

THE CONSUMMATION OF THE SOUL IN THE INTERMEDIATE STATE

Does the soul really continue its existence after death, or is the contention of the ancient (Book of Wisdom 2:1ff.) and modern materialists correct when they deny this on the basis of the claim that there is no independent soul-life at all but only perhaps a certain phosphorescence of the brain? Ancient and modern philosophers, to prove the continuation of the soul after death, have pointed to the fact that the soul is not a composite being and that only composites can be dissolved (Plato); or to the plasticity of the soul which demands a *progressus ad infinitum*; or to the consensus in this respect of all branches of the human race; or to the apparitions of souls after death, etc. But more convincing are the facts of experience which demand the self-existence of the soul-life and thus at the same time serve as proofs for the immortality of the soul: the fact of the struggle between body and mind and the control of the body by mind; the fact that the motion of physical atoms can never produce anything else but a physical movement; the fact that with all the changes of tissue in the human body including

the brain there is an unbroken continuity of self-consciousness; the fact that man can originate concepts which cannot possibly have their source in material substance, such as the concept of an immaterial spirit, or the infinite and eternal. Nevertheless the faith of the Christian does not rest upon those theories of the philosophers nor upon these facts of experience, important as they are for apologetic purposes. The Christian's conviction concerning the continued existence of the soul rests upon the unequivocal promise of his God which is more than all the conclusions of philosophy and more effective than all the facts of experience. In addition, he has in the new spiritual life itself which has been awakened in him by his regeneration, the beginning and the pledge of an eternal life. This beginning would be without meaning and purpose if there were no consummation to follow, in which the old Adam is entirely eradicated and the image of God in man is completely restored. Our present state of grace is an earnest of our blessed future (John 5:24; 6:47; 6:54; 11:25; I John 5:11f.; Col. 3:4; Rom. 8:24).

Concerning the state of the soul after death the Scripture does not say much, for its outlook in general is beyond the intermediate state toward the complete consummation after the resurrection of the body. But whatever little it does tell us is enough to fill us with joy and comfort concerning that state. Perhaps the chief passage to be considered is Luke 23:43. This

passage absolutely contradicts the Roman conception of a purgatory, for even the life of a malefactor can according to this passage be so purified by Christ that the soul can at once enter into paradise without being required first to go through a process of purification; moreover, there is an unmistakable emphasis here upon the fact that the believing soul is permitted at once, in the very moment of death, to enter into the state of blissful communion with God. The first part of Rev. 14:13 belongs here only if ἀπάρτι is to be construed with μακάριοι, meaning that those who die in the Lord are blessed from the very moment of death. Phil 1:23 is more clearly to be adduced. For here the state into which the soul enters in the moment of death appears as a state of being with Christ, because to Paul the departing and the being with Christ are evidently coincident experiences (again a refutation of Rome's view). The state of the soul after death is also referred to in II Cor. 5:1-9, where the apostle speaks of being unclothed in death as distinguished from being clothed upon or transformed in this life. Though to the apostle the state of being unclothed according to Phil 1:23 is the state of blessedness, he nevertheless would prefer being clothed upon in this life, and accordingly the latter condition appears to him the more desirable. However, here too he speaks of the state of the believing soul after death as a "being at home with the Lord." Most certainly the second part of Rev. 14:13 belongs here, where those who have

died in the Lord are said to be in a state of blissful rest.

Thus the state which because it comes between death and resurrection is commonly called the intermediate state consists in being unclothed, wherefore all external activity necessarily ceases while an all the more abundant inner life begins. Earthly self-activity and the direct relation to the world must come to an end because the soul lacks the body as the instrument for such activity. The soul now lives in communion with the Lord in a state of rest and in freedom from sin and evil, a state in which as it were it digests the impressions received in this earthly life and in which the wounds inflicted by sin can heal completely. If we should say that sanctifying influences perhaps still go out upon the soul from its communion with Christ, influences by which the sinful *habitus* (which is still found in the dying believer despite the fact of his justification in the moment of death, for we know that justification means a change of relationship and not of *habitus*) is removed, that would not imply a diminution but rather an intensification of its communion with God for the soul that has died in faith. While in Rev. 6:9-11 a waiting of the martyred souls for God's final judgment is spoken of, we dare not generalize that passage so as to include the souls of all who have died in faith, neither is the conclusion justified that there is something lacking in the soul's communion with the Lord. Certainly the souls have not lost

their interest in what befalls their brethren here on earth or in the affairs of the kingdom of God in this present world, on the contrary, they observe the progress of that kingdom with longing for its final consummation (compare besides Rev. 6:10 also Luke 16), but insofar as their communion with God is concerned this waiting does not indicate a deficiency.

And yet the intermediate state is still a state of only preliminary consummation, for as yet the body is not reunited with the soul. The Christian's hope is by no means merely the hope of a continuation of the life of the soul, of immortality in that sense. That indeed was all that Rationalism was able to save from the wreck of the Christian faith in Biblical eschatology, though it soon began to elaborate it in a sentimental and phantastic manner. Neither does the Christian's hope anticipate only a blissful communion of the soul with God. But the Christian's expectation of the future life includes the definite conviction of the resurrection of the body, in order that body and soul may rejoice in the living God. For this hope he has the clear and definite Word of God as a firm foundation (Dan. 12:2; John 5:28, 29; Acts 24:15; II Cor. 5:10; John 11:25f.; I Cor. 15, etc.). While this resurrection of the body is still in the future, therefore, the consummation can only be a preliminary one. The body is not only the companion of the soul, united with which it has lived through the span of this earthly life, but by

the very act of God's creation the two belong together as the two halves of the human being. It was Luther in particular who always emphasized the corporeity of man over against every kind of foolish spiritualism, and who knew of no other complete consummation but a consummation of body and soul. In the intermediate state, then, this absence of the body means for the soul of the believer an actual want, yet a want that recedes completely behind the vision of God and actual communion with Him.

CHAPTER LIII

THE FINAL CONSUMMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AS TO BODY AND SOUL IN ETERNAL LIFE

With the return of Christ the resurrection of the bodies and their reunion with the souls takes place (John 5:25-29). Thus the want mentioned in the preceding chapter is removed and the consummation is in every way complete. Body and soul now rejoice in the living God. The goal which God had set in creation and again in regeneration has been attained. Consummation, that is, holiness and glory, is there. While the powers of renewal included in faith here on earth have been unfolded only in part, they now blossom forth in all their eternal beauty and also bring about the glorification of the body. This holiness radiating outward from within is glory. All conflict between the flesh and the spirit is now removed and perfect internal harmony prevails. But there is also a most perfect external harmony, harmony with God and fellowmen. And all this harmony is the source of never-ending bliss. That which is true of the church, that it is to be presented without spot or wrinkle (Eph. 5:27), is true also of each individual, even as the individual is brought to this goal as a member of the whole church. This consummation will be more than a return to the beginning, not only because in place of the one Adam there will now be an

entire humanity, but also because the consummation of each individual will be more than the original endowment given in creation. Not only has every evil and ungodly element with all its consequences been eliminated from each individual, but every one has stood the test, though perhaps not without many a fall, in which Adam failed. Not only has that been accomplished which God made possible in creation, but also that which God wanted man to attain by way of the test. The divine counsel of grace is now realized: God has a people that with body and soul lives only unto Him in all eternity and is blessed in such a life, a people upon which He can shower all the fullness of his glory unceasingly to their ever increasing happiness.

In view of such a consummation the Christian can only pray that God may help him to preserve and develop the Christian life which by the creative power of his grace He has produced in him, in order that He may finally bestow upon him this blessed consummation. But the anticipation of it will also give him courage and strength not to hesitate or falter in the way and thus eventually to miss the goal.

Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which according to his abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you (I Pet. 1:3, 4)!

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 ISRAELITES - RESPECTS RELIGION, BUT DOESN'T PARTICIPATE IN
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 SEMITES - KNOWS GOD AND RESPECTS HIM

WORSHIP

BODY & SEX - MISUSE OF SEX

NOT SENSUAL, KNOWS GOD AND RESPECTS IT.
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